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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the impact of tax policy of firm
behavior. The first chapter uses new well-level production data on California oil wells
and after-tax producer prices to estimate how temporary taxes affect oil production
decisions. Theory suggests that temporary taxes could lead producers to shut wells,
and more generally that they create strong incentives for retiming extraction of the
exhaustible resource to minimize tax burdens. The empirical estimates suggest small
estimates of extensive responses to after-tax prices, meaning that wells are rarely shut,
but they also suggest substantial retiming of production for operating wells. While
the estimates vary with specifications, the elasticity of oil production with respect
to the after-tax price is estimated to fall between 0.208 and 0.261. The estimates
are used to calibrate a simple model of the efficiency cost of tax-induced distortions
relative to the no-tax optimal extraction path. Calculations suggest that a 15 percent
temporary excise tax on California oil producers reduces the present value of producer
surplus by between one and five percent of the no-tax surplus or between 113 and 166
percent of the government revenue raised, depending on the original life of the well
and the duration of the temporary tax.
The second chapter examines the impact of the federal R&D tax credit on re-
search spending during the 1981-1991 period using both publicly available data from
10-Ks and confidential data from federal corporate tax returns. The key advance
on previous work is the use of an instrumental variables strategy based on tax law
changes that addresses the potential simultaneity between R&D spending and its user
cost. The results yield a range of estimates for the effect of tax incentives on R&D
investment. Estimates using only publicly available data suggest that a ten percent
tax subsidy for R&D yields on average between $3.5 (0.24) million and $10.7 (1.79)
million in new R&D spending per firm. Estimates from IRS SOI data suggest that a
ten percent reduction in the usercost would lead the average firm to increase qualified
spending by $2.0 (0.39) million. Estimates from the much smaller merged sample
suggest that qualified spending is responsive to the tax subsidy. A similar response
in total spending is not statistically discernible in the merged sample. The inconsis-
tency of estimates across datasets, instrument choice and specifications highlights the
sensitivity of estimates of the tax-price elasticity of R&D spending.
How a corporate tax reform will affect a firms reported earnings in the year of its
enactment, and how the firm may choose to react to the tax reform, depend in part
on the sign and magnitude of the firms net deferred tax position. The final chapter,
written jointly with Jim Poterba and Jeri Seidman, compiles new disaggregated de-
ferred tax position data for a sample of large U.S. firms between 1993 and 2004. These
data are used to assess the size and composition of deferred tax assets and liabilities
and their magnitudes relative to the book-tax income gap. We find that temporary
differences account for a substantial share of the book-tax income gap. The key con-
tributors to the increase in the book-tax gap include mark-to-market adjustments,
property and valuation allowances. In interpreting the data we collect on deferred
tax assets and liabilities in the context of the behavioral incentives surrounding a tax
rate change, we find that a pre-announced reduction in the corporate tax rate would
give a third of the firms in our sample to a strong incentive to accelerate income to
the high-tax period, contrary to typical expectations that fail to take deferred tax
positions into account.
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The provisions of the U.S. tax code by design and by effect influence corporate
decision-making. Taxes on and subsidies for particular corporate activities lead to
disparate tax treatment of different production and spending decisions, altering the
incentives to engage in certain economic activities. Evaluating the effectiveness of any
subsidy provision or the cost of any tax provision hinges critically on the underlying
tax-price elasticities of production and investment decisions. The chapters of this dis-
sertation generate empirical estimates of the short-to-medium run effects of changes
to different aspects of corporate tax policy. The first two chapters estimate behav-
ioral elasticities directly, using plausibly exogenous variation in the after-tax prices
faced by firms. The third essay uses newly collected data and calibration to assess
the behavioral response of firms to a hypothetical tax change typically considered by
policymakers.
The first chapter uses new well-level production data on California oil wells for
the period 1977-2008, along with rich variation in producer prices induced by federal
oil taxes and pre-1980 price controls, to estimate how temporary taxes affect oil pro-
duction decisions. Because oil is an exhaustible resource, the effects of excise taxes on
production may be more complex than in many other markets. Theory suggests that
temporary taxes could lead producers to shut wells, and more generally that they cre-
ate strong incentives for retiming production to minimize tax burdens. The empirical
estimates suggest small extensive responses to changes in after-tax prices, meaning
that wells are rarely shut, but they also suggest substantial retiming of production
for operating wells. While the estimates vary with specifications, the elasticity of
oil production with respect to the after-tax price is estimated to fall between 0.208
and 0.261. The estimates are used to calibrate a simple model of the efficiency cost
of tax-induced distortions relative to the no-tax optimal extraction path. The cali-
bration takes into account the exhaustible nature of oil reserves. Because California
oil producers, like all U.S. oil producers, are price-takers, the efficiency cost of tax-
induced distortions falls solely on producers. Calculations suggest that a 15 percent
temporary excise tax on California oil producers reduces the present value of producer
surplus by between one and five percent of the no-tax surplus or between 113 and
166 percent of the government revenue raised, depending on the original life of the
well and the duration of the temporary tax. Temporary excise taxes appear to curtail
extraction along the intensive margin, reducing producer surplus but not triggering
early shut-in.
The second chapter examines the impact of the federal R&D tax credit on research
spending during the 1981-1991 period using both publicly available data from financial
filings and confidential IRS data from federal corporate tax returns. The key advance
on previous work is the use of an instrumental variables strategy based on tax law
changes that addresses the potential simultaneity between R&D spending and its
user cost. The results yield a range of estimates for the effect of tax incentives on
R&D investment. Estimates using only publicly available data suggest that a ten
percent tax subsidy for R&D yields on average between $3.5 (0.24) million and $10.7
(1.79) million in new R&D spending per firm. Estimates from IRS SOI data, which
only reports qualified research expenditures, suggest that a ten percent reduction
in the usercost would lead the average firm to increase qualified spending by $2.0
(0.39) million. Analysis of the components of qualified research spending shows that
wages and supplies, which comprise the bulk of qualified spending, account for the
increase in research spending. Estimates from the much smaller merged sample,
which makes use of the more precise tax data to calculate the tax. component of
the user cost, suggest that qualified spending is responsive to the tax subsidy. A
similar response in total spending is not statistically discernible in the merged sample.
The inconsistency of estimates across datasets, instrument choice and specifications
highlights the sensitivity of estimates of the tax-price elasticity of R&D spending.
Changes in tax policy can also generate incentives for firms to re-time their recog-
nition of income. A firms deferred tax position, which reflects the estimated future
tax effects attributable to past temporary differences between book and tax income,
affects the impact of tax changes on the firm. How a corporate tax reform will affect
a firms reported earnings in the year of its enactment, and how the firm may choose
to react to the tax reform, depend in part on the sign and magnitude of the firms
net deferred tax position. In particular, the disparate impacts of tax reform on firms
with net deferred tax assets and liabilities create different incentives to re-time the
recognition of income before and after an announced corporate tax rate change. The
final chapter, written jointly with Jim Poterba and Jeri Seidman, compiles new dis-
aggregated deferred tax position data for a sample of large U.S. firms between 1993
and 2004. These data are used to assess the size and composition of deferred tax
assets and liabilities and their magnitudes relative to the book-tax income gap. We
then analyze the incentives created by these positions for retiming income around tax
changes. We find that temporary differences account for a substantial share of the
book-tax income gap. The key contributors to the increase in the book-tax gap in-
clude mark-to-market adjustments, property, including leases and both tangible and
intangible property, and valuation allowances. In interpreting the data we collect on
deferred tax assets and liabilities in the context of the behavioral incentives surround-
ing a tax rate change, we find that a pre-announced reduction in the corporate tax
rate would give a third of the firms in our sample to a strong incentive to accelerate
income to the high-tax period, contrary to typical expectations that fail to take de-
ferred tax positions into account. Although we are unable to gauge how much income
would be shifted in response to such incentives, the nontrivial share of firms affected
by such an incentive suggests that policy-makers should consider the revenue impact
of income shifting when they estimate the short-run revenue effect of a change in the
statutory corporate tax rate.
Taken together, the results presented here suggest that the tax policy changes
examined had real effects on corporate economic activity in the cases of the windfall
profit tax and the R&D tax credit and that there is ample scope for income retiming
driven by incentives created by deferred tax positions. These empirical conclusions
are based on short-to-medium run time horizons. Whether tax policy leads to long-
term or permanent differences in economic behavior rather than just leading firms to
re-time their activities to minimize their tax burdens is an important open question
I hope to address in future work.
Chapter 1
Taxation and the Extraction of
Exhaustible Resources: Evidence
From California Oil Production
1.1 Introduction
Steep increases in oil prices often bring with them renewed calls to levy additional
taxes on the oil industry. Most recently the rapid run-up in prices during 2008 led
to legislative proposals and campaign trail discussions of new "windfall profit" taxes.
Advocates of such taxes argue that the upfront drilling investments necessary for
current production were made during periods of much lower prices and that profits
from such investments are an unearned "windfall." Critics counter that additional
taxes may have deleterious effects on domestic oil production, leading to increased
U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The consequences of these types of taxes hinge crit-
ically on how producers respond to changes in after-tax price. The effects of taxes
on the extraction of exhaustible resources like oil may be of increasing importance as
proposals to tax fossil fuels emerge as part of the climate change debate.
Despite the importance of estimates of the elasticity of U.S. supply for assessing
the impact of policy changes like the decontrol of oil prices in the late 1970s or current
policy considerations like the levying of new oil industry taxes or imposing an oil im-
port fee, consensus elasticity estimates have been lacking. Previous studies have relied
exclusively on time-series variation and have mostly found very small and economi-
cally insignificant elasticities.1 Most policy studies of oil markets rely on a range of
plausible elasticities due to the lack of consistent credible estimates. In fact the 2006
Congressional Research Service report on proposed windfall profit taxes stated, "few
studies generate reliable estimates and in fact some studies estimate negative supply
elasticities, which are not plausible."2 Thus CRS, like previous Congressional Bud-
get Office and OECD studies, employed a number of assumed elasticities-CRS used
supply elasticities of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8-that were within the wide range of estimates
rather than settling on a specific elasticity estimate. 3
I estimate the supply response using a new rich data set that reports monthly
production for all onshore wells in the state of California-the third-ranking state
in oil production-over a thirty-one-year period beginning in 1977. The data come
from mandatory monthly filings by well operators to the California Department of
Conservation Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources. I construct a dataset
of 30,025,957 observations describing 140,672 wells. These data cover all onshore
production between 1977 and 2008; the sample includes wells that were already com-
pleted and wells completed during the period. In addition to monthly production,
for each well, each month the data report the quality of the oil produced, the firm
operating the well, the method of pumping, exact location, the field and pool it taps,
and the status-whether it is capable of producing or shut-in. This level of detail
allows me to assign each well its appropriate regulatory and tax regime treatment,
following the Federal Code of Regulations for each year. Using this policy detail and
1Hogan (1989) and Ramcharan (2002) found significant supply elasticities of 0.09 (0,03) and 0.05
(0.02), respectively. Jones (1990) and Dahl and Yficel (1991) found insignificant elasticities of 0.07
(0.04) and -0.08 (0.06) and Griffin (1985) found a significant negative elasticity, -0.05 (0.02). Hogan
(1989) also estimated a longer-run elasticity of 0.58 (0.18).
2Lazzari (2006)
3 The OECD in its 2004 Economic Outlook based its projection of non-OPEC production on
elasticities of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. The US Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency does
not explicitly state the elasticities it uses in its analyses, but its forecasts indicate that an elasticity
of 0.2 over a ten year window and virtually zero for one year responses.
monthly field-by-grade prices from Platt's Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanac for each
year, I am able to trace over time the path of after-tax price for each well, taking into
account differential regulatory and tax treatment across wells.
Because these federal policies created substantial variation in after-tax price over
time, I am able to identify the supply response using only within-well variation. In
fact, regulatory and tax policy generate enough across well variation in after-tax price
in each month-year that I can also non-parametrically control for common unobserved
time factors affecting well productivity.
Previous attempts to estimate the supply elasticity of oil production suffer from
three difficulties. First, the use of the readily available but non-representative Depart-
ment of Energy Monthly Energy Review (MER) average pre-tax first purchase price
series introduces measurement error in the price variable, leading to potential down-
ward biases in estimates of the supply response. When I estimate my oil production
models with the MER price series rather than the more accurate field-by-grade prices
adjusted for well-specific regulatory and tax treatment, I find elasticity estimates an
order of magnitude smaller than my baseline estimates. These findings are similar to
estimates found in the previous literature.
Second, the persistence of tax and price variation may potentially differ; the elas-
ticity estimate and resulting cost parameter estimate used to evaluate the welfare
cost of excise taxes on oil extraction should be generated by after-tax price variation
of similar persistence as proposed tax policy.4 As policy proposals largely describe
temporary taxes, the temporary price changes induced by government policy isolated
here may be more appropriate than movements in world price. In fact, comparing a
supply elasticity estimate using my data that purges variation in world price through
month-year fixed effects, 0.237 (0.029), to an estimate using my data that retains
variation in world price, 0.071 (0.014), suggests that firms are less sensitive to pre-tax
price variation.
4 Jf variation in world price is more persistent than temporary tax variation, including price
variation in the after-tax price variation used to generate elasticity estimates will lead to an over-
estimate of the elasticity since firms are responsive to longer-term changes in after-tax price. If tax
variation was more persistent than world price variation, the opposite would be true.
Finally, time-series regressions use aggregate totals of U.S. oil production as the
dependent variable, introducing "aggregation bias" since well productivity is not ho-
mogenous. U.S. oil wells lie along a gradient of productivity; when prices are higher
the average producing well is less productive as some high cost wells are brought
online. Aggregation will subsume this heterogeneity and bias the coefficient.
To assess. the welfare cost of taxes on oil extraction it is important to distinguish
between response along the extensive and intensive margins. If the reduction in
production is driven by the shutting-in of wells, the high cost of reversing shut-in
makes this a potentially permanent loss of oil. On the other hand, if production
is reduced primarily along the intensive margin, operators are simply tilting their
extraction paths forward in response to the tax: they will pump less today and more
in the future. This intensive adjustment will still reduce producer surplus, but the
welfare cost will come from the delay in revenues and the additional cost of sub-
optimally pumping the well, not from an output gap. As my analysis examines the
within-well supply response, the exploration margin is not a part of my assessment
of the deadweight loss of temporary taxes.5 Temporary taxes are more likely to
delay rather than curtail exploration activities, meaning that temporary taxes could
lead to even more production re-timing than is captured here. Potential additional
adjustment on the exploration margin may make the estimates reported here a lower
bound on the full elasticity.
My estimates suggest that production from existing wells is price-responsive. The
main results show an after-tax price elasticity of oil production in California of 0.237,
with a 95 percent confidence interval of 0.180 to 0.295. Response along the extensive
margin is minimal; the main specification shows that a ten percent decrease in after-
tax price would lead to at most a 1.17 percent increase in the shut-in rate. The
estimates are used to calibrate a simple model of the efficiency cost of tax-induced
distortions relative to the no-tax optimal extraction path. These calculations suggest
that a 15 percent temporary excise tax on California oil producers reduces the present
'As new wells are completed they are added to the sample used to generate the empirical esti-
mates, but since the analysis uses only within-well variation in after-tax price, the estimate does not
measure the impact of new wells on aggregate production.
value of producer surplus by between one and five percent of the no-tax surplus,
depending on the original life of the well and the duration of the temporary tax. On
average each dollar of tax revenue raised reduces producer surplus by $1.13 to $1.66.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes a simple model of the impact
of excise taxes on the extraction of an exhaustible resource. Relevant background
information on the U.S. and California oil industries and the relevant institutional
knowledge regarding the decontrol of oil prices and the introduction of temporary
federal excise taxes are discussed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes the new rich
production and price data I assembled. Section 1.5 details the estimation strategy.
Section 1.6 presents the estimates of the supply response. Section 1.7 assesses how
after-tax price affects the well closure decision. Section 1.8 demonstrates the value of
micro-data and reconciles my elasticities with the much smaller elasticities estimated
in prior studies. Section 1.9 illustrates how the empirical estimates of Section 1.6 and
the model from Section 1.2 can be combined to assess the welfare cost of excise taxes
on domestic oil production. Section 1.10 concludes and discusses directions for future
research.
1.2 Taxes and the Extraction of Exhaustible Re-
sources
This section focuses on the well operator's extraction decision. Subsection 2.1 presents
a simple model of the oil well operator's problem, highlighting that exhaustibility
reduces the extraction rate relative to production from an inexhaustible resource.
Subsection 2.2 discusses the effects of excise taxes in the context of the model, which
have been recently proposed in reaction to rapidly increasing oil prices.
1.2.1 The Extraction Problem
The well operator chooses an extraction path to maximize profit, taking into account
the exhaustibility of the reserves of his well. Operators are assumed to be price-
takers with known reserves; as in the Hotelling (1931) model, the operator chooses
an extraction path by dynamically optimizing the present discounted value of total
profit from extraction over the life of the well. 6 Because the typical U.S. well lacks
sufficient natural subsurface reservoir pressure for the oil to flow to the surface, most
wells are pumped, making extraction costly.
Exhaustibility
For an exhaustible resource the intertemporal sum of services from a given stock is
finite.7 Exhaustibility in effect makes extraction a 'pump today or pump tomorrow'
decision for the operator. Extracting a unit today has an opportunity cost: the
unit cannot be extracted in the future. This opportunity cost creates an incentive for
holding the resource in situ, tempering the incentive to extract and sell. In the model,
the operator of a drilled well is assumed to know his reserve level with certainty, thus
exhaustibility means that the total amount of oil extracted from the well cannot
exceed his initial known reserves, RO:
oo
qt dt < Ro (1.1)
where qt is the extraction rate at time t. In addition qt is assumed to be non-negative,
ruling out pumping oil into the reservoir.
Exhaustibility
For simplicity, it is assumed that the full price path is known at time 0. Because the
operator is a price-taker, his problem is:
oo
max ertp [pqt - c (qt)] dt (1.2)
(q) o0
'Hotelling's seminal work has been extended and discussed by numerous authors, including Das-
gupta and Heal (1979).
7 The sum of services is still finite even if the resource is recyclable since less than the full quantity
can be recovered each time the output is recycled. Recycling, of course, is not relevant in the case
of oil.
subject to:
qtdt < RO and Rt > 0 (1.3)
where pt is the price, c (qt) is the cost of extraction and Rt is the reserve level at time
t. Though the operator's problem is dynamic, the shadow-value of reserves associated
with the exhaustibility constraint along the optimal extraction path is time invariant.
The non-negativity constraint can be ignored given the linearity of revenues and
the convexity of cost in qt-if qt is always non-negative and total extraction does
not exceed initial reserves, then the reserve level will always be positive. Thus, the
problem can be written as a Hamiltonian with a single constraint:
A (qt, AC) = ert [ptqt - c (qt)] dt - At qtdt - Ro (1.4)
where T is the time at which all profitable oil has been extracted and the economic
limit of the well has been reached. The first-order condition with respect to qt:
ert (pt - c' (qt)) - A (t) = 0 (1.5)
implicitly defines the optimal extraction rate at each time t, qt, as a function of
the price at time t, pt, the interest rate, r, and the shadow value of an incremental
addition to reserves, A. The second necessary condition:
OA (qt, A (t)) 0 (1.6)
-Rt
implies that the multiplier, A, is constant. The shadow value of reserves is pinned
down by the terminal condition. At time T the economic life of the well has been
reached and the extraction rate falls to zero.8 The transversality condition, A (T) = 0,
combined with first-order condition at time at time T, imply that qT is the production
level that equates the marginal and average costs of production. If the marginal cost
8In the last period of extraction the operator will choose an extraction quantity that equates the
marginal and average cost of extraction, for the specific cost function employed below that is:
qT = f
After extracting qr the operator shuts the well and the extraction rate jumps to zero.
of producing qT, c'(qT), exceeds the price, then the producer will opt to not produce
and shut-in and exit instead. Plugging the terminal production quantity, qr into the
static optimization condition at time T, the shadow value of reserves is pinned down:
A = e-rT(p) (PT - c' (qr)) (1.7)
where the life of the well, T, is a function of the price path, p, since higher aver-
age prices will accelerate extraction and shorten well life. The exact shape of the
extraction path is determined by the marginal cost of extraction and the discount
factor, with the shutdown condition, the equality of marginal and average cost, pin-
ning down the extraction amount at time T. The reserves will be fully exhausted
at time T since qr, the production quantity that equates marginal is, by virtue of
minimizing average cost, is less than production quantity that equates marginal cost
and price-the operator finds all remaining production profitable. Intuitively, once
he has paid the fixed cost to produce in the last period, he will produce the remaining
quantity (which is by optimality of the extraction path less than the quantity that
equates price and marginal cost).
The Cost of Extraction
Even after the completion of the well, extracting oil is costly. Extraction costs include
fixed costs such as the user-cost of pumping equipment and operating costs such as
energy inputs to drive the pump and labor costs of monitoring. The cost function is
modeled as convex in the extraction rate with an additional fixed cost of operating.
Letting q denote the extraction rate andf the fixed cost of operation, the cost function
can be written:
c (qt) = cqt + f if the well produces
0 if the well does not produce
where c is a parameter of the cost function.
The Optimal Extraction Path
Given the quadratic cost function, the optimal extraction rate and shadow value of
reserves are:
ert (pt - 2cqt) - A = 0 (1.8)
A = e-rT pT- 2 c) (1.9)
Combining equations 1.8 and 1.9, the optimal extraction at time t is:
* Pt e-r(T(p)-t) (PT - 2/f C) (1.10)
2c 2c
where again the economic life of the well, T, is a function of the price path, p; a
higher price today will lead to a faster extraction rate and a shorter well life. More
specifically, T (p) is implicitly defined by the exhaustibility constraint:
jT pA e-r(T(p)-t) (pT - 2V ) di=Ro (1.11)
JO 2c 2c
The extraction rate defined in equation 1.10 declines over time due to the dis-
counting of future profits. Wells that are further from their economic limit, T, will
pump at a faster rate. The extraction rate is inversely proportional to the slope of
the marginal cost function-wells with more steeply convex costs of extraction will
extract more slowly.
1.2.2 Excise Taxes and the Extraction Path
A Permanent Excise Tax
After the introduction of a permanent excise at rate T the operator's optimal extrac-
tion rate is:
, Pt (1 - T) e-r(T(p)-t) ((1 - T) PT - 2 c)
qt 2c (1.12)
The permanent excise tax reduces extraction in all periods, tilting the whole extrac-
tion path downward. Because the tax reduces revenues in all periods including the
final period of extraction when the well reaches its economic limit, the well may shut
down with reserves remaining in the well if the marginal cost of production exceeds
the after-tax price. In this sense, permanent taxes can induce shut-in.
This does not necessarily mean that the permanent excise tax reduces the life
of a well. On one hand, lower extraction rates due to the tax will lead to a more
than proportionate increase the amount of time necessary to pump the same reserves
pumped in the no-tax case; for a given level of aggregate extraction a slower extraction
rate extends the life of the well.' On the other hand, the tax could result in the well
shutting down with reserves remaining in the well; the operator will extract less oil
in total, which for a given extraction path reduces the life of the well. Whether
this combination of forces leads to a net increase or decrease in the life of the well
will depend on how close the well is to its economic limit when the permanent tax is
levied. Wells near the end of their original economic lives are more likely to experience
a net reduction in well life due to the permanent tax since the increase in abandoned
reserves is a larger fraction of total oil remaining in the well when the tax is levied.
Wells far from the end of their economic lives could actually experience an increase
in well life since the decrease in extraction rates may extend the life of the well more
than the new shutdown condition shortens it.
A Temporary Excise Tax
The introduction of an unanticipated temporary excise tax that is known to be in
place until time ti reduces after-tax price in the near term, but leaves the after-tax
9 For expositional clarity, assume that price is constant so that pt = p and that fixed costs are
absent, f = 0. Then the exhaustibility constraint is:
1 [(1-7-)p (l__r)per( T (p)-t)] dt = (1-7T) (pT - -z1 Pe fo
so any change in r must be offset by a more than proportional change in T. The increase must
be more than proportional because the extraction rate declines over time; the additional reserves
resulting from lower extraction rates are pumped when the extraction rate is low. At time To, the
original life of the well, now (1 - r) additional reserves remain; these reserves will take longer than
(1 - r) To to pump since the extraction rate at time TO is less than the average extraction rate up
until TO.
price after time ti unchanged. To simplify the analysis, but without loss of generality,
price is assumed to be constant between time 0 and ti and between ti and the end of
the well's life. The price between time 0 and ti is denoted by pi = (1 - T)p W where
pw is the pre-tax world price before ti and the price after ti is denoted by P2 = P
where pw is the pre-tax world price after time ti.
For wells with pre-tax economic lives that extend beyond time ti, while the tax is
in place between 0 and ti the operator's optimal extraction rate is:
p P1 e r(T(pi,P2)-t) - 2 )(1.13qt = - (1.13)2c 2c
and after ti the optimal extraction rate is:
P2 e r(T(pi,P2)-t) (P - 2/ f1c)
qt = - (1.14)2c 2c
The economic life of the well, T (pi,P2), is a function of both prices: a higher tax
rate in the first period will reduce extraction and lengthen the life of the well, higher
pre-tax price in either period will increase extraction rates in that period and shorten
the life of the well.
An increase in the tax rate reduces extraction in the first period. Assuming zero
fixed costs for expositional clarity, the total impact of a change in pi on the extraction
rate while the tax is in place is:
dlq* 1 e-r(T(pi,P2)-0) rti
> 1 er(T(pjP2)t) 2c (1.15)
dpi - 2c 1 + er(T(pip2)t) 2c
again, where pi = (1 - r) p', meaning that higher tax rates lead to lower extraction
rates. The impact of a change in the tax rate on the contemporaneous extraction
rate has two components: the direct impact from the first term of equation 1.13 and
the indirect impact from the effect the change in tax rate has on the economic life of
the well. The first term of equation 1.15 describes the direct impact of the change in
price on extraction: higher after-tax price accelerates extraction. The second term
captures the mitigating impact of the exhaustibility constraint: higher prices before
ti reduces the life of the well, increasing the opportunity cost of extraction since the
last barrel is pumped sooner which reduces the effect of discounting. The economic
life of the well, T (Pi,P2), which is shortened by higher after-tax price in the first
period, is implicitly defined by the exhaustibility constraint:
ji dt + jT dt - P 2 e (T dt < Ro
0 2c jtT2c JO 2c-
P1 t1 +P2 (T - t1 ) _ P2 (1 -rT)
2c 2cr -< Ro (1.16)2c 2cr~
Taking the total derivative of equation 1.16 reveals10
dT 
-t 1  1
dp1 - P2 1 - e-rT
meaning that a higher tax rate, which reduce pi, extends the life of the well by
reducing extraction rates between time 0 and time ti. Higher temporary excise taxes
lead the operator to retime production, shifting extraction from the tax period to
the future when the tax has expired. This forward tilting extends the life of the
well because the additional reserves that result from slower initial extraction will be
pumped such that extraction costs are minimized, which means extending the life of
the well.
For long lived wells, where T (P1, P2) is large, the impact of the second term of
equation 1.15 is small, especially if the tax is in place for a relatively short period of
time. If T (p1, P2) is large, then equation 1.15 is approximately:
dq* 1> -- (1.18)
dp1 - 2c
In other words the impact of a 10 percent decrease in the after-tax price, pi, is a
(0.05/c) reduction in the extraction rate for wells that are not near the end of their
economic lives. The empirical work aims to estimate the cost function parameter c.
ioThe total derivative of equation 1.16 is
t I p2 dT P2e r(-r) dT2c 2c dpi 2cr dp 1 -
Finally, wells with high fixed or operating costs and little remaining reserves may
shut-in in response to even a temporary tax; specifically the temporary tax could
induce earlier shut-in of wells with little remaining productive life. If the well op-
erator planned to shut his well before time ti prior to the introduction of the tax,
the introduction of the tax will hasten his abandonment since for his purposes the
temporary tax effectively is a permanent tax.
1.2.3 Summary
The extraction rate is an increasing function of the price today and a decreasing
function of the price at the end of the well's life; the higher the ultimate price of
oil, the greater the opportunity cost of extracting a unit today that would otherwise
remain in the well until it's last period of production. Excise taxes affect both the
current price and the opportunity cost of extraction. Temporary taxes mainly affect
the current price for long-lived wells, thus creating strong incentives for operators to
re-time production, shifting extraction from the tax period to the post-tax period.
This shifting means that the shortrun output gap induced by a temporary excise tax
on the extraction of an exhaustible resource overstates the welfare cost of such taxes;
reserves not extracted while the tax is in place will be extracted later, albeit less
profitably due to discounting and higher costs due to sub-optimal extraction. This
retiming also reduces the tax revenue raised. The implications of a temporary tax
based on the simple model described above suggest a strategy to assess the impact and
welfare cost of such taxes. Empirically estimating the cost parameter c would allow
for assessments of the welfare cost of excise taxes on the extraction of exhaustible
resources. The estimated cost parameter should be used to calculate total surplus
from production, taking the dynamics of extraction into account.
1.3 Institutional Background
To identify to the supply elasticity and the cost parameter c, I examine domestic
producer decisions during a period characterized by price regulation, decontrol and
the imposition of federal excise taxes. These policies significantly altered producer
prices and created considerable differences in producer price across wells. This sec-
tion provides background information on the California oil industry and details the
relevant history of government actions affecting producer prices. Subsection 1.3.1
describes the California oil industry and explains the exogeneity of world price to
the production decisions of U.S. producers and its implications for domestic producer
prices. Subsection 1.3.2 describes the decontrol of domestic oil prices and the levying
of the 1980 Windfall Profit Tax (WPT). I use the over time and across well variation
in after-tax price generated by decontrol and the WPT to indentify the after-tax price
elasticity and the cost parameter c.
1.3.1 The California Oil Industry: Production and Producer
Price
The United States is the third largest oil producer"l, behind only Saudi Arabia and
Russia; California is the third largest oil producing state in the U.S. Onshore oil
producers in California account for roughly one percent of total world production.' 2
The oil produced in California is of lower quality than more prominent benchmark
crudes such as West Texas Intermediate, the price of which is used in future and
forward markets. API gravity measures the specific gravity, or "heaviness" of oil,
which determines how efficiently the crude can be refined into petroleum products.13
California oil was more than 60 percent heavy or very heavy crude during the 1977-
1985 period. Heavy oil is generally more expensive to extract as its weight increases
pumping costs. Given the result from Section 1.2 that wells with higher marginal
costs will be less responsive to changes in after-tax price, it is reasonable to think that
estimates based on California wells provide a lower bound on tax-price responsiveness
"The U.S. was the third largest producer in the 1970s and 1980s as well though U.S.S.R production
totals were less accurately measured.
"U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration:
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-crd-crpdn-adcmbbLm.htm
13 API gravity is an inverse function of specific gravity:
API Gravity = 141.5 - 131.5Specific Gravity
for the average U.S. well. In California heavy oil wells are also less productive than
wells that produce lighter oil. 14
U.S. producer prices are not sensitive to the production decisions of individual
operators. Domestic pre-tax prices are set by the global oil market. Aggregate U.S.
oil production comprised roughly 15 percent of total world production while price
controls and windfall profit taxes were in place, a substantial but decidedly minority
share. Unlike most other oil producing nations, oil extraction in the U.S. is a com-
petitive market where large international oil firms operate alongside many smaller
independent producers. Though the large international companies that operate in the
U.S. also operate abroad, their market share was dramatically undercut by the orga-
nization of OPEC in 1960. By the mid-1970s OPEC nations accounted for roughly
half of world production and coordinated their production decisions in an effort to
influence price. Though the evidence on OPEC's effectiveness as a cartel is mixed,"
if any group of producers had the market share and coordination necessary to affect
prices it was and remains nationalized producers rather than the competitive fringe
that operates in the U.S. 6 Since they account for a small share of world production
and operate in a market alongside a cartel, U.S. oil producers, including California
producers, can reasonably be assumed to be price takers.' 7
Refiners always had the option to purchase imported oil-which was exempt from
both price controls and the WPT. During the price control era a permit trading
system allocated low-price domestic crude among refiners.' 8 Refiners did not face
14Heavy oil is oil with an American Petroleum Institute (API) gravity less than 20; very heavy
oil is oil with an API gravity less than 16. API gravity is an inverse function of specific gravity-
higher API gravity oil is lighter and sells for a premium. 11.6 percent of California crude during
the 1977-1985 period was heavy while 49.8 percent was very heavy. These wells were on average
less productive than wells that produced lighter crude as 52.9 percent of well-month observations
produced very heavy oil and 12.3 percent of well-month observations produced heavy oil.
15Hamilton (2009) reviews recent production and quota discrepancies among OPEC nations and
finds that OPEC members frequently cheat with respect to their quotas and there is little evidence
of a clear enforcement mechanism. Also see Alhaji and Huettner (2000) for a review of 13 studies
assessing the effectiveness of OPEC as a cartel.
6 As the U.S., including California refiners, imports oil, within the range of transportation costs,
domestic producers may have some pricing power. Given that transport costs comprise roughly 5
percent of oil prices, domestic producers have only a small scope of pricing power.
17Killian (2009) asserts "the price of crude oil is determined in global markets." Domestic pre-tax
prices were assumed to track world prices in other empirical studies such as Smith et al (1986).
18Since only domestic crude was subject to price controls, refiners who procured domestic crude
shortages since imported oil was always available for purchase. Thus, refiners and
perhaps consumers benefitted form price controls while domestic producers saw their
prices reduced by the price ceiling. While the WPT was in place, the availability of
tax-exempt imports fixed the refiner price at the world price; producer prices were
reduced by the full amount of the tax. 19
1.3.2 The Decontrol of Oil Prices and the Introduction of
the 1980 Windfall Profit Tax
In an effort to combat inflation the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 instituted a
wide array of wage and price controls. Domestically produced crude oil and refined
products were among the goods subject to price controls. While virtually all other
price controls were eliminated, prices caps on domestically produced crude oil and
refined products remained in place until 1980. The decontrol of oil prices began with
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which authorized the President
to rescind price controls at any point after May 1979 and the Energy Conservation
and Policy Act of 1976, which decontrolled oil extracted from marginally productive
wells called stripper wells. Decontrol was a reaction to the sudden increase in oil
prices due to the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Rising prices and less stable foreign sources
prompted concerns regarding U.S. oil independence and generated interest in increas-
ing domestic oil production. The Carter Administration actively used the authority,
and began decontrolling non-stripper domestic crude in June 1979. Decontrol went
forward with the understanding that the sudden increase in domestic producer prices
would be taxed at the federal level.20 The 1980 Windfall Profit Tax was signed into
earned rents. The federal government created a system of tradable permits to allocate low-priced
domestic crude among refiners to "fairly" distribute the potential windfall. Permits were allocated
according to historic crude sourcing.
1 9Though transportation costs are small, roughly 5 percent of price domestic producers may have
been able to pass a fraction of the tax equal to transport cost on to purchasers. All oil produced in
California is refined within the state, but refiner demand exceeds production so imports comprise the
difference. Imports come largely from Canada and Mexico and average transport costs run roughly
$1.30 per barrel. Rodrigue (2009)
20According the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax of 1980, "without such a tax, decontrol probably could not [have gone] forward."
law April 2, 1980 and virtually all non-Alaskan oil owned by a taxable private party
was subject to the tax. Purchasers withheld the tax from the amounts otherwise
payable to a producer and filed quarterly WPT tax returns with the IRS.
The name Windfall Profit Tax (WPT) is a misnomer. The tax was not a profit
tax, but an excise tax applied to the selling price of a barrel of oil regardless of its
production cost.
The timing of decontrol varied by API gravity, and by the age and productivity
of the well from which oil was extracted. These same oil and well characteristics
determined the Windfall Profit Tax (WPT) treatment as well. The WPT taxed oil
that was typically more costly to extract at a lower tax rate. Tax favored oil included
heavy, oil that had an API gravity of 16 or less, and oil from marginal wells, known
as stripper wells, that produce on average less than 10 barrels of oil per day for at
least 12 months.
All taxable oil was divided into three tiers under the WPT; each tier corresponded
to a different tax rate.2 1 An operator's WPT tax liability was equal to the product
of the WPT tax rate and the difference between the selling price and the base price
for each barrel of oil he sold. Oil in each tier was also assigned a different base price.
Thus, for the operator of well i at time t each barrel of oil sold at price Pit incurs a
WPT liability of:
WPT Taxit= r (Pit Bi) if Pit > Bi
0 otherwise
where Bit is the real base price. WPT payments were deductible form corporate
taxable income, meaning that the after-tax price (ATPit) received by the operator of
well i at time t was:
ATPt - (I oP (Pit - T rt (i - Bi)) if Pit > Bi
- TcP Pit otherwise
21Specific categories of oil, largely state-, Native American- or charitable trust-owned oil, were
exempt from the WPT. See Lazzari (2006) for further details.
The WPT was legislated as a temporary tax. At its height, the WPT raised $44
billion in gross revenue (before corporate income tax deductibility), or roughly half
the revenue raised by the corporate income tax. Statue required the tax expire by
1991. In reality the tax became ineffective due to sharp decreases in oil prices in
1986. 1985 was the last year it raised any revenue. In fact, the WPT was repealed in
1988 to eliminate the administrative burden of a tax that did not raise revenue. The
timing of decontrol and the simplified details of WPT treatment for each of the three
tiers of oil follow.
Tier I Oil
Tier I oil was oil extracted from a non-stripper well that produced oil in 1978 which
was not heavy, that is its API gravity exceeded 16. Tier I oil had been subject to
price controls through the end of 1979. Price controls on Tier I oil were phased out
gradually. Beginning in January of 1980 the selling price was a weighted average of
the world market price and the price control price with the weight on the market
price equal to 0.046 multiplied by the number of months since December 1979. At
the end of January of 1981 the phase-out of price controls was abruptly ended and
Tier I oil was fully decontrolled, raising the weight on the world price from roughly
60 to 100 percent. During the first 10 months of the WPT the windfall profit tax was
applied to a selling price that was in part a controlled price. The base price for Tier
I oil was 21 cents less than the May 1979 price control price for the property. The
tax rate on Tier I oil was 70 percent.
Tier II Oil
Tier II oil consisted of non-heavy oil from stripper wells that produced oil in 1978, and
oil produced from a Naval Petroleum Reserve field. A well is considered a stripper well
if it has ever averaged less than 10 barrels of oil per day for 12 consecutive months
after 1972. Oil produced from stripper wells was exempted from price controls in
August 1976.
A Naval Petroleum Reserve is one of four fields owned by the federal government
to which access is leased to private operators. The base price for Tier II oil was
the December 1979 selling price of oil from the same property multiplied by 0.425,
a conversion factor that achieved a statutorily set average base price of $15.20. The
tax rate on Tier II oil was 60 percent.
Tier III Oil
Tier III oil was comprised by two types of oil, new oil from wells that did not produce
oil in 1978 and heavy oil, which is oil with an API gravity of 16 or less. New oil
was fully decontrolled in June 1979. Price controls on heavy oil were lifted August
17, 1979. The base price for both new and heavy oil was the December 1979 selling
price of oil from the same property multiplied by 0.462, the ratio of the statutorily
set average base price to average prices in December 1979. Heavy and new oil were
the most tax-favored types of oil; the tax rate on Tier III oil was 30 percent initially
and was gradually reduced to 22.5 percent beginning in 1982.
The three tiers of oil, and even different categories of oil within Tier III, were
treated very differently by government policies. Differences in the timing of decontrol
and differential tax treatment provide the variation in after-tax price that generates
the supply elasticities estimated here. These policies created cross-sectional variation
in after-tax price allowing for flexible controls for underlying common time-varying
factors.
1.4 New Production and Price Data
The above section details the substantial variation in after-tax price over time and
across wells created by the decontrol of oil prices and the introduction of federal excise
taxes. These policies classified wells into different regulatory and tax tiers by the
characteristics of the well and the oil it produced. Thus well-level data are necessary
to account for and make use of this substantial variation. Wells within a field could
be assigned very different after-tax producer prices depending on whether or not they
produce the same kind of oil, share the same stripper status or produced in 1978.
Thus even field aggregation would not be fine enough to correctly assign even average
prices accurately to oil production by field. In order to use this well-level variation I
assembled a new database of well-level production and after-tax producer prices that
describes every onshore well in California starting in 1977, which encompasses the
regulatory and tax periods. These data have not been used in previous studies.
1.4.1 Data Sources and Description
The data used in this study cover all potentially active onshore oil wells in the state
of California beginning in 1977 and continuing through 2008. The main analysis
regarding the impact of price regulation and excise taxes makes use of the more
than 75,000 oil wells that were capable of producing at some point during the 1977
to 1985 period. The state of California's Department Conservation Division of Oil,
Gas and Geothermal Resources requires operators to report monthly production and
characteristics for all completed wells that are currently or potentially capable of
production. Characteristics reported each month include the date of well completion,
API gravity of the oil produced, the field and pool being tapped, operator name, and
the status of the well. The data are particularly well suited for the analysis since
they provide monthly level information that allows more precision in the timing of
price changes relative to the annual or quarterly data used in other studies. More
importantly, the data report the characteristics necessary to determine the timing of
decontrol and WPT tax treatment for each well.
California is divided into six oil and gas districts. Figure 1.1 maps the districts
and provides details on the geographic distribution of wells and production. Each
month between 1977 and 1985, total California production ranged between 2.37 mil-
lion barrels in February 1978 and 3.20 million barrels in August 1985. Roughly 16.1
percent of wells are shut-in on average; there is some variation in shut-in rates with
the smallest share of shut-in wells, 14.5 percent, during October 1978 and the largest
share, 17.5 percent, in December 1985. The top five producing wells each account for
less than 0.5 percent of total production.
Some adjustments to the data were necessary. Of the more than 30 million well-
month observations approximately 0.1 percent were duplicate observations; these were
dropped. In months where oil production is zero either because the well is not yet
complete or is shut-in, no API gravity data are reported; I assign these well-month
observations the soonest future API gravity in the case of uncompleted wells and the
most recent previous API gravity in the case of shut-in wells. API gravity information
is necessary to determine the after-tax price each producer faced when he made the
decision to either not complete the well that period or shut the well that period.
Stripper well status is determined by examining production history within the data,
so the share of wells qualifying for stripper status would rise mechanically at end of
1977 if only production history determined stripper status. In order to correct for
this data challenge, I back-fill stripper status so that a well that is determined to be
a striper well in January 1978 is classified as a stripper well in 1977 as well.
As explained in Section 1.3, all oil does not trade at a single price; different grades
trade at their own prices. The price data are from Platt's Oil Price Handbook and
Oilmanac, which provides field by field posted prices by month and API gravity for
controlled and decontrolled oil during the price control period, and pre-tax selling
prices after decontrol. Fields for which price data are not available are assigned
the average price for oil of the same API gravity for wells in California that month.
Because the prices of different grades do not track the world price in parallel, using
the more precise prices could potentially be important.22 Crude is globally traded
and priced based on API gravity and location. Location provides information on the
sulfur content of the oil since sulfur content is largely constant across the wells in a
field.23 Oil with low sulfur content, known as "sweet" crude, can be refined into light
22 During the price control era oil from the same well was classified as lower and upper tier oil
with upper tier oil receiving a higher price. Lower tier oil corresponded to what regulators believed
was the "expected" level of production based on the property's production history. Until the well
produced it's lower tier quota, all oil it produced would sell at the lower tier price. If the operator
exceeded his lower tier quota, then all additional oil produced would sell at the higher upper tier
price. The determination of whether a barrel of oil subject to price controls was upper- or lower-tier
is beyond the capacity of the data. This analysis assigns all price-controlled wells the upper-tier
selling price, as it is the more likely price for marginal production from a California well.
23 Transportation costs will also vary by location. Refiners with the lowest transportation costs,
typically those with the closest refineries, will purchase from a given field. As individual purchase
petroleum products such as gasoline or kerosene more cost effectively than high sulfur,
"sour" crude which is typically processed into diesel or fuel oil.24 For refining purposes,
oil of the same API gravity and sulfur content is viewed as perfectly substitutable
regardless of origin.
While various congressional acts created the systems of regulation, decontrol and
excise taxation that provide the identifying variation in producer prices, the precise
detailed rules of these legislative acts are found in the Federal Code of Regulations
for each year. I drew the details of price control assignment and WPT tax treatment
from "Title 10: Energy" of the Federal Code of Regulations for each year 1976-1980
and "Title 26: Internal Revenue" of the Federal Code of Regulations for each year
1981-1985, which detailed the implementation of price control and WPT legislation.
1.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of 75,342 wells used to
assess the impact of the regulatory and tax regimes of the late 1970s and 1980s.
The average well produces 443 barrels of oil per month; conditioning on non-zero
production raises the average roughly 50 percent. Approximately 28 percent of well-
month observations report zero oil production either because the well is shut-in or
the well has not yet been completed. The median well produces 113 barrels of oil per
month, the 75th percentile well-month observation produces 428 barrels per month
and the 99th percentile observation produces 5,325 barrels per month. The production
data are right skewed. The within-well production variation, 2,859, is comparable
to the overall standard deviation, 3,071. The average producer price during the
period, $18.3, is only 45 percent of the mean purchaser's price, with part of this
difference attributable to the corporate income tax and part to the WPT. Producers
for whom price controls were gradually phased out as they faced excise taxes under the
and production decisions are too small to move transport costs, the difference between price at the
wellhead and price at the refiner is taken to be independent of the decisions of individuals firms.
24When oil prices are referred to in the popular media, the price frequently quoted is that of West
Texas Intermediate, or UK Brent both of which are light and sweet. The OPEC basket, which is a
weighted average of crudes produced by OPEC nations, is a third benchmark and is both heavier
and sourer than WTI or Brent.
WPT received the lowest, less than $12.30, after-tax prices. Producers of lighter oil
received the highest prices in the sample, exceeding $32.00, at the end of 1979 and the
beginning of 1980 prior to the introduction of the WPT. The within-well deviations in
average after-tax price is 15 percent smaller than the overall variation in after-tax price
while the within and overall variation in pre-tax price is comparable. This discrepancy
is driven by the differential regulatory and tax treatment of wells over the period.
The average and median API gravities are 18.2 and 15.0, respectively, illustrating the
heaviness of California oil. Finally, note that although there is considerable variability
in API gravity in the sample (standard deviation of 6.8), each individual well has little
variation in the API gravity of the oil it produces (standard deviation of 1.4).
1.5 Estimation Strategy
The way in which oil prices were decontrolled and oil production was taxed provide
an unusual degree of variation in net-of-tax prices for identical commodities across
producers and overtime. The decontrol of oil prices and the introduction of the WPT
were policy changes implemented in tandem; oil prices were decontrolled by executive
order while legislation enacting the excise tax was in committee in Congress. Figure
1.2 illustrates the timing of decontrol for different types of oil over the 1979 to 1981
period, starting with new oil and ending with old oil. These different categories of
oil were also subject to different WPT tax rates and corresponding tax bases. Taken
together these policy changes provide substantial deviations from the world market
price.
The model described in Section 1.2 showed that the impact of a change in the
after-tax price on the extraction rate for a long-lived well was a decreasing function
of the cost parameter c. In other words, the cost parameter c can be recovered from
an estimate of the derivative of the extraction rate with respect to after-tax price.
The impact of a level change in after-tax price on the extraction rate in levels is the
empirical response of interest. The most natural regression framework that would
yield estimates of d is a simple linear model of the form:dpt
qit = o' + # (1 - Tit) pit + Xit-y + ui + 77t (1.19)
where qit is extraction per month, (1 - Tit) pit is after-tax price, Xit is a set of controls,
and ui + it is the error term." If the price ceilings and WPT tax rates were uncor-
related with the error term, the policy-based variation in after-tax price would yield
an unbiased estimate of the tax response. But if after-tax price is correlated with an
underlying well specific component of the error term, ui, then pooled ordinary least-
squares estimation will yield biased estimates. The bias of the estimate will depend
on the correlation between the omitted well-specific effect and the tax rate or price
ceiling. Price ceilings and excise tax rates were not randomly assigned to wells by
price controls and the WPT. Well characteristics, such as well age and stripper status,
and oil characteristics, namely specific gravity, which are key determinants of the cost
of extraction were used to determine regulatory and tax treatment. Regulatory and
tax treatment varied along these dimensions in part in an effort to favorably treat
operators who would be most adversely impacted by the policies. Thus, pooled OLS
estimates of equation 1.19 would be inappropriate.
Because extraction costs vary across wells even within tier, controls for the factors
that determine tax treatment may not be sufficient to fully address heterogeneity
in extraction costs. Instead, to isolate variation in the after-tax price not related to
underlying differences in extraction costs, the analysis uses only within-well variation.
Because of the considerable across time variation in after-tax price generated by the
decontrol of oil prices and the levying of the WPT, there remains sufficient variation
for each well over time to identify the supply response.
25The after-tax price here is denoted by (1 - Tit) pit although in reality price controls and the
windfall profit tax can both be described as taxes on a price basis, where the basis is the difference
between the selling price of a barrel of oil and a statutory base price. In the case of price controls,
the tax rate is 100 percent. This type of basis tax is structured like a capital gains tax and as in
the capital gains literature, the marginal incentive to sell a barrel of oil is captured by (1 - -rit) pit
and the basis is a transfer.
1.5.1 Residual Variation in After-Tax Price
Figure 1.3 plots different price measures for two wells. The real posted price line
reports the real purchase price of the oil. The upper plot describes a relatively tax
disadvantaged well and the lower plot describes a relatively tax favored well.
The upper plot tracks an initially non-stripper well that was decontrolled gradu-
ally beginning in January 1980, then fully decontrolled in January 1981; the gradual
decontrol can be seen in the nearly linear upward slope of the Real Posted Price line
starting in January 1980 and continuing until January 1981 when the price discon-
tinuously jumps with full decontrol. This well was initially subject to a 70 percent
WPT excise tax. The onset of the tax is the sudden downward jump in After-Tax
Price in March of 1980. In October 1982, the well qualified as a stripper well and thus
shifted to the slightly more tax-favorable Tier II and became subject to a 60 percent
excise tax rate, hence the uptick in After-Tax Price. The decrease in posted price in
January 1983 led to decrease in all price measures. Starting in January of 1983 Real
Post Price drifts slightly downward but is largely flat; After-Tax Price only further
flattens this slight negative slope.
My estimation strategy removes well and time fixed effects. Purging the after-tax
price measure of well fixed effects amounts to subtracting the well's average price
over all periods from the price each period. Thus the Residual-Well FE line is
simply a downward shift of the After-Tax Price line; the magnitude of the shift is the
level of the Well Mean line. Further purging the post-well fixed effect after-tax price
residuals of time fixed effects amounts to subtracting the average price each period
over all wells from the post-well fixed effect residuals. This two-way residual isolates
relative within-well price variation, where relative means relative to all other wells in
the sample that period. Thus, this well's two-way residual declines beginning in June
1979 as Tier III oil is fully decontrolled and market oil prices rise. The Residual-Well,
Time FE line slopes upward between January 1980 and March of 1980 as the well
began gradual decontrol while already decontrolled wells faced less rapidly increasing
prices. When the WPT is levied in March of 1980 the two-way residual continues its
upward trend because the increases in after-tax price due to continued decontrol more
than offset the tax. Even after full decontrol in January 1981, the relative within-well
after-tax price remains negative because this well faces the highest tax rate of all
wells. The disadvantage narrows as posted prices in the Livermore field increased
relatively faster than other fields. When the well is re-classified as a stripper well
there is a final uptick in the two-way residual as its WPT tax rate has fallen by 10
percentage points, which is short-lived as the Livermore price premium fades a few
months later. From that point on, the two-way residual is near zero since declines in
posted price result in after-tax prices nearly equal to average after-tax price for each
well.
The lower plot tracks a relatively tax-favored well. The well did not produce oil
in 1978 and thus the oil it produces is classified as new oil. The After-Tax Price
line jumps upward in June 1979 when new oil was decontrolled and again several
months later as world price increased and posted prices reflected the change. This
Tier III well was initially subject to a 30 percent WPT tax rate, which was decreased
by 2.5 percentage points each year starting in 1982 until the rate was 22.5 percent
in 1984. Focusing on the two-way residual line, Residual-Well, Time FE the fact
that this well was tax advantaged can be seen at several points in time. First when
this well was decontrolled in June 1979 the two-way residual is large and positive.
The strong upward movement of posted prices beginning in 1980 is mitigated in
the two-way residual since other wells were beginning decontrol and receiving higher
after-tax prices during this time though the residuals remain above zero reflecting
the fact that this well was fully decontrolled. The residual remains positive even
after the introduction of the WPT because it was tax favored, meaning it received
a higher after-tax price than the average California well. Declining posted prices
starting in 1983 brought the well's after-tax price in line with its average after-tax
price, which resulted in a near zero two-way residual since nearly all wells experienced
this convergence.
Price variation generated by temporary taxes is likely to be perceived as having
different persistence than movements in price. Different forces generate price and pol-
icy induced changes in after-tax price; that they would be viewed identically seems
unlikely. If producers perceive price as having greater persistence than tax-driven
changes, then supply elasticities generated by price changes would overstate the sup-
ply response to temporary taxes. Thus within-well variation in after-tax price, which
retains both price- and tax-driven changes in after-tax price may not be the appropri-
ate price measure for the analysis. To isolate price differences due only to differential
decontrol and tax treatment, the data are purged of time-series variation in price, in
other words average after-tax price each period subtracted off. The plot for each well
tracks this process of isolating relative within-well variation in after-tax price.
The key exclusion restriction of an identification strategy that purges after-tax
prices of well and time averages is that outside a time invariant fixed factor, wells
respond identically over time to changes in relative after-tax price. In other words,
there are no time-varying well-specific factors, besides after-tax price, affecting well
production.
1.6 Supply Response to Changes in After-Tax Price
Table 1.2 presents OLS estimates of,
qit = 0+01 (1 - Tc<"P) (Bigt + (1 - tw) (Pt - Bi 9t ))+/ 32aget+Xt+6 i+cit (1.20)
using the full sample of California oil wells. The dependent variable is the quantity
of oil produced by well i in month t. All specifications include well-level fixed effects
to absorb level differences across wells in the operator's response to changes in net
price, namely production cost heterogeneity. The sample includes all wells, whether
or not they shut-in. Month-by-year dummies absorb mean production and price
variation in each month. The tax-price elasticity is identified by within-well variation
in after-tax price relative to the within-well variation of other wells. As wells age their
productivity declines, so an additional control for the age of the well, measured from
its date of completion, is also included. Each column of Table 1.2 reports estimates
from a different regression.
Column 1 reports results from an estimation of equation 1.20. The estimated co-
efficient on the after-tax price, #1, implies that a one-dollar increase in the after-tax
price leads the average well to produce 8.73 additional barrels of oil, a price elas-
ticity of 0.237.26 Because well age is considered an important determinant of well
productivity, column 3 adds a quadratic term in well age. The insignificant increase
in the elasticity to 0.238, and the fact that the precision of the tax-price coefficient
estimate is unchanged, suggests that the linear control for well age is sufficient. Al-
though over the course of a well's life there is little change in the API gravity of
the oil extracted-the within-well standard deviation is only 1.4 degrees, less than
20 percent of overall variation-changes in API gravity could lead to changes in lift-
ing costs if the changes are concentrated and thus large for wells that do experience
changing gravity. API gravity fixed effects would undo the tax rate variation based
on oil heaviness, so slightly coarser controls are employed. Column 4 reports a spec-
ification like that of column 1 but includes dummies and quadratic time trends for
each decile of API gravity. The after-tax price coefficient is reduced by these added
time-varying controls for oil quality, but the change, a reduction of the elasticity to
0.208, is statistically insignificant and economically minor.
The data cover all wells in the state of California, including wells located in the
federally-owned and privately-leased Naval Petroleum Reserve (NPR), the Elk Hills
field. The private firm extracting the oil made production decisions, but received
less than the full posted price less taxes for each barrel it produced. Furthermore,
because the firm only leased the reserves, it may not have taken the exhaustibility
of the reserves into account in the same way that a reserve owner would. Thus, the
production response of these NPR wells to changes in after-tax price might be smaller
than the response for privately owned wells." Column 5 presents estimates of a model
26Adding well fixed-effects only, retaining the full variation in after-tax price, yields a point esti-
mate of 2.617 (0.500), which translates into a much smaller elasticity, 0.071.
2 7The NPR field was not tapped until 1976. In reaction to the 1973 Arab oil embargo the
federal government opened the Elk Hills field to drilling in 1976. From 1976 until 1998 the federal
government leased access to the field and a private firm extracted oil from the reserves. The oil is
sold to private refiners at the market price with the proceeds divided between the extracting firm and
the federal government; although the private firm determined production levels. Oil from the NPR
identical to that of column 1, but drops the Elk Hills wells from the sample. The point
estimate is larger which is consistent with the idea that operator of the NPR wells
was less price sensitive than other well operators. Though the estimated after-tax
price elasticity is larger in terms of the point estimate, the difference is statistically
insignificant. The NPR wells, in other words, were not significantly biasing the overall
estimate of column 2. The supply elasticity of the NPR wells, 0.173 (0.097) is roughly
25 percent smaller than the overall elasticity, but statistically indistinguishable from
the overall or non-NPR elasticities. Interestingly, dropping these wells reduces the
standard error of the after-tax price coefficient estimate by 30 percent.
1.6.1 High and Low Marginal Cost Wells
Equation 1.15 makes clear that responses will be smaller for wells with high marginal
costs, assuming that wells are far from the end of their economic life. Although the
vast majority of wells in California are pumped, 13,198 wells produce oil based on
their natural subsurface reservoir pressure for at least part of their lives. These flowing
wells have low operating costs if they produce their natural flowing quantity but it
is very costly to adjust their production either upward or downward. Adjustment
involves the installation of pumping equipment to either increase subsurface pressure
to accelerate extraction or to exert downward pressure to reduce the flow rate. In
other words, very high costs of extraction rate adjustment make the operators of
flowing wells unlikely to adjust their production levels to temporary changes
Table 1.3 presents estimates of equation 1.20 separately for flowing and pumped
wells. Because some wells may initially flow but then need to be pumped, the number
of wells in the flowing and pumped regressions exceeds the total number of wells.
Column 1 reports the baseline specification, which corresponds to column 1 of Table
1.2. Column 2 reports elasticity estimates for pumped wells, evaluated at mean sample
price and production quantities. Pumped wells-wells for which production levels
are more of a choice variable-are significantly more price elastic than the average
was subject to both price controls and the Windfall Profit Tax, but the price per barrel received by
the private extracting firm was less than the posted price minus taxes.
well. A ten percent increase in after-tax price results in a 3.56 percent increase
in oil production; the baseline specification implies only a 2.37 percent increase in
production. Flowing wells, on the other hand, do not show a statistically significant
production response to changes in after-tax price. The 95 percent confidence interval,
however, rules out supply responses larger than 0.072. All elasticities are evaluated
at average price and quantity, separately for pumped and flowing wells.
1.7 Well Closure Decisions
Wells that have high fixed costs are more likely to incur losses once the tax is put
into place. For wells near the end of their economic life, the post-tax profit from
remaining reserves may not offset the losses they will incur during the tax period.
Thus some well operators may choose to exit by shutting-in their wells. In fact, there
was notable concern regarding response along this margin at the time the tax was
introduced; two months before the enactment of the tax the Wall Street Journal ran a
critical editorial about the proposed Windfall Profit Tax titled "The Close-the-Wells
Tax."
Table 1.4 reports conditional logit and OLS estimates of,
u= 30+01 (i - rIc<" (B 9 t + (1 - T ) (Pq - Bigt))+132aget+xt+6j+cut (1.21)
where Sit is a dummy variable equal to one if the well is shut-in and #1, the after-
tax price coefficient, measures the percentage change in the probability of shut-in
caused by a one-dollar increase in price. Columns 1-4 report marginal effects and
semi-elasticities from conditional logit models. For comparison purposes, columns
5 and 6 report results from fixed effect OLS models. All of the regression models
include well and time fixed effects to partial-out cost heterogeneity at the well-level
and time-varying factors that affect production for all wells. If taxes motivate well
operators to close their wells, then the short-run impact of the tax could translate into
a longrun reduction in oil production as the reserves remaining in the shut wells are
effectively lost.28 The regressions reported in Table 1.4 are similar to the regressions
of Table 1.2. Columns 1 through 4 report estimates of equation 1.21 from conditional
logit models. As the predicted values of conditional logit models must lie between one
and zero, the model excludes wells that experience no variation in shut-in status.29
Identification again comes from relative within-well changes in after-tax price and the
exclusion restriction requires that no time-varying well-specific factors affect produc-
tion. Approximately 16.1 percent of well-month observations are shut-in during the
1977-1985 period; 27 percent of observations for wells that are neither always shut-in
nor always open are shut-in. The estimated after-tax price coefficient reported in
column 1 of Table 1.4 suggests that a 10 percent increase in the after-tax price only
reduces the rate of shut-in by 0.95 of a percentage point. This small estimated re-
sponse suggests that a temporary tax like the WPT has a negligible impact on firms'
shut-in decisions. This could be because the fixed costs of operating are small relative
to profit from production or because few wells are near the end of their economic life.
Of the wells producing in 1977, 69 percent are still producing in 1987, 44 percent are
still producing in 1997 and 34 percent are still producing in 2007.
Column 2 adds a quadratic term in well age to better adjust for the decline in
productivity that typically occurs over the life of the well. The estimates are virtually
identical, again suggesting that a linear control for well age is sufficient. Adding
quadratic time trends by API gravity decile increases the semi-elasticity by almost 25
percent-controlling for changes in the gravity of oil pumped from a well increases the
magnitude of the semi-elasticity estimate to -0.117. Column 4 excludes wells from the
Elk Hills NPR field. Dropping wells from the NPR field increases the point estimate
of price response along the extensive margin, suggesting again that firms that lease
government reserves are less price responsive than other operators. In fact the after-
tax price semi-elasticity of shut-in among Elk Hills wells is only -0.0002 (0.0002). The
2 8Shut-in wells can be re-opened but rarely are because reopening is very costly and shut-in reduces
the share of remaining reserves that is feasibly extractable. Only extraordinary price events typically
trigger the re-opening of shut-in wells.
2 9For wells that are always shut-in or always open to have predicted values between one and zero,
implies unbounded well fixed effect coefficients. The conditional logit model thus excludes these
observations.
difference between the results from column 4 and column 1, however, is statistically
insignificant.
The conditional logit model requires variation in the dependent variable for each
well in the sample. To assess the impact of limiting the sample this way I also
report shut-in semi-elasticity estimates from fixed effect OLS models. For comparison,
column 5 of Table 1.4 reports OLS estimates for the sample of wells with shut-in
variation that is used to estimate the conditional logit model; column 6 reports OLS
estimates from the full sample of wells. The estimate using the smaller sample is
nearly three times as large as the estimate from the full sample and similar to the
conditional logit estimates. The estimates of columns 5 and 6 imply that among
operators that have meaningful discretion over the shut-in status of their wells the
effect of after-tax price on the shut-in decision is more than significantly larger. This
suggests that the sample restrictions of the conditional logit model may be partly
responsible for the higher semi-elasticity estimates of columns I through 4 relative
to column 6. Though the conditional logit coefficients are twice as large as the
full sample OLS coefficient, they remain small in magnitude. Taken together, these
estimates suggest that the temporary tax does not lead to economically important
rates of shut-in.
1.8 Reconciliation with Estimates of the Previous
Literature
The analysis presented in Section 6 uses well-level production data and after-tax
prices carefully constructed from monthly field prices and complex regulatory and tax
treatment rules. Previous studies, summarized in Table 1.5-such as Griffin (1985),
which uses quarterly data from 1971 to 1983, or Hogan (1989) which uses annual data
over the longer 1966 to 1987 interval, or Jones (1990) which examines the 1983 to
1988 time period using quarterly data, or Dahl and Yiicel (1991) which uses quarterly
data from 1971 to 1987, or Ramcharran (2002) which uses annual data from 1973 to
1997-estimate the supply response using aggregate national production and average
pre-tax price.30 In other words these studies use time-series variation alone. As
Table 1.5 reports, these time-series elasticity estimates are 60 and 80 percent smaller
than my preferred elasticity estimate, 0.237 (0.029), when positive and significant
as in the cases of Hogan (1989) and Ramcharran (2002). Jones (1990) estimates a
statistically insignificant supply elasticity of similarly small magnitude, 0.07 (0.04). In
addition to these small positive elasticity estimates, Dahl and Yiicel (1991) estimate
an insignificant negative elasticity and Griffin (1985) estimates a significant negative
elasticity of -0.05 (0.02), which he suggests could be attributable to price controls.3 1
The supply responses estimated in these studies may not be appropriate for assess-
ing producer responses to excise taxes for three reasons. First, the use of the readily
available but imprecise Monthly Energy Review (MER) mean pre-tax first purchase
price series introduces measurement error in the price variable. As explained in Sub-
section 1.3.2 government policies created large deviations between after-tax price and
world price that differed by well. These deviations are not reflected in this pre-tax
price series. The average effective WPT tax rate-the ratio of after-WPT but before-
corporate income tax price to posted price-in my California data is 21.2 percent and
ranges from zero for wells for which the selling price eventually fell below their base
price to 56.4 percent for wells in the highest WPT tax bracket. Since the variation in
WPT rates across wells makes it impossible to construct the average after-tax price
from the average pre-tax price, using the MER average first purchase price series intro-
duces considerable measurement error for a significant fraction of sample years used in
previous studies. Ignoring taxes, especially when producer prices are reduced by the
full or nearly full amount of the tax, leads to measurement error in the producer price
variable and biases the resulting supply elasticity estimate downward. As column 2
of Table 1.6 shows, even in a within-well specification, using the MER prices instead
30These studies estimated supply elasticities for total U.S. production as part of an examination of
market structures among OPEC and non-OPEC countries; nonetheless most of these are the studies
cited in supply elasticity surveys, such as Dahl and Duggan (1996).
31Griffin (1985) is vague as to the particular problems price controls cause for his estimation
strategy. Presumably he means that the average price series from the Monthly Energy Review
that uses somehow overstates prices during the price control era, creating an artificial negative
relationship between price and production.
of well-specific after-tax price results in a small, statistically significant, elasticity es-
timate of 0.021 (0.01).32 Column 1 reports the results of my baseline specification,
which corresponds to Column 1 of Table 1.2. The pooled and times series regressions
reported in columns 3 and 4 yield similarly small elasticity point estimates, though
the pooled estimate, 0.024 (0.01) is statistically significant while aggregating to the
time-series yields an insignificant elasticity estimate of 0.017 (0.015). Taken together
columns 2 through 4 of Table 1.6 make clear that the MER average pre-tax price
series leads to considerably downward biased estimates comparable to those found
by previous studies and roughly one-tenth the size of my estimates based on more
accurate well-specific prices.
Second, this paper aims to assess the impact of taxes on oil production, so the
elasticity estimate should be generated by after-tax price variation of similar persis-
tence as proposed tax policy. The persistence of after-tax price changes driven by
movements in world price may be higher or lower than the persistence of changes in
after-tax price driven by temporary taxes. The supply response of interest is the sup-
ply response to after-tax price movements of similar persistence as proposed policy.
As proposals have largely described temporary taxes, the temporary price changes
induced by government policy isolated here are more appropriate than movements
in world price. Third, time-series regressions use aggregate totals of U.S. oil produc-
tion as the dependent variable, introducing "aggregation bias" since well productivity
is not homogenous. U.S. oil wells lie along a gradient of productivity; when prices
are higher the average producing well is less productive as some high cost wells are
brought online. Aggregation will subsume this heterogeneity and bias the coefficient.
Detailed well-level data make it possible for me to assign each well a more accurate
measure of its after-tax price. Well-level data also allows me to control for underlying
heterogeneity in well productivity overtime and across wells. Table 1.7 details the
advantage of the micro-data. All the regression results reported in Table 1.7 use
well-specific after-tax price as the key explanatory variables. The baseline estimate,
"Note that the preferred specification from my analysis using my constructed after-tax price also
includes month-year fixed effects that are precluded by the within-month-year invariance of the MER
time series.
corresponding the specification reported in column 1 of Table 1.2, is repeated in
column 1 of Table 1.7. Column 2 drops the month-year dummies, meaning that
the within-month variation in price isolated in column 1 is combined with overtime
variation in pre-tax price, sans a linear time trend, to yield the 0.071 (0.014) elasticity
estimate. In other worlds, adding the variation in world price shrinks the elasticity
estimate by roughly 70 percent. Producers are less sensitive to pre-tax price variation,
suggesting that producers may view underlying price variation as less persistent than
variation due to temporary taxes. Columns 3 and 4, which report estimates from
pooled OLS and time-series regressions, respectively, report negative elasticities. This
surprising negative correlation is due to nature of federal policies during decontrol and
the introduction of the WPT. Federal policy systematically treated less productive
wells more favorably-both heavy oil wells, which face higher extraction costs, and
stripper wells, which by definition are only marginally productive, were decontrolled
earlier and assigned lower WPT rates than other wells. Thus wells that on average
produced less oil received higher after-tax prices by fiat. While the well fixed effects of
the specification of column 1 controls for these underlying differences, the pooled and
time-series regressions of columns 3 and 4 reflect the imposed negative correlation.
I construct a subsample of wells for which after-tax price did not reflect such a
fundamental difference in operating costs by dropping all heavy and stripper wells.
In addition I restrict the sample to wells that began production before 1982 to make
the sample even more homogenous, but this restriction is less empirically relevant.33
This smaller sample retains cross-sectional variation in after-tax price since some wells
were classified as favorably treated new oil wells while wells that produced oil in 1978
were classified as old oil wells. The key is that these remaining regulatory and tax
treatment differences reflected less substantial systematic differences in production
costs. Columns 5 and 6 report pooled and time-series estimates from regressions
using this sample of more comparable wells. The elasticity estimates are statistically
indistinguishable from each other and the baseline estimate of column 1. Interestingly,
33 The estimates of columns 5 and 6 are statistically similar using later first-production date sample
limits.
the sign of the time trend coefficient is negative in these specifications unlike in
columns 3 and 4, suggesting that these more similar non-heavy non-stripper wells
slowed their production over time, likely due to depletion, while other factors led
heavy and stripper wells to not suffer the same declining trend.
1.9 Illustration of Lost Producer Surplus Calcula-
tion
The elasticity estimates discussed in Section 1.6 suggest that operators react to tem-
porary excise taxes by reducing production; according to the preferred specification,
reported in column 1 of Table 1.2, a ten percent increase in the excise tax rate leads
to a 2.4 percent reduction in production. The model described in Section 1.2 explains
that a temporary tax has both a direct and an indirect impact: the direct impact is
the decrease in production while the tax is in effect; the indirect effect is the change
in the economic life of the well.14 Because production here is the extraction of an
exhaustible reserve, reducing production while the tax is in place may extend the life
of the well.
The simple model of in Section 1.2 and the estimates from Section 1.6 can be com-
bined to illustrate how the welfare cost of a temporary tax on exhaustible resources
can be calculated. The illustrative calculation is based on two key assumptions: first,
that the simple quadratic cost function captures the cost of extraction, and second,
that wells are far enough from the end of their economic lives that second term of
equation 1.15 can be ignored. The second assumption is strengthened by the re-
sults reported in Section 1.7, temporary price movements did not cause economically
meaningful increases in the well shut-in rate, suggesting that few wells were very close
to the end of their economic lives. In addition, the model assumes that the operator
34 Alternative cost functions, namely ones where the cost of extraction is strongly impacted by the
amount of reserves remaining in the well, may not yield as long an extension in the life of the well. If
the cost of extraction in the post-tax period is substantially reduced by the larger reserves resulting
from slower extraction while the tax was in place, then the operator will pump more in the post-tax
period. This increase in the pumping rate may lead to a smaller increase in the life of the well.
knows the price path with certainty. The importance on this assumption hinges on
whether or not the general form of the extraction rules of equations 1.13 and 1.14
generalize to models that add uncertainty in prices. With these assumptions in mind,
the elasticity estimates from Section 1.6 can shed light on the welfare cost of the
temporary taxes like the WPT.
As Section 1.3 explains, excise taxes that apply to only domestic producers cannot
be passed on to refiners or consumers because imported oil was exempted from the
WPT. No change in consumer surplus results from such a tax. Because there is very
little shut-in in response to changes in the after-tax price, the change in producer
surplus is nearly equal to the change in producer profits; the only deviations arising
from the small number of wells that shut-in and thus save their fixed costs. The
welfare cost of the tax, the reduction in producer surplus less the tax revenue, will
be assessed here for a typical well, that is, a well that does not shut-in in reaction to
the tax.
For clarity, the pre-tax price of oil is assumed to be constant, so that pi = (1 - T) p
and P2 = p. The change in the life of the well for a small change in the tax rate,
according to equation 1.17, is:
dT< t 1 T
~ 1 + e-rTO
where r is the excise tax rate, ti is the duration of the tax starting at time 0, r is
the interest rate and To is the original economic life of the well.35 For example, a 15
percent excise tax in place for five years extends the life of an initially 40-year well by
approximately 0.75 of a year, assuming a pre-tax price of $25 and an interest rate of
five percent. Once the tax has been introduced, the operator reduces his extraction
rate before ti, extending the life of his well by dT. Producer surplus is reduced by
three factors: the tax liability incurred due to the tax, the profit loss from delaying
extraction and the add cost of sub-optimal extraction of the reserves due to tilting of
35This dT is an estimate of the increase in the life of the well that results from the introduction
of a temporary tax. The estimate assumes that that well life in the denominator is the original well
life. The actual change in well life would be calculated allowing this variable to increase along the
interval over which we integrate with respect to dP.
the extraction path in response to the tax. The total change in producer surplus due
to the introduction of the temporary tax will be:
T1
APS = j e -rt [(pqt - (1 - Tt) pqt) - (c (qt) - c (4t))} dt
where qt is the extraction rate at time t if the tax had never been levied, and qt
is the extraction rate at time t in light of the temporary tax. The time horizon
is T 1 = To + dT, the new economic life of the well extended by the reduction in
extraction between time 0 and time ti; the no-tax extraction rate qt will be zero after
time To. The tax rate, Tt, varies over time, as it is initially positive while the tax is
in place but is zero after time ti once the tax expires.
The average impact of a change in after-tax price on oil production implies an
average value of c of the cost function used in the model described in Section 1.2,
c (qt) = cqt + f. For the baseline specification, column 2 of Table 1.2, the coefficient
estimate, that is d, is 8.730 (1.082). This coefficient implies that for the average
well c = 0.0573.
Figure 1.4 plots the optimal extraction path before and after the introduction of
a 15 percent temporary tax that is in place for five years. Pre-tax price is $25 over
the whole life of the well. The well has an original life of 40 years, which increases to
approximately 40.74 years due to the tax. The area between the two curves to the left
of their intersection is the amount of oil not extracted while the tax is in place that
would have been extracted had their been no tax. The area between the two curves
to the right of their intersection represents the delayed extraction of this oil. The
product of these areas and after-tax price, discounted appropriately, is the change is
revenue due to the forward tilting of the extraction path caused by the introduction
of the tax.
Figure 1.5 plots the cost of extraction over the original extraction path and the
extraction path once the tax has been introduced. Cost-savings from extracting less
oil during the five years while the tax is in place are offset by increased costs later
as the "additional reserves" are extracted over the post-tax life of the well. The
difference in total extraction costs-the difference between the area to the left of the
intersection of the two curves and the area to the right, discounted appropriately-
represents the added costs of suboptimal extraction due to the introduction of the
tax.
Government revenue from the temporary excise tax:
GR = j e-rTpqtdt
partially offsets the reduction in producer surplus. The total welfare cost of the tax
is thus:
APS + GR = J e- [rt - (1 - t) pit) - (c (qt) - c (4t))] dt - j -rp~tdt
Table 1.8 reports the decrease in welfare due to a 15 percent excise tax as a fraction
of original producer surplus, using the implied cost parameter, for different well lives,
T, and tax durations, ti. The interest rate and pre-tax price used are five percent and
$25, respectively. Table 1.9 reports the decrease in producer surplus as a fraction of
the government revenue raised from the tax. These ratios represent the average cost
of a dollar of revenue in terms of lost producer surplus. Producer surplus before and
after the tax and government revenue in dollars can be found in the appendix tables.
As we would expect, the estimates suggest that a temporary 15 percent excise tax
reduces surplus more for short-lived wells and that its burden rises with the length of
time it is in place. Overall the numbers suggest that the welfare cost of temporary
taxes like the WPT is much smaller than a static estimate would suggest. In fact, a
five-year tax on a well with an original life of ten years reduces welfare by less than 5
percent. The welfare loss falls precipitously for wells with longer economic lives. The
welfare loss of the five-year tax falls to 2 percent for a well with a 20-year life, and is
less than 1 percent for a 40 year well. The welfare cost outpaces the revenue raised
from the tax, by as little as 13 percent in the case of a five-year tax on a 40-year lived
well and as much as 66 percent in the case of a one-year tax on a 10-year lived well.
If the tax were permanent instead of temporary, the shape of the extraction path
would not be affected but the well will be abandoned with more oil remaining in the
well if there are any fixed costs of production. In this case, the tax revenue raised
would exactly offset the loss in producer surplus while the well is extracting since the
production path is unaffected by a permanent tax. The welfare loss would arise from
the permanent loss of oil due to early shut-in; the size of this loss depends on the
fixed and variable costs of production.
These calculations only capture the change in producer surplus from raising rev-
enue through oil excise taxes. In the case of the WPT the revenues were earmarked
for specific purposes, namely subsidies for the production on synthetic fuels and con-
servation programs. The ultimate welfare impact of the decontrol and taxation of
U.S. oil production hinges not only on the welfare cost of the tax but on the welfare
impact of these projects as well.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper uses new detailed data on the quantity of oil produced by wells in Califor-
nia to estimate the effect of tax- and price control-induced variation in oil prices on
production decisions. The unusual cross-sectional variation in after-tax price provided
by these government interventions allows for flexible controls for underlying changes
in technology and time-varying factors, like world price, that affect oil production.
The estimated coefficients imply an elasticity of approximately 0.24, suggesting that
a 10 percent excise tax leads to a 2.4 percent reduction in domestic oil production.
I find that while oil production from existing wells is responsive to after-tax price,
the after-tax price has no appreciable impact on wells that flow in accord to their
natural subsurface pressure. Because these estimates imply the producers alter their
behavior in response to tax changes, they suggest that the incidence of an oil excise
tax cannot be modeled simply as a tax on the rents of oil producers.
Under the assumption that world oil prices are insensitive to U.S. producer deci-
sions, an excise tax on U.S. producers will reduce producer profits-a reduction only
partly offset by the government revenue raised from the tax. To illustrate how the
production elasticity estimates can be used to assess the efficiency effects of a tempo-
rary tax on exhaustible resources, I calculate the changes in production, extraction
costs and time path, and revenue from a temporary 15 percent excise tax. The calcu-
lations suggest that the distortion in production decisions reduces the present value
of producer surplus by between one and five percent of its original value, depending
on the original life of the well and the duration of the temporary tax. Put differently,
these calculations suggest that the average dollar of revenue raised from an excise tax
on California oil producers costs between $1.13 and $1.66 in lost producer surplus.
The supply responses measured here are potentially relevant to the evaluation
of a range of fiscal policies that could affect crude oil production. These include
changes in gasoline excise taxes, introduction of carbon taxes, and oil import fees that
could raise the price received by domestic oil producers. The results are particularly
important for the analysis of policies such as oil import fees that seek to promote
energy independence by raising producer prices of fossil fuels, since they suggest that
one impact of such policies will be acceleration of U.S. oil production from currently
producing wells. My estimates do not provide any evidence on how such fees might
affect exploration for new oil reserves or the decision to bring shut-in wells back into
production.
The empirical findings bear on short-run production decisions, and it is important
to remember several cautions about their broader interpretation. First, temporary
taxes are likely to delay exploration and development activities-the taxes delay
profits so firms will want to delay investments. This response margin is not captured
by the analysis presented above. Though exploration within the continental U.S.
has waned over time, firms could delay the exploration and development of offshore
reserves in reaction to temporary taxes, making the inclusion or exemption of these
areas from proposed taxes a policy question with potentially important ramifications.
Second, California wells and the oil they produce have higher extractions costs
than the average U.S. well. Because the oil is of such high specific gravity (low API
gravity) it is costly to extract, or lift, to the surface. The extraction rules derived
in Section 1.2 imply that the estimates from California may well provide a lower
bound on after-tax responsiveness for the average American well. Third, the estimates
generated here are identified by policies from the late 1970s and 1980s and are thus
historic. Although most major technological breakthroughs in the oil industry over
the last 30 years, such as horizontal drilling methods, have affected drilling rather
than pumping, technological changes that have improved extraction efficiency may
make these estimates less applicable to current proposals.
An important area for future work is how tax-induced distortions of the extraction
path affect the total quantity of reserves extracted. If perturbing the extraction
path relative to its no-tax level leads to less aggregate extraction over the life of the
well, then even temporary taxes will lead to permanent reductions in production and
corresponding welfare losses. The effect of temporary taxes on total extraction is an
open empirical question. One way such production loss can occur is if the well is
shut-in earlier than otherwise, but this is not the only channel. While the estimates
from California data presented here imply that shut-in decisions are relatively tax
insensitive, shut-in elasticities could potentially be higher in other parts of the U.S.
Shut-in elasticities are predicted to be higher where wells either have shorter lives or
higher fixed and variable costs; although California wells have higher than average
variable costs, fixed costs may be larger and wells shorter lived in other parts of the
U.S. I hope to address these issues in future work.
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Figure 1.1: California Oil and Gas District Map
The Bakersfield district accounts for roughly 61 percent of well-month observations and oil
production; the next most productive district, Cypress, accounts for 18 percent of well-month
observations but 24 percent of oil production. Ventura and Santa Maria, which are both coastal
each account for approximately 6 percent of production and the final district, Coalinga, pumps
the remaining 3 percent of California oil production.
Source: California Department of Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resource











- New oil: oil extracted from
in June of 1979.
e Very heavy oil: oil with an
September of 1979.
wells that did not produce oil in 1978, was decontrolled
API gravity of less than 16 degrees, was decontrolled in
* Heavy oil: oil with an API gravity of less than 20 but at least 16 degrees, was
decontrolled in January of 1980.
" Old oil: oil extracted from wells that produced oil in 1978, was gradually
decontrolled between January of 1980 until January 28, 1981. During the phase-out
period old oil sold at a price that was equal to the weighted average of the world
market price and the price control price ceiling, with the weight on the world market
price growing by 0.046 each month. Old oil was fully decontrolled by President
Reagan on January 28, 1981. February 1981 was the first full month old oil was
decontrolled.
- The 1980 Windfall Profit Tax was signed into law April 2, 1980 and went into effect
immediately.
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Figure 1.3: Prices, Before and After Taxes and Fixed Effects, Two Wells
Well 120005: Livermore Field, Operator: Hershey Oil Corp.
Old Oil, API Gravity of 23; Stripper starting 10/1982 (70% tax rate until 10/1982, then 60 percent)
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Well 1300071: Brentwood Field, Operator: Occidental Petroleum Corp.
New Oil, API Gravity of 40.7; Never Stripper (30% tax rate until 1982, then gradual decrease to 22.5%)
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6l Extraction Path Before and After the Introduction of a 5-year 15% Excise Tax.
.nal life, 5 percent interest rate.
Original Extraction Path
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Time
Optimal Extraction Before and After the Introduction of a 5-year 15 % Excise Tax.
.nal life, 5 percent interest rate.
Original Extraction Cost
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Time
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Mean
Oil Production (barrels)





























Note: These summary statistics describe the observations that comprise the sample for the
regression analysis. Not all 75,342 wells report 108 observations since both new wells are drilled and
old wells are abandoned during the sample period.
Summary StatisticsTable 1. 1:
Table 1.2: Well-Specific Output: Panel Data Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After-tax Price 8.730 8.741 7.659 9.598 -18.230
(1.082) (1.082) (0.979) (0.765) (1.026)
Well Age -1.269 -1.228 6.531 -1.258 -0.917
(0.069) (0.081) (1.885) (0.050) (0.028)
Well Age Squared -(0.0003)
(0.0002)
Well Dummies Y Y Y Y N
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y N
API Gravity Decile Dummies N N Y N N
API Gravity Decile Time Trends N N Y N N
0.237 0.238 0.208 0.261 -0.496
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028)
Number of Wells 75,342 75,342 75,342 73,548 75,342
Observations 6,517,140 6,517,140 6,517,140 6,350,820 6,517,140
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of
g,, = plo + f#l(1 - rt0)(Bg + (1 - x,:)(P -- B,)) + #32agej, + x, + b, + e-,
The dependent variable is the quantity of oil produced by well i in month t. After-Tax Price is the
posted price at which oil from well i was sold during month t, net of corporate and Windfall Profit taxes.
The coefficient on After-Tax Price, p8, reports the supply response of operators to net price.
Column 1 is the baseline specification; it includes time and well dummies and a control for well age.
Column 2 adds a quadratic well age term. Column 3 includes separate quadratic time trends, slopes and
coefficients, by API gravity decile. Column 4 drops all observations from the federal Naval Petroleum
Reserve. The elasticity calculations for all specifications is the product of the coefficient estimate and the
ratio of average after-tax price to average quantity for the sample of 4,681,973 producing oil wells.
All heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the individual well level.
Table 1.3: Regressions of Quantity Produced on After-Tax Price,
Flowing vs. Pumped Wells
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Pumped Flowing
After Tax-price Elasticity 0.237 0.356 -0.101
(0.029) (0.024) (0.088)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.253
95% Confidence Intervals [0.180, 0.295} [0.083, 0.108] [-0.274, 0.072]
After-tax Price 8.730 11.520 -12.180
(1.082) (0.784) (10.649)
Well Age -1.269 -1.570 -0.377
(0.069) (0.055) (0.866)
Well Dummies Y Y Y
Time Dummies Y Y Y
Number of Wells 75,342 72,797 13,198
Observations 6,517,140 5,698,198 818,942
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of
ga = P0 + l1p(1 - ro )(Bt + (1 - (P - B9, + 8 2age,, + Xt + b + E,
The dependent variable is the quantity of oil produced by well i in month t. After-Tax Price
is the posted price at which oil from well i was sold during month t, net of corporate and
Windfall Profit taxes. The coefficient on After-Tax Price, p1, reports the supply response of
operators to net price.
All specifications include well and time dummies. Column 1 is the baseline specification; it
reports the same estimates as column 1 of Table 2. Column 2 restricts the sample to only
pumped wells. Column 3 restricts the sample to only flowing wells, which do not require
mechanical lift to produce oil. The elasticity calculations for all specifications is the product of
the coefficient estimate and the ratio of average after-tax price to average quantity for the
estimation sample of producing oil wells.
All heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the individual well level.
Table 1.4: Conditional Logit Models of Well Shut-in Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit OLS OLS
Shut-in Var. Shut-in Var. Shut-in Var. No NPR Shut-in Var. Full Sample
After-tax Price -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0064 -0.0060 -0.0043 -0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Well Age 0.0126 0.0126 0.0455 0.0121 0.0014 0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Well Age Squared 0.000
(0.0000)
Well Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
API Gravity Decile Dummies N N Y N N N
API Gravity Decile Time Trends N N Y N N N
-0.095 -0.095 -0.117 -0.111 -0.080 -0.027
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0037) (0.0169) (0.0078) (0.0034)
Number of Wells 29,297 29,297 29,297 29,297 29,297 75,342
Observations 2,694,267 2,694,267 2,694,267 2,694,267 2,694,267 6,517,140
Note: This table presents conditional logit estimates of
5, = pl, + fl,(1 - TC)(Bi' + (1 - T: )(P, - Bj.,)) + pisage;, + f (t ) + 6i + ei,
The binary dependent variable is one if well i is shut-in in month t and zero if it is not. After-Tax Price is the
posted price at which oil from well i was sold during month t, less corporate and Windfall Profit taxes. The
coefficient on After-Tax Price, il, reports the extensive response of operators to net price.
Column 1 includes a full set of month-year and well dummies. Column 2 adds a quadratic term in well age.
Column 3 adds dummies and quadratic time trends for each API gravity decile. Column 4 excludes observations
from the federal NPR. The semi-elasticity calculations for all specifications is the product of the marginal effect
estimate and average after-tax price. Column 5 estimates an OLS model with well and time fixed effects using the
full sample of wells. Column 6 estimates the fixed effect OLS model using the smaller sample of wells that experience
variation in shut-in status. Columns 1-4 and 6 use a sample of wells that experience variation in shut-in status-a
requirement of the conditional logit model.
All standard errors are clustered at the individual well level.
Table 1.5: U.S. Supply Elasticities From Previous Studies
Study Sample Period Data Elasticity Estimate
Quarterly data on total U.S. production
and average pre-tax posted price from
Griffin (1985) 1971Q1 - 1983Q3 1971Q1 to 1976Q2, average pre-tax first -0.05 (0.02)
purchase price from 1976Q3 to 1983Q3.
No controls.
Annual data on total U.S. production and
Hogan (1989) 1966 - 1987 0.09 (0.03)
average pre-tax first purchase price.
Quarterly data on total U.S. production
Jones (1990) 1983Q3 - 1988Q4 and average pre-tax first purchase price. 0.07 (0.04)
No controls.
Quarterly data on total U.S. production
and average first purchase price. Added
Dahl and Yiicel (1991) 1971Q1 - 1987Q4 -0.08 (0.06)
controls for production cost, wells drilled,
U.S. income, and world oil production.
Annual data on total U.S. production and
Ramcharran (2002) 1973 - 1997 average pre-tax first purchase price. 0.05 (0.02)
Linear time trend included.
Note: These studies estimated supply elasticities for total U.S. production as part of an examination of
market structures among OPEC and non-OPEC countries; nonetheless most of these are the studies cited
in supply elasticity surveys, such as Dahl and Duggan (1996). All of these analyses rely on time-series
data for the U.S. These models were all estimated in logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.6: Alternative Specifications Using National Average Price Series
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Within Well Pooled Time-Series
WTI Price 8.730 0.320 0.365 11,223
(1.082) (0.148) (0.153) (10,036)




Well Dummies Y Y N N
Time Dummies Y N N N
0.237 0.021 0.024 0.017
After Tax-price Elasticity 0.3002004001(0.029) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
p-value 0.000 0.030 0.017 0.263
Number of Wells 75,342 75,342 75,342 75,342
Observations 6,517,140 6,517,140 6,517,140 6,517,140
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of the equation,
q, = Po + pf~j + f(t) +
The dependent variable is the quantity of oil produced by well i in month t in the baseline, within-
well and pooled specifications; the dependent variable is the total quantity produced across all wells in
month t in the time-series specifications. Average price is the average pre-tax first purchase price from
the Department of Energy's Monthly Energy Review price series. The coefficient on After-Tax Price, ,
reports the supply response of operators to this price measure.
Column 1 is the baseline specification where the price variable is the well-specific after-tax price,
corresponding to column 2 of table 2; it includes time and well dummies and a control for well age.
Column 2 uses average pre-tax price from the Monthly Economic Review (MER) price series rather than
the well-specific after-tax price and drops the time dummies; it controls linearly for time and omits the
well age control to better match previous time-series specifications. Column 3 excludes both time and
well dummies but retains the linear time control. Column 4 reports estimates from a time-series
regression of total production across all wells each month on MER average pre-tax price. As in the
previous literature no attempt to correct for autocorrelation is made. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the
sample to non-heavy, non-stripper wells that began production prior to January 1982 in an attempt to
construct of sample of more comparable wells. These wells were treated differently by decontrol policies
and the WPT as some are new wells and others are old wells. Column 5 reports estimates from a
specification identical to that of column 3 but uses this smaller, more comparable sample. Column 6
reports estimates from a specification identical to that of column 4 but again on the smaller sample of
non-heavy non-stripper wells that are both new and old. The elasticity calculations for 1, 2, 3 and 5 are
the product of the coefficient estimate and the ratio of average MER pre-tax price to average quantity
for the sample of 4,681,973 producing oil wells. For columns 4 and 6 the in-sample average MER pre-
tax price and oil production are used to construct the elasticity.
For columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the individual
well level.
Table 1.7: Alternative Specifications Using After-Tax Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Within Well Pooled Time-Series Pooled Time-Series
After-Tax Price 8.730 2.617 -19.676 -58,302 13.432 158,262
(1.082) (0.500) (1.015) (39,283) (4.946) (44,607)
Well Age -1.269 - - - - -
(0.069) - - - - -
Time - -1.260 0.315 0.098 -3.476 -56,305
- (0.080) (0.081) (0.007) (0.362) (2,164)
Well Dummies Y Y N N N -
Time Dummies Y N N N N -
0.237 0.071 -0.535 -0.036 0.149 0.208
(0.029) (0.014) (0.028) (0.024) (0.055) (0.059)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000
Number of Wells 75,342 75,342 75,342 - 20,699 -
Observations 6,517,140 6,517,140 6,517,140 108 1,090,659 108
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of the equation,
g, = po + #1 (1 - To ) (Bt + (1 - -r )(P - -8,) + f (t) + et
The dependent variable is the quantity of ~oil produced by well i in month t in the baseline, within-
well and pooled specifications; the dependent variable is the total quantity produced across all wells in
month t in the time-series specifications. After-Tax Price is the posted price at which oil from well i
was sold during month t, net of corporate and Windfall Profit taxes. The coefficient on After-Tax
Price, pJ, reports the supply response of operators to net price.
Column 1 is the baseline specification, corresponding to column 2 of table 2; it includes time and
well dummies and a control for well age. Column 2 drops the time dummies; it instead controls linearly
for time and omits the well age control to better match previous time-series specifications. The
coefficient on after-tax price in a within-well specification that controls linearly for well age but not for
time is 2.617 (0.500), within rounding error of the estimate reported in column 2. Column 3 excludes
both time and well dummies but retains the linear time control. Column 4 reports estimates from a
time-series regression of total production across all wells each month on average after-tax price. As in
the previous literature no attempt to correct for autocorrelation is made. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the
sample to non-heavy, non-stripper wells that began production prior to January 1982 in an attempt to
construct of sample of more comparable wells. These wells were treated differently by decontrol policies
and the WPT as some are new wells and others are old wells. Column 5 reports estimates from a
specification identical to that of column 3 but uses this smaller, more comparable sample. Column 6
reports estimates from a specification identical to that of column 4 but again on the smaller sample of
non-heavy non-stripper wells that are both new and old. The elasticity calculations for 1, 2, 3 and 5 are
the product of the coefficient estimate and the ratio of average after-tax price to average quantity for
the sample of 4,681,973 producing oil wells. For columns 4 and 6 the in-sample average after-tax price
and oil production are used to construct the elasticity.
For columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the individual
well level.
Table 1.8: Percentage Decrease in Total Surplus Due to the
Introduction of a 15% Temporary Excise Tax
Duration of Temporary Tax (ti)
T1 1 2 3 5
10 -0.015 -0.027 -0.037 -0.049
15 -0.007 -0.014 -0.020 -0.030
20 -0.005 -0.009 -0.013 -0.020
25 -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.015
30 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012
40 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008
Note: This table reports the ratio of the change in total surplus, the loss in producer surplus less
government revenue, over the government revenue, for a single well whose cost function
parameter c = 0.0573, which corresponds to the average elasticity response reported in column 1
of Table 2. Pre-tax price is assumed constant and equal to $25. The interest rate is 5 percent.
Producer surplus before the tax is calculated using the following equation:
P T t p rT-) p e-r(T-t) )2 t 2(I 'O2PS= e[-" pe2c dt= 1-e~
Producer surplus after the tax is calculated using the following equation:
[ 2c c 2c 2c [ 2c 2c 2c 2c r
(1- T)2 
- e )+ (- rT' )2)
Government revenue from the temporary tax is calculated using the following equation:
GR= f'e-"rTW(I r)p e - lt))t = TP2 ((1 (i-e-") -e' tfo 2c 2c 2c r
where I = 7P + dT, the new economic life of the well. The original economic life of the well, 1,
varies down the rows while the duration of the temporary tax, ti, varies along the columns. The
entries are (PS-PS'+GR)/ PS.
Table 1.9: Ratio of the Change in Surplus to Government Revenue
Raised From the Introduction of a 15% Temporary Excise Tax
Duration of Temporary Tax (tj)
T-J 1 2 3 5
10 -1.66 -1.63 -1.59 -1.52
15 -1.38 -1.38 -1.37 -1.36
20 -1.27 -1.27 -1.27 -1.27
25 -1.21 -1.21 -1.21 -1.21
30 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
40 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13
Note: This table reports the ratio of the change in total surplus, the loss in producer surplus less
government revenue, over the government revenue, for a single well whose cost function
parameter c = 0.0573, which corresponds to the average elasticity response reported in column 1
of Table 2. Pre-tax price is assumed constant and equal to $25. The interest rate is 5 percent.
Producer surplus before the tax is calculated using the following equation:
P S " = rte " p e- r T - c p - r( t d t = 1 - e - )PS c 2c ( 2c 2c 4cr 1e)
Producer surplus after the tax is calculated using the following equation:
PS ~ pe- ('-t) Q~ ((--)p pe r(T'-t) 2 1 r P p p -r(T' -t) \ P / -r(T -t) \2
PS'=fe~"(1-2) - -c - 2dt+ e~p- - _C dt2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c 2c
= 
2 (((1 -)11-e~ t )+(1-e-T' )2)
Government revenue from the temporary tax is calculated using the following equation:
GR = e~rtp(I - e r(T 1)) = W 2 ((1_ I'(-e) e-rT')
S2c 2c 2c r
where To = § + dT, the new economic life of the well. The original economic life of the well, 7,
varies down the rows while the duration of the temporary tax, ti, varies along the columns. The
entries are (PS-PS'+GR)/GR.
Appendix 1: Producer Surplus Before and After the Introduction of a
Temporary Excise Tax and Government Revenue Raised
Table A1.1: Producer Surplus Before the Introduction of a 15%
Temporary Excise Tax


































Note: This table presents producer surplus for the operator of a single well whose cost function
parameter c = 0.0573, which corresponds to the average elasticity response reported in column 1
of table 2. Pre-tax price is assumed constant and equal to $25. The interest rate is 5 percent.
Producer surplus is calculated using the following equation:
PS= 0 e~"[p pe -cTOt) _, dt = 4c (1-erTO) 20 2c 2c 2c 2c 4cr
The economic life of the well, 'I, varies down the rows while the duration of the temporary tax,
ti, varies along the columns. Before the tax is in place, the "duration" of the tax is irrelevant,
thus the surplus is equal across columns.
Table A1.2: Producer Surplus After the Introduction of a 15%
Temporary Excise Tax




























Note: This table presents producer surplus for the operator of a single well whose cost function
parameter c = 0.0573, which corresponds to the average elasticity response reported in column 1
of table 2. Pre-tax price is assumed constant and equal to $25. The interest rate is 5 percent.
Producer surplus is calculated using the following equation:
Psi~ ~~~___ 
_____ -,T-, TI )p per(T', )2 1 , e /" p Ppe-,T-)_ (P pe rT-))
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The economic life of the well, V, varies down the rows while the duration of the temporary tax,
ti, varies along the columns. Before the tax is in place, the "duration" of the tax is irrelevant,
thus the surplus is equal across columns.
Table A1.3: Government Revenue From the Introduction of a 15%
Temporary Excise Tax


























Note: This table presents government revenue from temporary taxation of a single well whose
cost function parameter c = 0.0573, which corresponds to the average elasticity response reported
in column 1 of table 2. Pre-tax price is assumed constant and equal to $25. The interest rate is
5 percent. Government revenue is calculated using the following equation:
GR = e-rp (I1-)p per(Tt))t = ( (i - ert)- ' )tfo 2c 2c 2c r t
The economic life of the well, V, varies down the rows while the duration of the temporary tax,
t,, varies along the columns. Before the tax is in place, the "duration" of the tax is irrelevant,
thus the surplus is equal across columns.
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Chapter 2
Do Tax Credits Stimulate R&D
Spending? Revisiting the Effect of
the R&D Tax Credit in its First
Decade
2.1 Introduction
In an attempt to stanch a decade-long decline in the GDP-share of private R&D
spending, Congress adopted a tax credit for R&D expenditures in 1981. The Research
and Experimentation Credit (R&D Credit) awards firms that increase their research
spending a tax credit of up to 25 percent of their expenditures in excess of their past
research spending. As the credit is incremental, the research credit offers no subsidy
to firms that fail to increase their R&D spending. Along with existing provisions that
allowed firms to expense R&D spending, the research credit lowers the after-tax cost
of qualified research in hope of incentivizing firms to increase their R&D investments.
As the primary tax provision designed to encourage private R&D expenditures,
the effectiveness of the Research and Experimentation Credit (R&D credit) has been
of interest to both researchers and policymakers alike. Although early work (Eisner
et al (1984)1 and Mansfield (1986)2 ) suggested that the credit had an insignificant
or modest impact on R&D spending, more recent studies have found surprisingly
large user cost elasticities. Using confidential IRS data, Altshuler (1988) found that
between 1981 and 1984 average effective credit rates were just a fraction-less than
one-tenth-of the period's 25 percent statutory credit rate. Later studies, most no-
tably Hines (1993) and Hall (1994), found that the R&D tax credit proffered much
more bang-for-the-buck. Hines (1993) explored the effect of changes in the allocation
rules of R&D expensing on the R&D activity of multinational firms. Using a special
Compustat data panel describing foreign pretax earnings and foreign taxes paid be-
tween 1984 and 1989 for a subset of firms, Hines exploited variation in the fraction
of U.S. R&D expenses firms can deduct against U.S. income for tax purposes to es-
timate the response of R&D spending to its after-tax price. His short-run estimates
ranging from -1.2 to -1.6 and long-run estimates ranging from -1.3 to -2.0 suggest
a tax-price elasticity of R&D that well exceeds unity. Although the changes in the
allocation rules are conceivably exogenous, Hines' tack relies on variation in the tax
treatment of R&D expenditures across firms-it essentially compares firms with and
without excess foreign tax credits, an experiment that is different than the changes
in the main statutory provisions of the R&D tax credit that are examined here.
The closest antecedent to this paper is Hall (1994), which used Compustat data
from financial filings beginning in 1981 and ending in 1991. In her log first-difference
specifications, Hall uses cross-time within-firm variation in tax positions and marginal
R&D tax subsidies to estimate a short-run elasticity of -1.5 (0.3) and a long-run
'Eisner, Albert and Sullivan (1984) took a natural experiment approach and made use of special
survey data describing the composition of firm R&D spending to construct a difference-in-difference
estimate of the effect of the R&D tax credit. They found that spending on research that qualified
for the R&D tax credit grew 25.7 (5.0) percentage points faster than unqualified research spending
between 1980 and 1981. They found that difference in spending growth was statistically insignificant
in 1982, suggesting that the policy change did not fundamentally alter spending patterns. Comparing
changes in aggregate qualified and unqualified R&D spending implicitly assumes that absent the
introduction of the R&D tax credit these types of R&D spending would have increased identically;
systematic spending trend differences among firms with different R&D spending mixes would violate
this assumption.
2Mansfield (1986) compared the experiences of the US, Canada and Sweden using firm-level survey
data; executives of a stratified sample of firms were asked to estimate the effect of the relevant tax
incentives on the firm's R&D expenditures. According to the executives, each dollar of forgone tax
revenue resulted in 30 to 40 cents of induced R&D spending.
elasticity of -2.7 (0.8).
More recent work examining the impact of state tax credits and international
experiences has found more modest elasticities (Wilson (2007), Bloom et al (2002)).
Cross-country analysis by Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) suggests much lower
short- and long-run user cost elasticities. In their preferred dynamic specification they
estimate a -0.14 short-run elasticity and a -1.09 long-run elasticity. Bloom et al worry
that OLS estimates of the user cost elasticity would be upward biased because the user
cost of R&D is a function of the interest rate which is positively correlated with R&D
spending. They instrument the R&D user costs with the tax component of the user
cost to address this endogeneity issue as well as attenuation bias concerns. Although
some countries in their sample have incremental R&D credit regimes, where high
spending firms receive higher credit rates, Bloom et al do not address this potential
source of bias. Wilson (2009) uses variation in state tax preferences for R&D to
estimate both the impact of a state's R&D policy on R&D conducted in that state and
the impact on R&D in neighboring states. Using state aggregate data he finds that
R&D spending is negatively impacted by tax preferences in other states, suggesting
that firms shift R&D to proximate states with lower R&D user costs. The magnitude
of this response nearly offsets the in-state response of R&D to changes in the in-state
user cost. Wilson concludes that the aggregate R&D user cost elasticity is small and
near-zero; state subsidies draw R&D across state borders rather than encouraging a
new dollar of R&D spending. His state-level analysis yields an elasticity estimate of
0.17 in the short-run and 0.68 in the long-run. Wilson assumes that all R&D subject
to an incremental R&D tax credit receives the highest statutory rate, abstracting
from simultaneity between R&D spending and R&D user costs.
This paper re-examines the impact of federal tax advantages for R&D between
the inception of the R&D tax credit in 1981 and 1991. Data after 1991 are excluded
because the credit was allowed to first lapse in 1992. Since this and other lapses
likely affected firms' expectations of the after-tax user cost of R&D, the analysis
here is limited to only the first 11 years after the introduction of the research credit.
Furthermore, during this period the R&D credit underwent several substantial revi-
sions that allow for an instrumental variables strategy based on tax changes. Unlike
previous efforts to assess the impact of tax subsidies on R&D spending, this paper
incorporates restricted-access IRS corporate return data. As explained in more detail
below, the structure of the R&D tax credit makes a firm's marginal tax subsidy diffi-
cult to infer from annual R&D spending as reported in its public financial statements
alone. Data from the corporate tax return allows for accurate measurement of the tax
subsidy each firm faces on its marginal R&D dollar each year and allows for unbiased
assessment of the impact of the tax credit on R&D expenditures.
The main contributions of this paper are the use of IRS Statistics of Income
(SOI) data that accurately describe marginal credit rates and a more direct correction
for potential biases due to the simultaneity of R&D spending and marginal credit
rates. Tax subsidy terms constructed using only publicly available Compustat data,
and constructed using IRS data, differ and the differences often vary from year to
year. This finding at a minimum suggests potential measurement error in subsidy
rates calculated using public use data. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that
different instrument sets produce different estimates of the effect of tax subsidies
on R&D expenditures. These findings raise questions about the robustness of many
panel data strategies for estimating the elasticity of R&D spending.
Using an instrumental variables strategy based on tax law changes to disentangle
any potential simultaneity between R&D spending and its user cost, I estimate a
short-run user cost elasticity for R&D spending. The results yield a range of estimates
for the effect of tax incentives on R&D investment. Estimates using only publicly
available data suggest that a ten percent tax subsidy for R&D yields between $3.5
(0.24) million and $10.7 (1.79) million in new R&D spending by the average firm.
Estimates from IRS SOI data, which only reports qualified research expenditures,
suggest that a ten percent reduction in the usercost would lead the average firm
to increase qualified spending by $2 .0 (0.39) million. Analysis of the components
of qualified research spending shows that wages and supplies, which comprise the
bulk of qualified spending, account for the increase in research spending. Estimates
from the much smaller merged sample, which makes use of the more precise tax data
to calculate the tax component of the usercost, suggest that qualified spending is
responsive to the tax subsidy. A similar response in total spending is not statistically
discernible in the merged sample. The inconsistency of estimates across datasets,
instrument choice and specifications highlights the sensitivity of estimates of the tax-
price elasticity of R&D spending.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 sketches the conceptual framework
underlying the regression analysis. R&D is viewed as a durable input into the firm's
production function. Tax subsidies are modeled as inducing relatively small changes
in steady-state investments in R&D. Section 2.2 briefly describes key aspects of the
R&D tax credit and their impact on the user cost of R&D spending. Section 2.3
discusses and contrasts public financial and restricted-access SOI data and details
measurement issues. Section 2.4 lays out the empirical model and methodology,
including a description of the instrumental variables used. Section 2.5 presents the
results of different specifications using the two data sets. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Like most other R&D studies, this paper treats R&D, specifically the services of
R&D capital, as an input into a firm's production function.3 Research projects are
undertaken by private firms to develop new products or new methods that increase
sales. The price of output is normalized to one. The output of firm i in time t, Yit,
is generated via a production function with a constant elasticity of substitution (-)
between the stock of R&D capital, Sit, and all other inputs, lit:
Yit = F (Sit, it) = ±iS + (1 - 0l) I (2.1)
where O is the firm-specific CES distribution parameter. Note that - captures both
the elasticity of substitution and the user cost elasticity of R&D spending. R&D
3 Though only a small share of R&D spending is directly for capital goods, more than half of
all expenditures consist of wages and fringe benefits and only 5 percent of costs are attributable
to depreciation (NSF 2003), R&D expenditures are thought to buildup a stock of R&D knowledge.
The service flows from this knowledge stock is the input into firm production.
investments, Rit, add to the R&D capital stock, Sit, without adjustment frictions;
R&D capital depreciates at a constant rate 6. The R&D stock is governed by:
S = Rit -6Sit (2.2)
The standard derivation of the Hall-Jorgenson user cost of capital formula can
be extended to reflect both federal tax subsidies for R&D and the impact of the
tax status of the firm. A firm that is taxable at marginal rate Tit can expense its
R&D spending in the current year and earn a tax credit at marginal rate cit, which
is indexed by firm because the marginal credit rate is a function of the firm's R&D
spending as explained in further detail in section 2.1.2.4 Firms discount the future
at a common real interest rate, rt, purchase R&D and other inputs at prices pst and,
pI*, and face a common constant depreciation rate on R&D capital, 6. The taxable
firm maximizes profit according to the following present-value Hamiltonian:
Hit (Sit, Ist~wit ) = {~e-rt((1 - it ) (F (Sit, Iit ) - pt, ht) - pts Rit (1 - -rit - cit)]
- wit [Rit - 6S~i - Sit] } dt (2.3)
where wit it is the shadow value of R&D capital.
From the requisite first-order conditions the analogous Hall-Jorgenson arbitrage
condition for the optimal R&D capital stock can be written:
(1 - rit - cit) (rt + - rs) p' = (1 - Tit) Fst (2.4)
where Tit is the marginal corporate tax rate, cit is the marginal research credit rate,
rt is the common real interest rate, 6 is the depreciation rate of R&D capital, irS ist
the time-varying growth rate of R&D input prices, pt is the price of R&D inputs,
and Fs is the first-derivative of the production function, F (Sit, it), with respect to
4The corporate tax rate is indexed by firm to account for the progressivity of federal corporate
taxes. In 2007 the 35 percent flat corporate tax rate applied to income greater than $18.333 million;
incomes less than this level were taxed at a lower rate except for small intervals of more heavily
taxed income. Some small firms subject to a marginal tax rate less than 35 percent do spend on
R&D; their R&D credit rate reflects their smaller marginal tax rate.
R&D capital.
Note that the credit rate, cit, enters the relation linearly because the depreciation
base is not typically reduced by the amount of the credit. Firms are viewed as
discounting at their real borrowing rates; although R&D is risky, the firms that
account for the lion's share of R&D spending are large highly-rated firms that could
fund their R&D by borrowing at generally low interest rates. The depreciation rate
for R&D, 6, is thought to be high since a sizable fraction of R&D spending does not
yield intellectual capital and goes to wages, supplies and equipment rental, none of
which are durable. Since the wages comprise the bulk of R&D spending, R&D price
inflation, 7r, should closely track wage growth for scientists and engineers.
Rearranging equation 2.4, the user cost of R&D capital, pit, for a taxable firm can
be written:
(rt + 6 -7rs) ps (1-Tit - cit)Fsu = Pit = t (2.5)
(1 - rit)
A nontaxable firm with kit years of tax losses will not use the R&D expensing
provision to offset income until those losses are exhausted; it will offset income in kit
years at the prevailing tax rate. Similarly, a firm that has insufficient tax liabilities
to fully apply any R&D credit earned this year will carry its credit forward jit years
until it can fully use it. The tax terms in the user cost formula for nontaxable firms
must be appropriately discounted to reflect the delayed use of the subsidies. Finally,
the loss-laden firm does not contemporaneously pay taxes on income arising from
current R&D services because currently accrued losses offset these earnings; but it is
absorbing losses that would have otherwise remained unused and available in available
in kit years when the firm first reports taxable income. The user cost of the nontaxable
firm must also reflect the value of these used losses. The relevant tax rate for valuing
these absorbed losses is the tax rate prevailing in kit years:
(Tt + 6 - 7rS) p (1 - rit+kit (1 + rt)-kit - ct (1 + rt)(2
pit = + rt)k(2.6)
where rt is the interest rate, 6 is the depreciation rate, pt is the price of R&D inputs,
Tit is the marginal tax rate, kit is the number of years until any losses are exhausted,
cit is the marginal research credit rate, and jit is the number of years any R&D tax
credits must be carried forward. Note that in the case of the taxable firm, kit and Jit
will be zero and the user cost formula will be identical to equation 2.5.
As noted above, the firm's marginal R&D credit rate, cit, varies across firms as
well as over time. Initially, the marginal credit rate was a nonlinear function of the
firm's current R&D spending, its recent R&D spending and its future R&D spending.
Legislative modifications to the R&D credit's provisions changed the definition of the
credit and the marginal credit rates firms faced. These changes are detailed below.
2.3 The R&D Tax Credit
In addition to direct federal support for R&D, such as research performed by federal
agencies and grants for basic and applied research, the federal government provides
indirect support for privately sponsored research through the tax code. Federal tax
law offers two incentives for private R&D: a deduction for qualified research spending
under Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and a non-refundable tax
credit for qualified research spending above a base amount under IRC Section 41.
These two tax advantages reduce the after-tax price of R&D investment; they are
jointly referred to here as the "R&D tax credit" and their combined effect on the
after-tax price of and impact on R&D spending is assessed.5
The Section 41 credit, known legislatively as the Research and Experimentation
Tax Credit, was introduced as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
allowing firms to earn a tax credit on spending they were already able to expense
under the existing Section 174 expensing provision. The credit is available for qualified
research expenditures, which were defined as salaries and wages, certain property
and equipment rental costs and intermediate materials expenses incurred in research
5 Net Operating Loss (NOL) carry-forwards resulting from Section 174 expensing can be carried
forward up to 20 years-five years longer than Section 41 tax credits can be carried forward. Al-
though this discrepancy in carry forward life has real implications for some firms, this level of detail
is beyond the descriptive capability of the Compustat and IRS data used here and is ignored.
undertaken to discover knowledge that is technological in nature for a new or improved
business purpose. The tax credit was initially effective beginning July 1, 1981 and
ending December 31, 1985.
In its original form the incremental tax credit was equal to 25 percent of qualified
research expenditures (QREs) above a firm-specific base amount. A firm's base was
its average nominal qualified spending on R&D in the previous three years, or 50
percent of current spending, whichever was greater. For the first nine years of the
R&D tax credit the firm's base was defined as:
1Bit = Base for R&D Credit = max - (Rit-1 + Rit- 2 + RIt-3), 0.5Rit for t=1981-198913
(2.7)
where Rit is R&D spending by firm i in year t.
Because a firm's base was a moving average of its past spending, additional re-
search spending in the current year increased the firm's base by one-third of the
increase in each of the subsequent three years. This 'claw-back' muted the credit's
incentive effects; some firms were even left with negative marginal credit rates.
The marginal credit rate between 1981 and 1988 is:
0 if Rit+m < Bit+m for m = 0-3
-s {+(1 )r -(m+kit) if Rit < Bit and Bit+m < Riit+m{ m=1
and Rit+m < 2 Bit+m for any m = 1-3( 3 -
cit = st (1 + rt)-" - Z (1 + rt-(m+kit) if Bit+m < Rit+m < 2 Bit+m{ 3M=1
for any m = 0-3
st j (1+ rt)_ - (1 + rt)~(m+kit) if Rit > 2Bit and Bit+m < Rit+m{ m=1
and Rit+m < 2 Bit+m for any m =1-3
where st is the statutory credit rate, kit is the number of years until any tax losses
are exhausted, jit is the number of years the credit must be carried forward (it will
be negative if it can be carried back), and rt is the real interest rate. The negative
summation term in the above equation represents the claw-back provision.
In the credit's original incarnation, a firm's marginal credit rate was highest when
its current year R&D spending, Rit, exceeds its current base amount, Bit, but is
anticipated to not exceed its base in the following three years. Spending less than
its base amount, the firm would not be eligible for credits in the next three years
and thus not subject to the claw-back provision. In this case, if it has sufficient tax
liabilities to fully offset its R&D tax credit, the firm's marginal credit rate is the
statutory credit rate, sit, or half the statutory credit rate if its current year spending
exceeds twice its base. In terms of the preceding equation, if the firm is eligible for
the full statutory rate, its current spending would exceed its base but be less than
twice its base, and sufficient tax liabilities would mean jit is zero. If the firm expected
its spending in the subsequent three years to be below its base amounts, the second
summation term would be zero. From 3.5 to 9.5 percent of firms (5 to 16 percent of
firms earning a credit) between 1981 and 1990 had marginal credit rates equal to the
statutory rate, depending on the year.
Because a firm's base can never be less than half of current expenditures, when
R&D spending exceeds twice its historically defined base, the redefined base is in-
creased 50 cents for every additional dollar of R&D spending. When this is the case,
the first additive term of the preceding equation is halved, and the maximum marginal
credit rate is reduced from 25 percent to 12.5 percent.
A firm that claimed the tax credit but had insufficient current-year tax liabilities
to offset was allowed to carry the excess credit back up to three tax years and/or
forward up to 15 tax years; carrying back (forward) the credit increases (decreases)
the present value of the R&D credit. In other words, jit can range from -3 to 15.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the credit through 1988, but also reduced
the statutory credit rate from 25 to 20 percent.6 This rate reduction was not mo-
6 TRA86 also folded the tax credit into the General Business Credit under IRC Section 38, sub-
jecting the credit to a yearly cap. The tax credit was also expanded to include research contracted
to universities and certain other nonprofits. The definition of QREs was also changed so that it
applied to research aimed at producing new technical knowledge deemed useful in the commercial
development of new products and processes. These changes in the definition of QRE are beyond the
tivated by any careful assessment of the tax credit, but was instead part of one of
the primary goals of TRA86-reducing the differences in tax burdens among major
business asset categories (CRS 2007). The tax credit was extended through 1989 by
the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, which also reduced the total
tax preference for R&D by requiring firms to reduce the tax credit they claim by half
the value of any deductions they claim under Section 174.7 This partial recapture of
the credit effectively cut a firm's marginal credit rate from 20 percent to 16.6 per-
cent if its R&D spending exceeded its base by less than 100 percent, and from1O to
8.3 percent if its R&D spending exceeded its base by more than 100 percent. The
marginal credit rate in 1989 is:
0 if Rit+m < Bit+m
for m = 0-3
3
-se (1 - jrit) } E (1 + rt)-(m~kit) if Ri < Bit and Bit+m Rit+m
m=1
and Rit+m < 2Bit+m for any m = 1-3
Cit * 3
St (1 - jrit) (1 + rt)-i" - 1 L (1+ rt if Bit+m < Rit+m < 2Bit+m
m=1
for any m = 0-3
{ 3Ot (1 -rit) 1 (1 + rt)it- (1 + rt~~i).if 1 - > 2Bit and Bit+m : Ri-t+m
M=1
and Rit+m < 2 Bit+m for any m = 0-3
where Tit is the marginal tax rate, st is the statutory credit rate, kit is the number of
years until any tax losses are exhausted, jit is the number of years the credit must
be carried forward (it will be negative if it can be carried back), and rt is the real
interest rate. The additional corporate tax rate term, (1 - -rit), in the marginal
credit formula for 1989 reflects the recapture of half of the deduction. In 1989 the
capability of the data, including the IRS data, used here as research expenditures are only reported
in terms of contemporaneous definitions.
7Firms could alternatively reduce the depreciation basis of their R&D expenses by the value of
the credit; this was less tax advantageous since losses have longer carry-forward periods than credits.
Firms are assumed to have reduced the value of their credit rather than the value of their deduction.
credit was revamped. The claw-back provision created dynamic disincentives for
current R&D spending, leading to negative marginal credit rates for some firms and
lower than statutory rates for many others. Addressing this concern, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 altered the base formula, replacing the moving
average with a base unrelated to recent R&D spending. The new formula for the
base was the greater of 50 percent of current qualified spending, and the product
of the firm's average gross receipts in the previous four tax years and the firm's
"fixed-base percentage," a measure of historic research intensity. The firm's fixed
base percentage is its ratio of total qualified R&D expenditures to total gross receipts
between 1984 and 1988, subject to a 16 percent ceiling. The base formula from 1990
on is:
Bit = max 1 Gitmmin IRin/ E Gin , 0.16 , 2 R, (2.8)(= n198 n1984 n .6 t
where Git is gross receipts or sales and Rit is the R&D expenditures of firm i in year
t. As the base definition changed, the tax credit subsidy on the marginal dollar of
R&D spending changed as well. Beginning in 1990 the marginal credit rate is:
0 if Rit < Bit
cit= st (1 - Tit) (1 + rt)-t if Bit < Rit < 2Bit
ist (1 - -rit) (1 + rt) "' if Rit > 2Bit
where again, sit is the statutory R&D credit rate in year t, rt is the interest rate, Tit
is the firm's marginal corporate tax rate, and jit is the number of years of tax losses.
Start-ups, firms lacking gross receipts or QREs for three of the five years be-
tween 1984 and 1988, were assigned a three percent fixed-base percentage. OBRA89
extended the credit through 1990 and required firms to reduce their Section 174
deduction by the entire amount of research credits claimed. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 and Tax Extension Act of 1991 extended the research
credit through 1991 and 1992 respectively. Pay-as-you-go rules adopted as part of
OBRA90 were a major obstacle to more lasting extension (CRS 2007). From its
inception until 1992 the credit was always extended before it expired. The first of
several retroactive extensions occurred in 1993 after the credit was allowed to lapse
in 1992. Even the retroactive extension covered only the last two quarters of 1992.
Because this and other lapses likely affected firm expectations, the analysis here is
limited to just the first 11 years of the R&D tax credit. Table 2.1 provides a summary
of the legislative history of the R&D tax credit.
If corporate tax rates are expected at the time of R&D investment to remain
constant in the future, they have no impact on R&D spending decisions-firms expect
to expense their investments and pay taxes on the income from those investments at
the same rate. The 1980s, however, were a time of changing corporate tax rates. The
value of the Section 174 expensing provision was reduced by the Tax Reform Act of
1986; as the corporate tax rate was reduced to 40 percent in 1987 and to 34 percent
in 1988, the benefit of expensing fell in parallel. If firms expected these reductions
in the corporate tax rate, they would have invested in R&D with a higher cost of
capital in mind. These corporate tax rate changes and their impact on the after-tax
cost of R&D are assumed to have been expected by firms and are part of the analysis
presented here. Taken together, changes in the expensing provision and tax credit
significantly affected the user cost of R&D; their joint impact on the user cost of the
marginal dollar of R&D spending is assessed below.
2.4 Data
The analysis presented here draws on two data sources, public data that has previously
been used to assess the impact of the R&D tax credit and restricted-access IRS
Statistics of Income (SOI) data that has not previously been used to estimate the
user cost elasticity of the R&D credit. Each of these data sets has its advantages and
disadvantages as does their combined use.
2.4.1 IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) Data
The IRS SOI data are drawn from a panel sample of corporate tax returns. The data
for each firm-year observation comes from the firm's basic tax return, Form 1120.
Data items relating to R&D spending are pulled from the firm's Form 6765, part of
its Form 1120. The data report the firm's annual qualified R&D expenditures, base
amount, tentative R&D tax credit, and limitations due to insufficient tax liabilities
among other details. SOI data provide an accurate measure of the actual credit
rates firms face each year on their marginal dollar of R&D spending. Only SOI data
describe qualified spending with enough detail for this level of accuracy. But for all
the detail and accuracy the SOI data afford, they have limitations as well. First, is
the issue of censoring. A firm only reports the details of its research spending in those
years when it applies for the R&D tax credit; in years where it will not earn a credit,
it is unlikely to complete Form 6765. Thus in years when the firm does not apply for
a credit, its qualified spending is not known (SOI data report missing values as zeros.)
So as not to drop these observations, I assign firms that have previously claimed the
R&D credit, but did not complete Form 6765 a zero marginal credit rate. Effectively,
I assume that firms are not leaving potential R&D tax credits on the table. Only firms
that have ever claimed the R&D tax credit, that is filed a form 6765 as part of its 1120
are included in the sample used in the analysis. This amounts to a sample of 3,500 and
6,500 firms per year; the exact count is reported in the tables. The qualified spending
of these 'missing' firms remains unknown, however. It is treated as it appears in the
data, as a zero, but this likely understate R&D spending; robustness checks that limit
the sample to only those firms that complete Form 6765 each year and analysis that
also makes use of public data provide checks for this treatment. Second, IRS data
only report qualified research expenditures. Although these are exactly the type of
expenditures that are needed to accurately calculate the marginal credit rate, we are
not only interested in the impact of tax subsidies on these expenditures. If firms
respond to larger tax subsidies by shifting their R&D spending from unqualified to
qualified spending, we will interpret the impact of the R&D tax credit differently than
if they are increasing total research spending by the same amount they are increasing
qualified spending. IRS data do not provide any sense of how a firm's non-qualified
spending responds to subsidies for qualified spending.
2.4.2 Compustat Data
Compustat data are drawn from firms' annual SEC (10-K) filings. The Compustat
sample includes essentially all publicly traded firms that report the information re-
quired to compute their marginal R&D tax credit rates. There are roughly between
1,200 and 1,800 firms per year in the Compustat sample. These data have two key
advantages. Compustat data are available for years prior to the introduction of the
R&D credit in 1981. Financial statements provide a more comprehensive measure of
R&D spending. Nonetheless, Compustat data have three major weaknesses.
First, because Compustat data describe only publicly traded firms, large firms are
overrepresented in the sample. NSF surveys report that between 1981 and 1992 firms
with at least 5,000 employees conducted more that 80 percent of all R&D, suggesting
that data concerning large public firms will describe the lion's share of R&D dollars.
Nonetheless, if private firms are more (or less) responsive to changes in the tax-
price of R&D, estimates based on the Compustat data understate (or overstate) the
effectiveness of the tax credit.
Second, the accounting rules that govern financial reporting differ from the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (IRC) in their definition of R&D. A firm's marginal credit rate is a
function of its qualified R&D spending, not its total spending as reported in its finan-
cial statements. To qualify for the federal tax credit, R&D expenditures must meet
a set of criteria relating to the experimental and technological nature of the project
and the stage of the product development it aims to enhance. The R&D expenses
reported in financial filings (referred to here as total R&D spending) conform to a
broader definition that includes both R&D conducted abroad and domestic research
expenditures that do not qualify for the R&D tax credit because they fail to meet
the experimental and technological criteria.
If firms respond to changes in subsidies for qualified R&D by changing their qual-
ified and non-qualified spending shares, constructing the tax component of the firm's
user cost of R&D using only data describing total R&D spending will lead to a biased
measure of the usercost. For example, if firms increase the qualified share of their
spending when subsidies are high, the effective credit rate could be understated if this
disproportionate increase in qualified spending lifts the firm's spending above its base
or the effective credit rate could be overstated if the increase in qualified spending
leaves the firm above twice its base level. Because a firm's credit rate is determined
by its relative QREs, changes in the composition of spending can affect credit rates.
Using the broader measure of R&D will result in non-classical mis-measurement
of the tax-price, which is a function of qualified R&D spending. Only SOI data can
overcome this measurement issue. Similarly, because financial data do not describe
unused previously earned tax credits, the present value of currently earned R&D tax
credits may be overstated; overstating the value of the credit understates the price of
R&D, potentially under-estimating the magnitude of the tax-price elasticity.8
Third, firms only report R&D expenditures in their financial statements if these
expenditures are "material" by accounting standards. The data are therefore cen-
sored with a firm-specific threshold. To assess the influence of materiality censoring,
robustness checks report the results of a specification limited to only those firms
with data in all years and a specification employing a control function to correct for
selection.
Combining IRS and Compustat data overcomes many of the weaknesses of the
individual datasets. Measuring the impact of the accurately measured after-tax user
cost (from SI data) on total (from Compustat data) R&D spending can gauge whether
any responsiveness of qualified spending is due primarily to shifting. Furthermore,
research spending is likely to be reported in Compustat even in years when the firm
does not complete its Form 6765 because it fails to earn a credit. Materiality remains
an issue, however. The main disadvantage of the merged sample is size. Because the
8This lack of information on other tax credits is even more important after 1986 when the R&D
tax credit was folded into the General Business Credit (GBC). The GBC not only caps the total
amount of credits that can be used in any year but also prescribes the order in which they must be
used. A firm that has a lot of higher priority credits would value currently earned R&D credits less.
IRS data sample describes private and public firms, only a fraction are public firms
and a smaller fraction still ever apply for the R&D tax credit and have sufficient data
to compute their marginal credit rates. Thus the merged sample consists of fewer
than one thousand firm-year observations.
2.4.3 Measuring R&D Expenditures
Using Compustat data to determine whether a firm's current year spending qualifies it
for an R&D tax credit and if it is subject to the 50 percent of current year spending
limitation (i.e. whether current year qualified spending exceeds the firm's base or
twice its base) incorrectly assesses the firm's credit status for 44 percent of the 755
firm-year observations that appear in both the Compustat data, drawn from financial
statements, and the IRS data. For the average firm over the whole period, qualified
research was 38 percent of total research. Among firms with positive QREs, the
average firm spent 68 percent of its total research expenses on qualified research, but
weighting by QRE the average falls to 56 percent, meaning that qualified spending
represented a smaller a share of total spending for firms with high QREs. Table 2.2
illustrates the heterogeneity in the ratio of QREs to total R&D as reported in financial
statements for the subset of firms that appear in both data sets and have sufficient
data to be included in later regression analysis.' For five of the sample's eleven years
more than half of the firms reported no QREs but did report R&D expenditures in
their financial statements; most of these years follow the 1986 absorption of the R&D
credit into the General Business Credit (GBC). Qualified research ranged between
40 and 80 percent of total research for the lion's share of the sample that reported
non-zero QREs. For a non-trivial share of the sample, on average 12 percent, qualified
spending represented more than 90 percent of its total spending.
The distribution of qualified spending shares varies over time, including between
years when the parameters of the R&D credit changed. In 1986 when the R&D credit
9The accounting definition of R&D includes all the categories that comprise IRS QREs but is
less strict in terms of the experimental and technological nature of these expenditures. For example,
expenses related to testing and the modification of alternative products is classified as R&D for
accounting purposes but generally do not qualify for the R&D tax credit.
was folded into the GBC the share of firms reporting no QREs but still reporting
research expenses for financial purposes rose by more than 11 percentage points while
the share of firms for which qualified research represented between 20 and 80 percent
fell by more than 12 percentage points. Again in 1990 when the credit was revamped
and base amounts were redefined, the distribution changed markedly. The fraction
of firms reporting no QREs fell by more than ten percentage points, mostly accruing
to the 20 to 40 percent and 60 to 80 percent categories. The distribution varied
in other years as well, some when other policy changes occurred such as 1985, but
also between years when the credit's structure remained unchanged such as between
1983 and 1984. Although Table 2.2 only describes the evolution of the distribution
of qualified spending shares for a limited sample of firm that report R&D spending
in both data sets, it makes clear that the ratio of qualified to total R&D spending
varied considerably from year to year. This type of variation makes clear that using
Compustat data describing total R&D expenditures to construct marginal credit rates
will often lead to incorrect measures of the marginal tax subsidy for R&D investment.
2.4.4 Computing the User Cost
Each firm's marginal credit rate is computed according to the prevailing structure of
the R&D tax credit and its tax position as described above in marginal credit rate
equations above. Credit rates are computed both using Compustat data and IRS
data; as explained above, credit rates constructed from Compustat data are likely to
be inaccurate but are widely used in previous studies that rely on publicly available
data. Further details of the formulas' components can be found in the appendix.
Table 2.3 reports the average percentage reduction in R&D user costs due to tax
preferences, the share of firms eligible for an R&D tax credit and the fraction with
negative marginal credit rates. Because actual receipt of a credit is not observed
in public financial data, a firm is considered eligible for an R&D credit if its R&D
spending exceeds its base; firms not receiving a credit are firms who report enough
information to calculate their marginal credit rates, but whose R&D expenditures do
not exceed their base amounts. In the SOI panel data a firm is considered eligible for
an R&D tax credit if it claims a positive tentative R&D tax credit on form 6765 of its
corporate return." Changes in tax policy and changes in R&D spending both drive
changes in the tax-adjustment term of the user cost of R&D, making it difficult to
infer the impact of policy changes from observed user costs. When only the expensing
allowance was in place, tax factors did not affect the user cost of a firm that had
sufficient tax liabilities in the year it expensed its R&D spending; changing tax rates
did affect the user costs of firm who carried forward their losses. The introduction of
the R&D credit in 1981 reduced the average tax-adjustment term from near unity to
0.914 according to IRS SOI corporate return data as shown in Table 2.3.
The average tax-adjustment term according to the Compustat data, which only
reports total R&D spending, was 0.884 in 1981, three percentage points less than the
average in the IRS sample. This is largely because the IRS sample contains a larger
fraction of firms that face negative marginal credit rates, 24.1 versus 14.9 percent,
which reduces the average subsidy level. These negative rates are driven by firms
that fail to earn a credit in 1981 but face higher bases in subsequent years when
they do qualify for a credit; in the Compustat data 65.7 percent of firms earned a
credit in 1981, but according to the IRS sample only 52.1 percent for firms earned a
credit. The two samples are comprised of largely different firms and dissimilarities
in the averages in Table 2.3 reflect both the inaccuracy of calculations based on the
Compustat data and differences in the composition of the samples. Between 1982 and
1984 the Compustat data suggest a higher average user cost than the IRS data with
differences between three and six percentage points; in part this is driven by a much
larger share of negative credit rate firms in the Compustat sample during these years.
10 A firm's tentative tax credit is the product of the statutory credit rate (including any decrease
in the rate due to expensing after 1989) and the excess of its qualified research spending over its
base amount, subject to the 50 percent of current research spending limit. It is the IRS analogue to
the definition of eligibility I use in the Compustat data. The actual credit a firm realizes in a given
tax year also includes any R&D credits carried back or forward and any flow-through credits from
partnerships, subchapter S corps, estates or trusts, and is limited by its current year pre-credit tax
liability. The order in which credits are applied in calculating the firm's pre-R&D tax credit tax
liability varied slightly from year to year, but in general the R&D credit was a more senior credit.
Eligibility was measured using tentative rather than total allowable R&D credit for comparability
reasons and because total allowable credit data is not available for all years, particularly after the
R&D tax credit was folded into the GBC.
Average user costs converge beginning in 1985 and continue to track through 1988.
For the last three years of the sample average user costs are four to five percentage
points higher in IRS sample than the Compustat sample.
Examining the variation in average tax-adjustment factors over time in the IRS
sample provides a sense of how the tax subsidy affected true user costs. The five
percentage point reduction in the statutory R&D credit rate in 1986 coincided with
a rise in the tax-adjustment term from 0.906 in 1985 to 0.94 in 1986 and finally to
0.947 in 1987 the first year the rate reduction was in place for a full year; the nearly
nine percentage point drop in the share of firms eligible for the R&D credit over
the two-year period, however, suggests other forces were also at play. Other factors
countervailed the impact of partial credit recapturing in 1989, leading to only a small
increase in the tax-adjustment term of the user cost. The 1990 reformulation of the
R&D credit, which eliminated the claw-back provision and complete credit recapture,
barely affected average tax subsidy or the credit recipiency rate.
Although the Compustat tabulations show a nearly twelve percentage point de-
cline in the fraction of firms qualifying for a credit-a pattern consistent with the
findings of Gupta, Hwang and Schmidt (2004)-this decline in 1990 is not apparent
in the more accurate IRS data. Between five and ten percent of firms were subject
to negative credit rates between 1982 and 1990 when the claw-back provision was
eliminated; their average marginal credit rate was roughly -8 percent. Firms in sev-
eral situations could face negative marginal credit rates. For example, assuming tax
liabilities in all years and a three percent real interest rate, a firm whose spending this
year exceeds twice its base but for the next three years lies between 100 to 200 percent
of its base would have faced a marginal credit rate of -11.1 percent under the 1982
to 1985 regime, -8.9 percent under the1986 to 1988 regime and -7.4 percent in 1989.
The unusually high fraction of firms that had negative credit rates in 1981, nearly a
quarter of firms were tax disadvantaged by marginal R&D spending, may be due by
delays in increasing research spending in reaction to the credit's introduction. Firms
may not have been able increase their spending enough to qualify for a credit in 1981
but every dollar they did spend increased base amounts in subsequent years, leading
to negative marginal credit rates. The 1990 reformulation improved incentives for
marginal R&D investment for a substantial fraction of firms.
The averages presented in Table 2.3 belie substantial heterogeneity in the impact
of tax preferences on firm user costs. Using confidential IRS data Altshuler (1988) also
found substantial heterogeneity in the effective R&D tax credit rates firms faced de-
pending on their near-term R&D spending pattern and tax status. Table 2.4 provides
more detail regarding the dispersion of tax-adjustment factors each year according to
the IRS data. In 1980, prior to the introduction of the R&D credit, in the Compustat
sample tax policy had no impact on R&D user costs for more than 80 percent of
firms; tax loss carry-forwards decreased the present discounted value of the Section
174 deduction and increased R&D user costs for the remaining firms. Once the R&D
tax credit was adopted in 1981, in the IRS sample few firms-roughly five percent-
had user cost tax-adjustment factors of one since even firms ineligible for a credit in
the current year were increasing their bases for the following three years with every
additional dollar they spent on R&D. Between 1981 and 1989, 53.2 percent of firms
on average had tax-adjustment factors that ranged between 0.95 and 1.25. Average
tax-adjustment factors were above 0.75 and below 1.25 for nearly 89 percent of firms
over the same period. A substantial fraction of firms, however, experienced much
higher and much lower user costs due to tax factors prior to the 1990 reform. Some
firms, as many 11.1 percent of firms in 1981, experienced marginal credit rates so
negative as to push their tax-adjustment factors above 1.25; for eight firms between
1981 and 1985 tax factors increased their user costs by more than 150 percent. Dur-
ing the same period, up to 18.8 percent of firms had marginal R&D tax credit rates
so high that tax preferences reduced their user cost by 25 percent or more. After
the 1990 reform, no firm was subject to a negative marginal credit rates, depopu-
lating the right tail of the tax-adjustment factor distribution. Some firms, as many
or even more than before, continued to have tax-adjustment factors that modestly
exceeded unity after the 1990 base redefinition-firms with zero (99.2 percent) or low
marginal credit rates (0.8 percent) and at least one year of tax losses-the mean tax-
adjustment factor of these firms was 1.033. Starting in 1990, all firms in the sample
had tax factors between 0.75 and 1.25 as fewer firms had tax factors in the tails of
the distribution; firms were more concentrated between 0.75 and unity than in the
preceding half-decade. In effect the 1990 reformulation eliminated both very high
and very low tax-adjustment factors, but largely left the fraction of firms receiving a
credit and average tax subsidy rates unchanged.
2.5 Empirical Model
Applying the arbitrage condition described in equation 2.4 to the CES production
function yields the factor demand equation: Sit = 67Yitp-'. The user cost, as laid
out in Section 2.1, is a function of the firm's current R&D spending, the relationship
between the firm's spending and its base this year and for as long as the next three
years, its loss position, and the corporate tax rate. Again, the Hall-Jorgenson tax-
adjusted user cost of R&D capital per dollar of investment is:
(rt + 6 - 7rS)p (1 - Tit+kit (1 + rt)-kit - ct (1 + rt)Jit)
Pit - Tit+ki, (1 + rt-ki)
where rt is the interest rate, J is the depreciation rate, 7rt is the one-year growth
rate in the prices of R&D inputs, Ps is the price of R&D inputs, rit is the marginal
corporate tax rate, jt is the number of years the credit must be carried forward (it
will be negative if it can be carried back), ki is the number of years until any tax
losses are exhausted and ci is the marginal R&D credit rate. The log linear form of
the factor demand equation forms the empirical foundation of most previous empirical
analyses of the cost elasticity of R&D and is the initial basis of the analysis presented
here. Differencing the log linear equation to purge any unobserved firm heterogeneity
yields the following regression equation:
log s a= olog Pit + r/log (it)+ it (2.10)Sn the apit_1 a cYit_1i
In the absence of adjustment costs, the optimal stock of R&D capital will be
attained each period in accordance to any changes in the tax or non-tax terms of the
user cost. I assume that the flow of R&D services in a year is proportional to R&D
investment. Under these assumptions, the change in the R&D capital stock will be
captured by the change in R&D investment. Equation 2.10 can be written instead in
terms of the log-difference in R&D investment:
R( (pit_' Y 'log = o- log + 7 log i + Eit (2.11)
Rit-1 (Pit- 1 Yit1
Aggregate macroeconomic factors such as technology opportunities, changes in
U.S. patent policy and IRS regulations, and aggregate demand will affect firm R&D
decisions. Year fixed effects are added to the model to absorb these potentially
confounding factors. I assume that the non-tax components of the cost of capital,
[rt + 67rs] pt, together vary over time but not across firms and time. Since pit enters
the regression in log form, under my assumptions, [rt + oirf] pt is fully absorbed by
the year fixed effects, leaving just the tax factor:
1 - Tit+kt 1 + rt) -kit - cit (1 + rt (2.12)
1 - rit (1 + rt)-ki'*)
to vary across firms and over time. The regression equation becomes:
log - -log A + log i t + Xt + Ct (2.13)(Rit_1 (Ait1 1 Yit-1)
As was explained in Section 2.2, a firm's R&D tax credit rate is a non-monotonic
function of its R&D spending. A firm whose spending is less than its base receives a
zero credit and has a zero marginal credit rate; a firm whose spending exceeds its base,
but is less than twice its base receives a credit equal to the product of the effective
statutory rate and its spending above its base and has a marginal credit rate equal to
the effective statutory rate; a firm whose spending exceeds twice its base receives a
credit equal to the product of the effective statutory rate and its spending above its
base and has a marginal credit rate equal to one-half of the effective statutory rate.
A firm's marginal R&D credit rate and it R&D spending level are clearly jointly
determined; the term capturing the tax-price change, log (Ait/Ait_ 1), is correlated
with eit. For example, if there is a positive shock to R&D spending (et > 0) then,
due to the structure of R&D tax credit, the marginal credit rate could mechanically
increase if the firm was otherwise below its base or decrease if the firm was otherwise
above its base. An OLS regression of equation 2.13 would therefore lead to a biased
estimate of the behavioral elasticity.
To disentangle this endogeneity I rely on an instrumental variables strategy sim-
ilar to those Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) use in studying
individual taxpayer decisions. The strategy to build instruments for the user cost
variable, log (Ait/Ait_ 1), is to compute As, the marginal tax-price the firm would face
in year t if its real R&D spending did not change from the previous year. The nat-
ural instrument for the actual change in the tax factor of the after-tax user cost,
log (Ait/Ait_1) is the difference in the logarithms of the firm's "synthetic" tax factor
under current law and their actual lag tax price, log (AS/Ait_ 1). The instrument by
construction eliminates the effect of R&D spending changes on the change in tax
price so that the synthetic change in tax price only reflects the exogenous changes
in the provisions of the R&D tax credit. It is the exogenous changes in the effective
tax price of R&D spending due to changes in the corporate tax code and provisions
of the R&D credit that are the source of identification of the behavioral response.
Firm fixed-effects purge firm-specific correlation in the evolution of R&D spending
while time fixed effects purge changes in R&D spending common across all firms.
The resulting residual variation in the tax-price that identifies the estimated elastic-
ity arises from within-firm changes in the tax-price of R&D relative to the changes
experienced by the average firm. In other words, the identifying variation measures
how a firms tax subsidy compares with its own average subsidy across time and the
average subsidy of other firms within a given year.
Only observations from years where a tax policy change went into effect are used
in the analysis." The key exclusion restriction is that the constructed synthetic tax
"The years used are 1982, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. For a summary of the changes made
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factor does not affect R&D spending other than through the actual tax factor, con-
ditional on firm and year fixed effects and sales. In later regressions, as explained in
section 2.5, a polynomial in lagged R&D spending is added as a control to account
for reasons other than the tax price why firms in different parts of the R&D spending
distribution might experience different patterns of R&D growth. These added con-
trols tighten the exclusion restriction; the identifying assumption now only assumes
that the R&D spending distribution is not evolving on its own in a way that is corre-
lated with the year-specific changes in the tax treatment of R&D. Given the strong
nonlinearities of the firm-specific credit function, this assumption seems innocuous.
Table 2.5 presents a comparison of average actual and synthetic tax-adjustment
factors by year; the actual tax-adjustment factor averages differ from those in Table
2.2 because the sample of firms is constrained to those that report sufficient data to
also construct the synthetic factor, namely the first lag of R&D spending. Between
1985 and 1986, when the statutory credit rate fell from 25 to 20 percent, the actual
tax-adjustment term increased by 3.8 and 4.5 percentage points in the Compustat and
SOI data respectively while the synthetic tax-adjustment term increased similarly in
the SOI data but by more than 15 percentage points in the less accurate Compustat
data. Comparing 1986 synthetic tax factors to 1985 actual tax factors, which are both
a function of 1985 R&D spending, shows that in the IRS data tax changes led to a
decrease in average user costs while the Compustat data point to a marked nearly
10 percentage point increase, further highlighting the difficulty of using Compustat
data.1 2 In the Compustat data average actual tax factors fell by 1 percentage point
with the introduction of recapturing in 1989 but barely moved in the IRS data; in
both datasets synthetic factors increased by roughly 1.5 percentage points. The 1990
base redefinition reduced user costs as is made clear by the 2.4 and 5.4 percentage
point differences between 1989 actual and 1990 synthetic tax factors in the Compustat
and SOI data, respectively. Actual tax factors fell by less or increased slightly in the
to the R&D tax credit in these years, please see Section 2.1 or Table 2.1. Data from 1982 are used
in lieu of data from 1981 because the 1982 was the first full year the credit was in effect.
121n the much smaller sample of observations found in both the Compustat and SOI data the pat-
tern of a decrease between 1985 actual and 1986 synthetic in IRS data and an increase in Compustat
data also holds.
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case of the SOI data, signaling that firms also changed their R&D spending such that
their marginal credit rates decreased.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Compustat Data from Financial Filings
The framework of the analysis presented here is similar to earlier studies, including
Hall (1994). As a baseline, my best effort to replicate the relevant Hall results and
reconcile them with my own estimates is presented in Table 2.7. Hall used instru-
mental variables for several reasons: first, the simultaneity of her regressors with the
firm's future R&D expenditure path; second, measurement error in the tax price due
to the inaccuracy of using financial data to calculate tax prices; third, measurement
error due differences between the tax price as forecasted by the firm when making
its spending decisions and observed by the econometrician. To address these issues
she instruments for all right hand side variables with the regressors lagged two and
three times as well as with lagged tax status and lagged growth rates in R&D and
sales. Column 1 of Table 2.7 reports the results of my attempt to replicate the results
in column 4 of Table 2.6 in Hall (1994), which corresponds to the first-differenced
log-log specification.
Column 2 instruments with lagged right-hand side variables and uses data from
the entire decade after 1981 but includes non-manufacturing firms; the addition of
these firms does not significantly affect the estimated tax-price elasticity. Years where
the parameters of the R&D tax credit remained unchanged are dropped in column 3's
specification as my instrumenting strategy relies on tax changes. Again limiting the
sample to 1982 and 1986-1990 does not dramatically affect the estimated elasticity.
Column 4 uses the synthetic tax-price instruments, which are described in detail
in Section 2.2. These instruments, which are more plausibly exogenous than the
instruments used in columns 1-3, reduce the tax-price elasticity estimate by nearly
fifty percent. Because the change in sales, which is included as a control in equation
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2.13 could conceivably be endogenous, column 5 reports the results from a model
that does not include contemporaneous or lagged sales as a regressor. Dropping the
log-change in sales has no impact on the estimate.
The IV regression of equation 2.13 might itself be biased if Ct and Rit_ 1 are
correlated. Mean reversion, for example, would lead to a negative correlation between
the error term and R&D spending the previous year. If et and Rit_ 1 are correlated
then the instrument will be also be correlated with the error term since the instrument
is constructed using spending last period. Like Auten and Carroll (1999), and Gruber
and Saez (2002) last period spending, log Rit_1, is added as a control. Because changes
in the R&D tax credit may affect any relationship between current and last period
spending, these controls are allowed to vary by year as a robustness check (see column
2 of Table 2.8). Of course including a control for the lag dependent variable in a
differenced model leads to a biased estimator in finite samples. I instrument for
lag spending as suggested by Hausman, Hahn and Kuersteiner (2001) using further
lags. The results of this regression are reported in column 6 of Table 2.7. Again the
inclusion of these further controls does not change the estimated elasticity.
To investigate the sensitivity of the relationship between R&D spending and its
user-cost to alternative specifications a series of robustness checks were conducted;
the results are presented in Table 2.8. The baseline specification from column 6 of
Table 2.7, which instruments for the endogenous tax-price with the synthetic tax-
adjustment factor and includes controls for the logs of lag R&D spending and lag
sales, is reported in column 1 to facilitate comparisons. As described above, because
changes in tax policy may affect the underlying relationship between current and lag
R&D spending, for example if more generous tax treatment leads to the undertaking of
new projects that require many years of funding, column 2 interacts the lag spending
terms with year fixed effects. Allowing the effect of log Rit-1, to vary from year to
year has virtually no impact on the user-cost elasticity estimate. Columns 3 and 4
control for industry specific factors. Neither industry fixed effects, column 3, nor linear
industry time trends, column 4, appreciably impact the elasticity estimate. Because
only firms with material R&D expenditures must report their R&D expenditures in
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financial filings, the data are censored by a firm-specific threshold. Column 5 reports
estimates from a specification that includes a control function to correct for selection;
identification is from functional form. Correcting for selection reduces the magnitude
of the point estimate by a statistically insignificant 1.2 percentage points. Column 6
assess the impact of selective reporting by limiting the sample to only those firms that
report R&D spending in all years. The estimated elasticity is roughly 1.7 percentage
points larger, but again the difference is statistically insignificant. Firms end their
fiscal years in all months of the year; tax policy is largely tied to the calendar year.
Tax-price variables are likely to be mis-measured for firms whose fiscal years do not
coincide with the calendar year. To assess the impact of this mis-measurement the
model is estimated using only firms with December fiscal year ends. As column 7
reports, the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from the baseline estimate.
The log-log specification includes only observations with non-zero R&D expendi-
tures. In the Compustat data this does not necessitate dropping many firms, in fact
only 40 firm-year observations have zero R&D expenses but report all other neces-
sary data, including previous spending, to be included in a regression of the form of
Column 4 of Table 2.6. In other words, if a firm ever reports R&D expenses in its
SEC filings, it does so in every year and once it engages in material R&D it continues
to do so. The log-log specification is less appropriate for analysis of the IRS data.
Firms only report the specifics of their R&D spending and credit status in years they
claim the credit; if a firm does not qualify for a R&D tax credit it likely does not
file a form 6765 and it does not disclose the details of its research activities. The
IRS data in short has many more zeros than the Compustat data. Though a firm
that does not file a 6765 form likely has non-zero research expenditures, in the main
analysis using only the IRS data these observations are treated as the appear in the
data as zeros. The appropriateness of this treatment is assessed in later analysis that
uses both Compustat and IRS data. To retain observations with zero spending but
also scale for disparate firm size in the remaining analysis the dependent variable of
regression equation 2.13 is replaced with the change in R&D spending divided by first
lag of sales. Sales is a natural choice for the scaling variable since research-intensity,
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the ratio of R&D to Sales, has been an outcome of interest in previous research in-
cluding (Griliches (1984)) and is used as a benchmark, the fixed base percentage, in
the formula for the R&D credit as well.
The regressions reported in Tables 2.9-2.12 are of the basic form:
[Rit-Rit 1- =a + a[A - Aut- 1] + r [Sit /iti 1  + 7yRuti + Xt + cit (2.14)
Table 2.9 reports the results of regressions of the above form using only Compustat
data. Column 1 reports the OLS results, which suggest that a ten percent decrease in
the tax component of the user cost of R&D would increase the average firm's R&D-to-
lagged-Sales ratio by 4.3 percent. Adding flexible time controls, as in column 2, does
not affect the estimated coefficients. Because a firm's credit rate is a function of its
R&D spending column 3 instruments for the firm's tax component to disentangle this
simultaneity. As described earlier, the instrument is constructed using the first lag of
R&D spending, which must be controlled for in the regression. Because the first lag
of R&D spending is also a lagged dependent variable, it must also be instrumented
for with other lags.13 Instrumenting for both the endogenous tax component and
the first lag of R&D expenditures shrinks the point estimate from -0.045 (0.01) to
-0.035 (0.008), a statistically insignificant reduction in magnitude. The estimates
reported in column 3 imply that a ten percent decrease in the user cost, or a 9.36
percent subsidy, would result in a 3.56 percent increase in the average firm's R&D
intensity. In other words, if sales levels remained unchanged, the average firm's R&D
expenditures would increase by roughly $10.7 million. The estimates from column
4 of Table 2.8 suggest that a ten percent decrease in the usercost would result in a
$3.5 million increase in R&D spending; the specification differences lead to somewhat
different answers. Estimating the specification of column 3 of Table 2.9 on the 6,339
observations from the sample of column 4 of Table 2.7 that have sufficient data, yields
a coefficient of -0.036 (0.008)-almost identical to the estimates reported in column
isHere the third lag of R&D spending is used, but the results are invariant to instrumenting with
other lags.
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3 of Table 2.8.14 It is not the difference in selection resulting from dropping the zero
spending firms that drives the difference in elasticity estimates but the difference in
specification. Different specifications clearly yield different estimates of the impact
of tax subsidies on R&D spending. Though the estimates are robust within a class
of specifications, as illustrated by Table 2.8 for the log-log specification, using R&D
intensity as the outcome of interest triples the implied effect of a ten percent reduction
in usercost.
2.6.2 IRS SOI Data
Table 2.10 reports the results of regressions of the basic form of equation 2.14 but
uses only IRS data. While providing unbiased measures of the subsidies to qualified
R&D spending, the IRS data does not describe total R&D spending by firms. The
IRS data come from the research credit form, Form 6765, and describe only qualified
research expenditures, in other words only the spending to which the credit applies.
Though using IRS data alone cannot capture how tax subsidies affect total R&D
spending, they can describe how subsidized R&D spending responds to its subsidy.
OLS estimates reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.10 suggest that a ten percent
decrease in the user cost of R&D would result in approximately $3.8 million in ad-
ditional qualified research spending by the average firm. Instrumenting for the tax
factor, however, halves the estimate, suggesting a ten percent reduction in user cost
only increases average qualified research spending by $2 million. The average firm
in the sample reports roughly $8 million in QREs; among firms with non-zero QREs
average qualified spending is $27.5 million. Although the coefficient estimates in Ta-
ble 2.10 are similar in magnitude to those of Table 2.9, because qualified research
expenditures (QREs) comprise less than forty percent of total R&D expenditures,
the implied elasticities of Table 2.10 are much larger than those of Table 2.9.15 The
14Estimating the specification of column 4 of Table 2.6 using just the 6,171 observations that have
sufficient data for both specifications yields an elasticity of -0.461 (0.032), virtually identical to the
estimate reported in column 4 of Table 2.6.
15 Qualified R&D comprises 39 percent of total R&D for the subsample of 953 firms found in both
data sets that report both measures of research expenditures.
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fully instrumented specifications have standard errors too large to make precise com-
parisons, but the point estimates of the two tables suggest that qualified research
spending is more elastic that total R&D. These comparisons should also be caveated
by the fact that the regressions in Table 2.9 make use of an inaccurate measure of
the tax component of the usercost.
IRS data report as many as five categories of QREs. Using the same regression
specification as column 3 of Table 2.10, but replacing total QREs with each compo-
nent of spending, the impact of tax subsidies on different types of qualified research
spending is reported in Table 2.11. Qualified spending broken down by category
was unavailable for 1990, so the number of observations reporting R&D spending on
wages and salaries, supplies, equipment rental, and contracted research is only 14,394
rather than 18.691 as in column 3 of Table 2.10. Data regarding research payments
to universities and other eligible nonprofit organizations for the conduct of basic re-
search were not reliably available after 1986, hence only one year of data is included in
the column 5 regression. Interestingly, changes in usercost only significantly impact
wages and salaries and supplies, columns 1 and 2 respectively. Wages and salaries
and supplies, comprising 66.6 and 19.2 percent of qualified R&D respectively, are the
two largest categories of research spending. Although contracted research accounts
for 11.6 percent of QREs, usercost does not appreciably affect contracted research
spending as shown in column 4.
The elasticities reported in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show that qualified research
spending is responsive to tax-based subsidies. The magnitude of the elasticity is
larger than that of total spending as measured in the Compustat data and reported in
Table 2.9, suggesting that the portion of research that the credit is applied to is more
measurably responsive than overall spending. It is notable that the same choice of
instruments that reduced the elasticity estimated in the public data still yields a large
elasticity estimate for qualified research. The different impacts of different choices of
instruments, specifications and research spending measures make it difficult to draw
strong comparative conclusions, but highlight the fact that estimates of the elasticity
of R&D spending with respect to the tax-price are sensitive to these choices.
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2.6.3 Merged Sample of Compustat and IRS SOI Data
By merging the Compustat and SOI samples the impact of tax subsidies on total
and qualified R&D spending can accurately be assessed using a common sample as
described in Section 2.3. Because the SOI data is a sample of firms that includes
both public and private firms, and more important because only a fraction of firms
report R&D spending in their financial filing or file for the R&D tax credit, only 953
observations can be matched between the two data sets. The instrumenting strategy
I employ, which requires multiple lagged values of R&D spending as well as other
data, further reduces the sample. Table 2.12 presents estimates from regressions
identical to those of Table 2.11 but restricted to this merged sample. IRS data is
used to construct the tax factor for all four columns of estimates. Columns 1 and 2
and describe the impact of changes in the tax factor on total R&D spending while
columns 3 and 4 describe the impact on qualified spending. Interestingly, for both the
OLS and IV specifications changes in user cost have no statistically discernible impact
on total R&D spending, despite the relatively small standard errors. Estimating the
specification of Column 3 of Table 2.9, which is identical to column 2 of Table 2.12
except the user cost measures are based on Compustat rather than the more accurate
IRS data, on the sample of roughly 200 merged firm-years yields a coefficient estimate
of -0.058 (0.028)-a statistically significant estimate similar to those of Table 2.7. This
suggests that the mis-measurement of the tax subsidy in Table 2.8 may play a role in
generating statistically significant estimates that are not apparent when the correct
tax subsidy measure is used as in Table 2.12.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.12 report estimates for the impact of changes in the
user cost on qualified research expenditures. Again, much like Table 2.10, usercost
decreases result in statistically significant increases in R&D spending according to
both the OLS and IV specifications. The results reported in columns 2 and 4 suggest
that when the correct measure of the tax-adjustment factor is used, only qualified
research spending is significantly affected by tax subsidy for qualified spending. Total
R&D expenditures include other forms of spending, such as R&D conducted abroad
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or by subsidiaries unconsolidated for tax purposes or R&D that is not deemed ex-
perimental or technological enough, that make it difficult to discern the impact of
the tax subsidy on total R&D spending. It is important to note that these different
measured impacts come from a very small sample. Because the merged sample is
so small, the pattern of these estimates is more suggestive than definitive. They do
show, however, that the estimated impact of tax subsidies for R&D is sensitive to the
choice of spending measure.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper uses public data from financial filings and new restricted-access data from
tax returns to assess the impact of tax credits on R&D expenditure decisions. An
instrumental variables strategy that relies on tax policy changes disentangles the
simultaneity of incremental credit rates and R&D spending. The empirical findings
demonstrate that tax-price elasticity estimates for R&D are sensitive to choices of
instruments, specifications and spending measures. Estimates using only publicly
available data suggest that a ten percent tax subsidy for R&D yields between $3.5
(0.24) million and $10.7 (1.79) million in new R&D spending. Estimates from IRS
SOI data, which only reports. qualified research expenditures, suggest that a ten
percent reduction in the usercost would lead firms to increase qualified spending by
$2 .0 (0.39) million. Analysis of the components of qualified research spending shows
that wages and supplies, which comprise the bulk of qualified spending, account for
the increase in research spending. These estimates come from different samples and
use different data to construct measures of the tax component of the usercost of
R&D. Estimates from the much smaller merged sample which makes use of the more
precise tax data to calculate the tax component of the usercost suggest that qualified
spending is responsive to the tax subsidy. A similar response in total spending is not
statistically discernible in the merged sample.
These disparate and inconsistent results from different data samples illustrate the
sensitivity of estimates of the tax-price elasticity of R&D to choices of instrumental
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variables, specifications and spending measures. Rather than yielding a single, con-
sistent, number for the elasticity, the various analyses presented here instead show
that estimates of the tax price elasticity are not robust across datasets and methods.
Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn. First, there is considerable evidence
that qualified research spending-the exact research efforts that are subsidized by
the tax credit-is responsive to the reductions in the usercost due to the R&D credit.
Second, comparisons between Compustat and SOI data show that relying on the
public data results in significant mis-measurement of the tax-adjustment factor of
the usercost. Third, non-qualified research spending is a significant fraction of total
research spending as reported in financial filings, averaging more than 60 percent,
and is a potentially important margin of adjustment when firms increase research
spending in light of tax subsidies.
The empirical findings reported here bear on short-run research spending deci-
sions, and there are several important considerations regarding broader interpreta-
tions. First, longer run impacts may differ from the short-run response investigated
here. Long-run elasticities may exceed the one-year response if changes in research
spending incur adjustment costs. Long-run elasticities could conceivably be smaller
than the one-year response if firm's react to changes in their effective R&D tax sub-
sidies by simply retiming research spending to maximize their credits. Second, the
analysis here uses changes in the provisions of the research credit from the 1980s to
identify the user-cost elasticity; research patterns from up to 30 years ago may not
represent current R&D patterns in terms of shares of spending by firms in different
industries, of different sizes, etc. Third, throughout the analysis firms' expectations
of the future of the R&D tax credit are ignored. During its first decade the R&D
credit was always renewed before it expired. Since then the credit has been allowed
to lapse several times, most of the time being put into place retroactively, but on
one occasion the credit was simply allowed to expire for a year. In the current, less
predictable environment, firms' expectations regarding the future of the R&D credit
likely impact how they react to the subsidy while it is in place. Estimates from an
era of greater certainty may not be fully applicable today.
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The inconsistency of estimates across the datasets and specifications make clear
that further work is needed to assess the impact of tax subsidies on R&D spending.
Larger datasets that allow for accurate measurement of the tax subsidy each firm
faces and broad measures of R&D spending would allow researchers to better assess
how non-qualified research spending reacts to subsidies for qualified spending. While
it may be worthwhile to incentivize firms to direct nonqualified spending toward
activities that qualify for the credit, if the increase in qualified spending reported here
comes largely at the cost of nonqualified spending, the effect of the policy has a very
different interpretation than if the increase in qualified spending was new research
dollars. The degree to which spending is being redirected to qualified research is
an important open question for future work. The question of relabeling has also
drawn attention in policy circles. If firms are not even redirecting research, but just
relabeling activities as qualified activities, the policy would be ineffective. Perhaps
assessments of how IRS audit outcomes change with subsidy rates could help shed
some light on how the R&D tax credit creates incentives for relabeling. These are
issues I would like to pursue in future work.
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ive History of the Research and Experimentation Credit
Sec. 174
Corporate Qualified Research ecion4 Foreign allocation Carryback/
Tax Rate Expenditures * rules Carryforward
Maximum of previous 3- Excluded: research 100% deduction 3 years/15
year average or 50% or performed outside against domestic years





46% Same Same Same Same Same
Definition narrowed
















Same Same Same -50% credit against domestic Same
income; 36%
allocation
1984-1988 R&D to sales
ratio times current sales -100%Same Same Same Same
(max of 16%); 3% of credit
current sales for startups
Same Startup rules modified Same Same Same Same
50% deduction
35% Same Same Same against domestic Same
income; 50%
allocation
Same None - Same Same
1984-1988 R&D to sales 50% deduction
ratio times current sales -100% against domesticSame Same as before lapse Same
(max of 16%); 3% of credit income; 50%
current sales for startups allocation
Also includes research
Same undertaken in Puerto Same Same Same Same
Rico and U.S.
possessions.




Same Same alternative credits Same Same Same
modified as outlined
on next sheet.
apply the credit rate to 50% of current QREs if the base amount is less than 50% of current QREs.
provides an immediate deduction for most research and experimentation expenditures. Taxpayers can also elect to
es over 60 months, but in practice most firms immediately expense R&D. However, the IRC does not define R&D
;ulations have generally interpreted them to mean 'R&D costs in the experimental or laboratory sense."
1), the Senate Budget Committee's 2006 Tax Expenditures compendium and Thomas legislative summaries.
117
tion of Firms by Qualified Share of Total R&D Expenditures, Merged Sample of
3 SOI Data
ions 0 0.00-0.20 0.20-0.40 0.40-0.60 0.60-0.80 0.80-0.90 > 0.90
0.279 0.148 0.262 0.164 0.049 0.016 0.082
0.343 0.014 0.057 0.186 0.200 0.029 0.171
0.263 0.013 0.026 0.224 0.224 0.092 0.158
0.360 0.013 0.053 0.227 0.213 0.040 0.093
0.419 0.000 0.093 0.140 0.209 0.047 0.093
0.533 0.013 0.013 0.147 0.160 0.040 0.093
0.538 0.000 0.077 0.123 0.154 0.031 0.077
0.525 0.000 0.082 0.098 0.131 0.016 0.148
0.563 0.016 0.078 0.156 0.063 0.016 0.109
0.458 0.017 0.102 0.169 0.119 0.017 0.119
0.544 0.018 0.105 0.123 0.070 0.000 0.140
0.435 0.023 0.082 0.163 0.147 0.033 0.118
-es are the ratio of qualified research expenditures (QREs) as reported in the firm's corporate tax return to the firm's
reported in its financial filings. The firm's research credit and marginal research credit rate are determined by QREs.
es as reported in financial statements includes foreign research spending and expenditures that do not satisfy the
gical requirements of the R&D credit. The sample consists of all firms that can be successfully merged by Employer
veen the Compustat and IRS datasets and report enough data to be included in later regression analysis.
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Costs, Credit Recipiency Rates and Shares With Negative Credit Rates by Year, Compustat and IRS SOI Data
Compustat Data IRS SOI Data
Fraction Fraction
Fraction Fraction
User Cost with User Cost with
Year Observations (Tax Price Receiing Negative Observations (Tax Price Receiing NegativeR&DTax R&DTax
Component) Credit Marginal Component) Credit Marginal
Credit Rates Credit Rates




























1985 1,304 0.904 0.604 0.194 3,929 0.906 0.376 0.080




























1990 1,821 0.918 0.459 0.000 5,467 0.961 0.283 0.000
1991 1,831 0.926 0.419 0.000 4,759 0.958 0.248 0.000
16,009 0.920 0.561 0.138 62,288 0.919 0.379 0.081
of all firm-year observations that report sufficient data to be included in later regression analysis. The tax component
beled A, in the text, takes both expensing provisions and the research credit into account, in addition to reflecting any
te of tax advantages. In the Compustat sample firms receiving R&D tax credits are all firms that report current year
their calculated base amounts. In the IRS sample all firms who report a tentative R&D tax credit are considered credit
ial credit rates arose for firms prior to the revamping of the credit in 1990 when they failed to qualify for a credit in the
nt year spending increased base amounts for the subsequent three years when they did qualify for the credit.
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ser Costs, Credit Recipiency Rates and Shares With Negative
mpustat and IRS SOI Data
Credit Rates by Year,
Compustat Data IRS Data
Fraction Fraction
Fraction Fraction
User Cost with User Cost with
Receiving Receiving
(Tax Price Negative (Tax Price Negative
RDTxR&D Tax NgtvComponent) Credit Marginal Component) Credit Marginal

























31 0.980 0.677 0.226 0.919 0.516 0.161
53 0.957 0.698 0.094 0.935 0.509 0.132
1.000 0.622 0.289 0.926 0.422 0.133
1988 45 0.951 0.711 0.178 0.916 0.489 0.111
1989
45 0.944 0.667 0.178 0.940 0.444 0.067
















3ists of all firms that can be successfully merged by Employer Identification Number between the Compustat and IRS
. data to be included in later regression analysis. The tax component of the user cost formula, labeled At in the text,
,ions and the research credit into account, in addition to reflecting any losses that reduces the value of tax advantages.
irms receiving R&D tax credits are all firms that report current year R&D expenses that exceed their calculated base
le all firms who report a tentative R&D tax credit are considered credit recipients. Negative marginal credit rates arose
aping of the credit in 1990 when they failed to qualify for a credit in the current year but their current year spending




































insists of all firm-year observations from the Compustat dataset that report sufficient data to be included in later
ax component of the user cost formula, labeled X, in the text, takes both expensing provisions and the research credit











































































son of Average Actual and Synthetic User Cost Tax-Adjustment Factors, Compustat and
Compustat Data IRS Data
Actual User Synthetic Actual User Synthetic
User Cost User Cost
Cost Tax- Cost Tax-Year Observations Tax- Observations Tax-
a tmn Adjustment Adjustmentent
Factor FactorFactor Factor
1981 1,520 0.882 0.765 - - -
te of 1982 1,371 0.907 0.792 5,529 0.855 
0.885
wback 1983 1,239 0.921 0.817 5,519 0.875 0.868
1984 1,238 0.906 0.841 5,251 0.886 0.868
1985 1,304 0.904 0.846 3,747 0.906 0.865
bte of 1986 1,317 0.942 1.002 3,501 0.951 
0.885
wback 1987 1,347 0.957 1.013 5,277 0.952 0.888
1988 1,466 0.933 0.926 5,249 0.953 0.897
te of
wback 1989 1,538 0.923 0.940 5,184 0.957 0.913
6te of 1990 1,692 0.916 0.899 5,030 0.962 0.903
1991 1,699 0.923 0.901 4,488 0.959 0.902
15,731 0.919 0.886 48,775 0.924 0.888
tax-adjustment factors reflect both prevailing expensing and research credit provisions and contemporaneous research
rates are calculated using contemporaneous total R&D spending in the case of Compustat data and qualified research
F IRS SOI data. Synthetic user cost tax-adjustment factors are constructed using prevailing expensing and research
rst lag of research spending (total R&D spending in Compustat data and QREs in the IRS SOI data).
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:ation in column 1 corresponds to my best effort to replicate the results of an earlier study, Hall (1994). That
ted for all three regressors with their second and third lags as well as with lagged tax status and lagged growth
s. It limited the analysis to only manufacturing firms but included observations from all years between 1981 and
ng strategy based on synthetic tax-adjustment user cost factors, used in columns 4-7, is laid out in Section 2.2 and
here the provisions of the tax credit were altered. The basic specification of columns 4-7 is:
+ x, + ?I10 + E;,
le all firms, though the vast majority are manufacturing firms. Column 5 resestimates the specification of column 4
able, logS1t. Column 6 adds a control for the first lag of R&D spending logged, logRt 1 , instrumenting with the
egressions include year fixed effects and a constant. Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry
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)rice Elasticity Estimates Using Compustat Data, Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.453 -0.440 -0.401 -0.400 -0.441 -0.470 -0.460







6,207 6,207 6,207 6,207 6,207 3,360 3,305
is the baseline estimate and corresponds to column 6 of Table 1.7. The log-change in the tax-adjustment
ith the synthetic change in the tax-adjustment factor, as explained in Section 1.2.2. The specification of
I) + i
nd the first lag of log R&D spending, logRit. 1. Additional terms are included in the specifications
Column 2 adds a cubic in logRit.1 for each year. Column 3 includes industry fixed effects and column 4
i NAICS two-digit industry. Column 5 adds a control function to correct for selection. Column 6 limits
;a for all five years. Column 7 limits the sample to firms wit December fiscal year ends. All regressions
are clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table 2.9: Impact on
Dependent Variable:
Total R&D Spending (COMPUSTAT Data Only)








First Lag Total R&D - -(3 9E-07(8.79E-07)
-0.436 -0.453 -0.356
(0.101) (0.104) (0.078)
Impact of a 10% decrease 13.182 13.705 10.749
in usercost in $M R&D (3.059) (3.145) (1.787)
Observations 7,762 7,762 7,631
Note: All regressions include a constant. Column 1 presents estimates of the equation:
R, -R,,_ a +0o;,- Xi,t+1 si,-St-] + yR,_+X +i,
Si,_, Si,_1 .
Column 2 adds year fixed effects. Column 3 instruments for the endogenous change in the tax part of the
usercost with the synthetic change described in Section 2.2.2, retaining year fixed effects. All data are
inflated using the GDP index. Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit industry level according to
NAICS codes from Compustat.
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Impact on Qualified R&D Spending (IRS Data Only)








First Lag Total R&D - - (1.61E-06)
-3.424 -3.316 -1.673
Usercost Elasticity -. 2 336--7(0.522) (0.503) (0.332)
Impact of a 10% decrease in 3.836 3.715 1.960
usercost in $M R&D (0.585) (0.564) (0.389)
Observations 28,371 28,371 18,691
Note: All regressions include a constant. Column 1 presents estimates of the equation:
Ri, - R a =a a + r )y -
-.
;1 1± [ n + yR,, + Eit
. Si,_ 1 Si- I
Column 2 adds year fixed effects. Column 3 instruments for the endogenous change in the tax part of the
usercost with the synthetic change described in Section 2.2, retaining year fixed effects. All data are
inflated using the GDP index. Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit industry level according to
NAICS codes from Compustat.
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Table 2.10:





















































iclude a constant and year fixed effects. Columns 1 through 5 present estimates of the equation:
+x,+nlog( +E
the tax part of the usercost in instrumented with the synthetic change described in Section 2.2, retaining year fixed

















Table 2.12: Impact on Total R&D Spending (Merged Data)
Dependent Variable: (A Total R&D Exp./Salest_1 (A Qualified R&D/Salest.1)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.002 -0.013 -0.047 -0.087A Tax Part of Usercost (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.040)
--0.003 -0.002 0.027 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.020)
1.47E-05 -1.79E-06
(1.23E-05) (1.57E-05)
0.043 -0.315 -2.330 -5.312
0.211 0.254 (0.700) (2.435)
Impact of a 10% decrease in -0.330 2.168 8.156 15.669
usercost in $M R&D (1.614) (1.743) (2.451) (7.182)
Observations 314 217 314 216
Note: All regressions include a constant and year
the equation:
fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 present estimates of
R t -R1 =a +oj, - A_,]+ri S" - + yR_, +E,e[S I ~ J It I
Columns 2 and 4 instrument for the endogenous change in the tax part of the usercost with the synthetic
change described in Section 2.2, retaining year fixed effects. All data are inflated using the GDP index.
Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit industry level according to NAICS codes from Compustat.
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Appendix
Several variables used to calculate a firm's marginal R&D tax credit rate are not
reported directly and must instead be inferred from other variables. These variables,
and their instrument analogue were calculated as follows:
jit: the number of years the firm will carry forward any earned R&D tax credits
If a firm does not pay federal taxes, it is assumed to not have taxable income
and must therefore carry-back (then carry-forward) its R&D tax credit. The R&D
tax credit can be carried back up to 3 years and carried forward up to 15 years.
The analysis presented here only calculates up to 6 carry-forward years; firms who
would carry the credit forward more than 6 years are assigned a six-year carry-forward
period. The firm will first offset taxes paid (Compustat Data63) three years prior. If
its taxes paid three years prior are insufficient to offset the credit, it will offset taxes
paid two years prior, then one year prior. Any remaining R&D tax credit will then
be carried forward.
To construct the synthetic tax rate, jit is replaced by a constant (0.5) for all firms
in all years.
kit: the number of years until any tax losses will be exhausted
Compustat reports a firm's stock of net operating loss carry-forwards (Data 52)
but not their time to expiration. Net operating losses (NOLs) can be carried forward
up to 20 years. All NOL carry-forwards are assumed to be used before they expire.
NOLs are first used to offset the following year's pre-tax income (Data272). If next
year's pre-tax income is insufficient to offset all NOL carry-forwards, the remaining
NOL carry-forwards are offset against the second leading year's pre-tax income and
so on. The analysis presented here only calculates up six years of tax losses; firm who
may have more than six years of tax losses are assigned a tax loss period of six years.





Deferred Tax Positions and
Incentives for Corporate Behavior
Around Corporate Tax Changes
Joint with James M. Poterba and Jeri K. Seidman
3.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that corporate executives support lower statutory corpo-
rate tax rates, because after-tax corporate earnings would be higher if tax rates were
lower. While for most firms this statement is an accurate long-run characterization,
the short-run effects of a corporate rate reduction can differ across firms. Disparities
in the tax circumstances of different firms can lead to important cross-firm differences
in the short-run effect of changes in statutory tax rates, and potentially in the firms'
support for rate reduction.
For example, when corporate tax reform was debated by Congress in 2004, survey
evidence suggested that executives at a majority of firms supported corporate tax
rate reduction, and that they preferred rate reduction to other tax reform options.
Yet some large firms with substantial deferred tax assets that would be subject to
revaluation if the statutory corporate rate changed lobbied successfully against a
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corporate tax rate cut, in part because a rate cut would have reduced the value
of these assets. Hanna (2009) explains that "a corporate tax rate cut would cause
a small group of manufacturing companies, on behalf of which the representatives
were lobbying, to take an immediate charge or "hit" to earnings-thereby reporting
lower quarterly net income and lower earnings per share." In part as a result of
their efforts, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) included a complex
domestic activities production deduction that had the approximate effect of a rate
cut without requiring firms to write down their deferred assets and liabilities. This
episode illustrates how deferred tax assets, and the incentives they create for firms
for whom they are significant, can play an important role in the analysis of corporate
tax transitions.
This paper aims to better understand the potential effect of deferred tax positions
on corporate behavior. It also explores how these positions may affect managerial
preferences regarding corporate tax reform. Deferred tax asset or liability positions
recognize the estimated future tax effects attributable to past temporary differences
between book and tax income.1 How a corporate tax reform will affect a firm's
reported earnings in the year of its enactment, and how the firm may choose to react
to the tax reform, depend in part on the sign and magnitude of its net deferred tax
position. We collect data on, and then describe, the amounts and components of
deferred tax assets and liabilities for the largest public U.S. corporations between
1993 and 2004. The sample of firms that we study account for nearly forty percent
of the aggregate market capitalization of the U.S. corporate sector in 2004.
The presence of deferred tax assets and liabilities is important for understand-
ing the transitional impact of statutory tax rate changes on different firms. It also
complicates the task of estimating the revenue impact of a corporate tax change.
Deferred tax positions generate incentives for firms to re-time their recognition of in-
come around tax changes. The resulting changes in reported corporate earnings may
iThe difference between reported pre-tax income, and estimated taxable income, is comprised of
temporary, permanent and other differences. Temporary differences result from discrepancies in the
timing of income and expense recognition for book and tax purposes. Temporary differences affect
a firm's cash flow both when they arise and when they reverse; this future effect gives rise to the
recorded deferred tax position.
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affect the revenue raised by the tax system. When tax rates are scheduled to decline,
firms with large deferred tax assets have an incentive to shift income into the present
to utilize deferred tax benefits at a currently high tax rate, just the opposite of the
standard prediction that when tax rates decline income will be deferred until the
low-tax regime takes effect. In contrast, for firms with large deferred tax liabilities,
the incentive to defer income to the anticipated low-tax regime is even stronger than
for firms without such liabilities, since by shifting income into the future these firms
can discharge their deferred liabilities at the lower rate. Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson
(1992) and Guenther (1994) study the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), which re-
duced corporate rates. They find that firms delayed reporting of income so that this
income would be taxed at the new, lower tax rate. Maydew (1997) finds that firms
generating Net Operating Losses in the years immediately following TRA86 delayed
income recognition or accelerated deduction recognition to increase the loss, thereby
moving the refunds from the carryback into a tax year with a high statutory rate.
These results support the view that firms attempt to shift income across time periods
when there are pre-announced changes in statutory corporate tax rates, and that the
way they make such shifts depends on their particular tax position.
When the statutory corporate tax rate changes, firms must revalue their deferred
tax positions; this revaluation flows through current period net income. As the size of
the deferred tax positions of U.S. corporations increases, the potential for revaluation
of these balances to materially affect net income, and to affect the way managers and
shareholders view corporate tax reform, increases. McChesney (1997) provides exam-
ples of how industry lobbying influenced the Tax Reform Act of 1986; understanding
deferred tax asset and liability positions may more generally offer insights into firm
lobbying incentives regarding corporate tax reform. Mills (2006) and Neubig (2006),
among others, suggest that concerns about the changes in reported income that are
associated with such revaluations may be an important determinant of whether cor-
porate executives support potential corporate tax reform.
This study explores the influence that deferred tax positions may have on the way
firms respond to tax changes, and on the incentives managers may face when they
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lobby with regard to tax policy. While we do not examine the political actions of firms,
we suggest that a political economy perspective on firm behavior might offer useful
insights on the support for, and opposition to, various corporate tax reforms from
the corporate sector.2 We construct and describe components of deferred tax assets
and liabilities for large corporations. We identify all public firms that are Fortune
50 members between 1995 and 2004 and carefully construct comparable entities for
the period 1993 to 2004 by combining merged companies prior to the merger and
divested companies after the divestiture. For this set of 81 "super-firms," we then
catalog the components of their deferred tax positions so we can investigate changes
within category and in total for each firm. Hand-collection is necessary because the
available machine-readable balance sheet data has historically encoded only the long-
term deferred tax liability disclosed on the balance sheet rather than the net deferred
tax position and components disclosed in the tax footnote. While the most recent
Compustat data includes net deferred tax positions, is not complete. This data field
is populated for only 50.9 percent of the firm-years in our sample. The machine-
readable data therefore does not permit analysis of short-term deferred tax liabilities
or any deferred tax assets. This makes it impossible for researchers to measure the
magnitude of deferred tax assets that are likely to influence the amount of lobbying
against a proposed rate cut or the extent of income shifting that might take place as
firms try to utilize NOLs when faced with a statutory tax rate reduction.
The aim of our study is to calculate the size of net deferred tax asset and liability
positions in order to allow policy-makers to better understand the incentives facing
large U.S. corporations. We also provide evidence on how changes in temporary
differences-both aggregate temporary differences and specific types of temporary
differences-are linked with the recent rise in the difference between reported pre-tax
book income and estimated taxable income (the book-tax gap).
Our analysis has three parts. First, we measure both the total book-tax gap and
2We focus on temporary differences, rather than permanent differences, because permanent dif-
ferences do not accumulate over time in the form of deferred tax assets or liabilities, so they do
not create incentives with regard to tax policy transitions in the way that temporary differences
do. The full impact of a permanent difference is recognized in the period when the underlying
income-generating activity takes place.
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the portion of the gap attributable to temporary differences. Our hand-collected
firm-level data set enables us to overcome missing-data problems that are common in
the standard data source, Compustat, in order to accurately calculate these figures.3
Our findings suggest that temporary differences account for a substantial share of the
book-tax gap. When we stratify our data by year, we find that in every year, more
than half of the book-tax gap for the median firm in our sample is attributable to
temporary differences.4 Additionally, both the fraction of firms in our sample with
a net deferred tax liability and the size of the average net deferred tax liability rise
substantially during our sample. Thus, growth in temporary differences appears to
contribute to the widening of the book-tax gap. As a firm's deferred tax position rises
relative to its non-tax assets and liabilities, the firm is likely to be more sensitive to
proposed changes in statutory tax rates.
Second, we disaggregate deferred tax positions into categories in order to un-
derstand whether the recent growth in the book-tax gap attributable to temporary
differences is observed over most of the components that contribute to temporary
differences, or is driven by a few specific types of temporary differences. This dis-
aggregation provides the first detailed analysis of the components of deferred tax
positions for a significant and relatively constant sample of firms over an extended
period of time.' Key contributors to the increase in the book-tax income gap in-
clude mark-to-market adjustments; property, including leases and both tangible and
intangible property; and valuation allowances. The overall growth of the book-tax
3 We use current tax expense to calculate the book-tax income gap and deferred tax expense
to calculate temporary differences. Using hand-collected data, current tax expense (deferred tax
expense) is non-missing and non-zero for 92.4 percent (91.2 percent) of the firm-year observations
in our sample. Compustat current tax expense, calculated as the sum of TXFED, TXFO and
TXS, (Compustat deferred tax expense, calculated as the sum of TXDFED, TXDFO and TXDS) is
non-missing and non-zero for 74.8 percent (62.6 percent) of the firm-years in our sample.
4The residual (Book Income less [(Current plus Deferred Tax Expense)/0.35]) should be at-
tributed to permanent and other differences as well as to measurement error. Tax expense not
clearly disclosed as current or deferred (for example, tax expense due to Discontinued Operations
or disclosed only by jurisdiction) will be included in this residual measure.
5 Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997) collect similar data on the size and components of
deferred tax positions but only study the period 1992-1994. Phillips, Pincus, Rego, and Wan (2004)
study a longer period, 1994-2000, but study a random sample of firm-years in this period. We collect
data for a relatively constant set of firms over a long period, which allows us to make across-time
comparisons.
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gap is smaller than the growth in some of the items noted above, however, because
some accounting items that reduce the book-tax gap, such as NOL and tax credit
carryforwards, also increased during our sample period.
Finally, we interpret the data we collect on deferred tax assets and liabilities in
the context of the behavioral and political economy incentives surrounding a tax rate
change. We find that a pre-announced reduction in the corporate tax rate would
give a third of the firms in our sample a strong incentive to accelerate income to the
high-tax period. Moreover, many of these firms seem to have the capacity to make
such a shift. While we are unable to estimate how much income would be shifted
in response to such incentives, and the magnitude would depend on the size of the
rate change, the nontrivial share of firms affected by such an incentive and the rise in
the size of loss carryfowards, suggests that policy-makers should consider the revenue
impact of rate-change-motivated income shifting when they estimate the short-run
revenue effect of a change in the statutory corporate tax rate.
We also estimate the net income impact of a statutory rate change to demonstrate
how this aspect of a corporate rate cut might influence the incentives firms have
to lobby for or against specific tax changes. For the average firm in our sample,
reducing the statutory federal corporate income tax rate from 35 to 30 percent would
result in a $328 million increase in reported net income as a result of revaluation
of deferred tax positions. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across firms.
More sample firms would report an increase than a decrease in net income from
revaluations associated with a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate. Among
those that would report an increase, the average impact of a rate reduction to 30
percent would be $677 million. For firms with a net deferred tax asset, however, the
rate reduction would induce an average reduction of $315 million in net income. Our
results quantify a potentially important transitional effect of corporate tax reform on
net income-the revaluation effect of deferred tax positions-that policy-makers may
want to consider as they try to target transition relief in prospective tax legislation
to the various types of firms that may be affected by policy changes.
We divide our analysis of temporary book-tax differences into five sections. The
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next section-section 3.2-explains how temporary differences generate deferred tax
assets and liabilities. This background is particularly important for non-accountants.
Section 3.3 describes the data set that we have assembled from a sample of SEC
filings, identifies a number of potential data limitations and presents summary statis-
tics. Section 3.4 disaggregates the book-tax gap, both to estimate the importance of
temporary differences within our sample and to provide details on the most significant
components of temporary differences. Section 3.5 examines how the sum of past tem-
porary differences can affect net income when tax policy changes induce revaluations.
A brief conclusion in section 3.6 explores implications of our findings for tax policy
and suggests future research.
3.2 Temporary Differences Between Book and Tax
Earnings
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 109 (SFAS 109), Accounting for Income
Taxes, which took effect for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992, provides
guidance for the calculation of tax expense. SFAS 109 uses a balance sheet approach
to determine provision for income taxes. Deferred tax expense is calculated as the
change in the firm's net deferred tax position. To calculate the end-of-period deferred
tax position, temporary differences are cumulated over time and multiplied by the
statutory corporate tax rate that the firm expects to be in effect, under enacted laws,
when the temporary difference reverses. Temporary book-tax differences are the
result of disparities in the timing of an income component's inclusion in book and tax
earnings. When expected tax rates are constant through time, a firm's deferred tax
expense equals the current statutory tax rate times temporary book-tax differences
that arise or reverse in the current period.6 When tax rates change, the balance
sheet approach adopted in SFAS 109 requires revaluing net deferred tax positions.
The revaluation of the deferred tax asset or liability is then included in net income
6Under SFAS 109, temporary differences are recorded at their full tax-effect and are not dis-
counted to reflect any timing considerations.
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through the deferred tax expense or benefit.7
While the balance sheet approach of SFAS 109 may appear relatively complicated,
in most instances the following simplification yields approximately the same result.8
Total tax expense, which measures the taxes that will be due at some point in time
on current period income, equals the statutory corporate tax rate times taxable book
income, less tax credits and other rate adjustments.' Taxable book income equals
pretax book income less permanent differences between book and tax income. Per-
manent differences arise when a component of income enters one earnings measure
but not the other. The exclusion of tax-exempt interest from taxable income but
inclusion of tax-exempt interest in pretax book income is an example of a perma-
nent difference. The effect of permanent differences on the firm's net income, taxable
income, and cash flow is fully reflected in the year when these differences occur.10
While temporary differences do not affect total tax expense, they do affect taxable
income. Temporary book-tax differences arise when book and tax rules differ not on
the treatment of an income component but on the timing of its inclusion in book
and tax earnings. For example, the difference between book and tax depreciation is a
temporary difference. Temporary differences affect the partition of total tax expense
between current and deferred tax expense. In the absence of revaluation, temporary
differences do not affect net income.
Total Tax Expense = Current Tax Expense + Deferred Tax Expense (3.1)
7Revaluation of the deferred tax balance flows through net income regardless of whether or not
the creation of the deferred tax balance affected net income. For example, deferred tax positions
associated with unrealized gains and losses on available for sale securities affect other comprehensive
income rather than net income but revaluation of these positions would affect net income.
8 This simplification does not hold when the statutory rate changes, merger activity occurs, or in
certain other settings.
9 We refer to tax credits and other rate adjustments that affect current tax expense but not taxable
income as other differences. These other differences confound our estimate of taxable income.
1mWhen permanent or other differences are not able to be utilized in the period in which they
arise (for example, excess charitable contributions or R&D credits), a deferred tax asset will be
created to record the expected benefit from using this permanent or other difference in the future.
In these cases, permanent and other differences may affect net income, taxable income, and cash
flow in additional years. In general, deferred tax assets related to permanent and other differences
are small relative to those related to temporary differences.
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Temporary differences generate a disparity between current-period pretax book and
tax income, but they also generate a future, opposite-signed effect on taxable income.
Temporary differences also affect cash flow twice-both in the period in which they
arise and defer a tax payment or receipt and in the period in which they reverse and
generate the deferred tax payment or benefit.
Deferred tax positions equal the current statutory corporate tax rate times the
sum of differences that will reverse in the future, which equals the historical sum of
the firm's temporary differences. Firms with a positive sum of temporary differences
have a net deferred tax liability (DTL): they have accelerated tax deductions relative
to accounting expenses or have recorded income for accounting purposes that has
not been recognized yet for tax and they will owe tax when this difference reverses.
Firms for which taxable income has exceeded pretax book income, in contrast, have
a deferred tax asset (DTA); they are entitled to future tax relief either because they
have already paid additional taxes relative to their tax expense, either on taxable
income that has not yet been reported for accounting purposes or on accelerated
expenses relative to tax deductions, or because they have a tax benefit (a tax credit
or NOL) they have not yet been able to use.
For a firm in steady state, with constant nominal-dollar investment flows and other
balance sheet items, temporary differences should not affect pretax book income rel-
ative to taxable income. For example, the reductions in taxable income relative to
pretax book income generated by recently-acquired assets subject to accelerated de-
preciation should just offset the increases in taxable income relative to pretax book
income on older assets that have already been completely depreciated for tax pur-
poses. When the firm experiences swings in investment from year to year, however,
or is growing, temporary differences associated with different vintages of investment
will not be of equal magnitude so they may affect book relative to taxable income.
Similar patterns could emerge as a result of variation over time in other temporary
components.
We study temporary differences by analyzing reported deferred tax positions.
Three features of SFAS 109 that affect these reports are particularly significant for our
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study. First, firms must report both deferred tax assets and liabilities, not just a net
deferred tax position. Deferred tax positions are presented on the balance sheet based
on a current/non-current classification, as determined by the current/non-current sta-
tus of the underlying asset or liability that gave rise to the deferred tax position. Sec-
ond, firms must adjust their reported DTAs and DTLs when laws change. Changes
in statutory corporate tax rates, in particular, must be reflected. For many firms,
and for many but not all components of deferred taxes, a reduction in the statutory
corporate tax rate would reduce DTLs (DTAs) and thereby have a positive (nega-
tive) effect on reported earnings. Third, firms must report a valuation allowance that
reflects the probability of realizing deferred tax assets." This permits an assessment
of the potential tax benefit associated with a deferred tax asset.
Disaggregating deferred tax assets and liabilities makes it possible to study many
aspects of these deferred tax positions, but we are aware of only four studies that have
moved beyond machine-readable data to focus on the components of the deferred tax
account." Phillips, Pincus, Rego and Wan (2004) disaggregate changes in deferred
tax positions to explore which types of deferred tax positions reveal aggressive finan-
cial reporting. They find that changes in deferred tax positions related to revenue
and expense accruals and reserves are particularly likely to signal aggressive financial
reporting. Givoly and Hayn (1992) study how share prices of firms with deferred tax
liabilities reacted to the corporate tax rate reduction in the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
They find that the decline in corporate rates had a favorable effect on the market
value of firms with deferred tax liabilities, after controlling for the other effects of tax
reform on these firms. Chen and Schoderbek (2000) distinguish changes in deferred
tax positions that were triggered by the 1993 corporate tax rate increase from other
changes to deferred tax positions. They find that analysts reacted in roughly the
same way to both types of changes, even though the persistence and predictive power
"A valuation allowance is a contra-asset account that reflects the value of deferred tax assets that
are not likely to be recognized. The deferred tax asset is netted with the valuation allowance to
assess the firm's expected future tax benefit.
1 2 Several studies analyze a portion of the deferred taxes. For example, Miller and Skinner (1998)
and Bauman, Bauman, and Halsey (2001) study the valuation allowance related to deferred tax
assets.
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of the two are likely to differ. Finally, Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997) dis-
aggregate deferred taxes and find some evidence that market participants consider
the source of deferred tax positions in valuation. We follow these studies in disaggre-
gating deferred tax balances, but we focus on how temporary differences change over
time and on how they affect the income statement rather than market values.
3.3 Data Collection
Machine-readable data, such as the deferred tax liability balance recorded by Com-
pustat, measure firms' deferred tax positions with substantial noise. Until recently,
Compustat reported long-term deferred tax liabilities as shown on the balance sheet,
but it omitted deferred tax positions reported as assets or as short-term liabilities,
thereby preventing researchers from identifying firms with net deferred tax assets or
from accurately measuring the position of firms with net liabilities." Compustat's
Fundamentals database, introduced in 2007, collects data on net deferred tax positions
as well as the balance of short-term and long-term deferred tax assets and liabilities.1 4
This dramatically improves the ability of researchers to measure the net deferred tax
positions of firms. However, the Fundamentals dataset does not yet contain data for
all firms for all years." Our dataset has many advantages over Legacy Compustat.
Relative to Fundamentals Compustat, its primary advantage is its completeness.
A second limitation of machine-readable data is that it does not allow detailed
"For example, the 2005 balance sheet for Kimberly-Clark reports a current deferred tax asset
of $223.4 million and a long-term deferred tax liability of $572.9 million. Legacy Compustat only
collects the liability disclosed on the balance sheet of $572.9 million. Even if Compustat had also
collected the balance-sheet-disclosed current asset of $223.4 million, the user would not have been
able to tie to the footnote-disclosed net deferred tax liability position of $121.4 million because of
deferred tax positions included in other assets on the balance sheet.
14 Returning to the example in the footnote above, for 2005 Kimberly-Clark, Fundamentals Com-
pustat collects $223.4 million for short-term deferred tax assets, $228.1 million for non-current
deferred tax assets, and $572.9 million for long-term deferred tax liability as well as the net deferred
tax liability position of ($121.4) million.
"Fundamentals Compustat has backfilled tax data for a number of firms and continues to backfill
fairly rapidly (nearly 30 percent of our sample has become populated in the last 6 months.) However,
only 50.9 percent of the valid observations during our period have a non-missing value for Net
Deferred Tax Balance. Researchers will find comfort in the fact that 96.9 percent of the Net Deferred
Tax Balances collected by Compustat are approximately equal to the Net Deferred Tax Balances we
hand-collected.
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component-based analysis of deferred tax asset and liability positions. As part of
our study, we endeavor to provide evidence about which types of differences have
contributed to the rise in the book-tax gap. A second benefit of our dataset over
both Fundamentals and Legacy Compustat is that it is includes information on the
type of temporary difference which created the deferred tax position.
To overcome the limitations of existing data sets, we collect data from the tax
footnote in 10-K filings for FORTUNE 50 firms for fiscal years between 1993 and
2004. Our sample begins in FY 1993 because it is the first year when all firms'
financial statements were prepared in accordance with SFAS 109. FORTUNE ranks
firms by gross revenue.' 6 Our sample includes both financial and non-financial firms.
Since we are interested in tracking deferred tax positions over time, we use the annual
FORTUNE 50 lists to construct a panel data set. For any firm in the FORTUNE
50 in any of our sample years, we collect data for the entire sample period. There is
moderate turnover in the FORTUNE 50. Only 25 of the firms in the 1995 FORTUNE
50 were in the 2004 FORTUNE 50. Nine of the 50 firms on the 1995 list were acquired
between 1995 and 2004. In a typical year, five firms leave the FORTUNE 50 for various
reasons. One hundred firms appear in the FORTUNE 50 at least once between 1995
and 2004. We drop four firms from this group: State Farm Insurance and TIAA-
CREF, which are private companies that do not need to file 10-Ks, and Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, which are government-sponsored enterprises. This leaves a sample
of ninety-six firms.
Corporate control transactions complicate the problem of tracking FORTUNE 50
firms through time. Sample firms acquire other firms, or in some cases are themselves
acquired. When this occurs we collect data on the acquired or acquiring firm for
years prior to the acquisition. To preserve data comparability over time, we create
"super-firms" by combining the distinct accounts of the two firms that subsequently
consolidated. This process is designed to minimize discrete changes in deferred tax
positions that are due to acquisitions. However, no methodology we know of will
"Prior to 1995, FORTUNE rankings included only manufacturing firms. To avoid including firms
that are only in the FORTUNE 50 due to the exclusion of non-manufacturing firms, we formed our
sample using the FORTUNE rankings from 1995-2004.
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completely eliminate these changes because the merger itself can create deferred tax
assets and liabilities. 17
Because most of the companies acquired by FORTUNE 50 firms are companies
that are not part of the FORTUNE 50, constructing super-firms involves data col-
lection on many small companies. This increases the number of firms in our sample
in at least one year to 420; these firms combine to create 81 super-firms. Due both
to limited availability of electronic filings in the early years of our sample and to the
non-traded nature of some firms, the number of super-firms in our sample rises from
71 in the fir'st year (1993) to 78 in the final year (2004). Appendix A lists the indi-
vidual firms in our sample. Our analysis relies on super-firms rather than individual
companies as our units of observation to preserve comparability across years. SFAS
109 mandates: (i) an income tax summary, which details the significant components
of income tax expense; (ii) a rate reconciliation, which reconciles reported income
tax expense with the amount that would result from applying the domestic federal
statutory rate to pretax income; and (iii) a schedule of deferred tax positions, which
provides information about DTAs and DTLs. Firms also are expected to disclose
information regarding the amounts and expiration dates of loss and credit carry-
forwards, the division of tax expense between continuing operations and all other
items, the composition between domestic and foreign earnings before income taxes,
and temporary differences for which the firm has not recorded a deferred tax liability,
including permanently reinvested foreign earnings.
We match each firm-year observation with Compustat using both firm name and
year, and validate the match using total assets and net income.18 We collect the
7Our super-firm methodology will minimize differences due to non-taxable mergers accounted
for as a pooling-of-interest. However, a non-taxable merger accounted for as a purchase will result
in stepped-up basis for book but not tax, increasing deferred tax liability positions. While our
methodology (taking the change between the merged firm and the sum of the target and the acquiring
firm) will usually reduce the change relative to considering a change between the merged firm and
the acquiring firm only, our methodology does not always eliminate the change caused by the merger.
18We collected tax information from the first 10-K or annual report filing for each fiscal year.
Restatements may cause differences between the total assets and net income entries in the 10-
K and those reported in Compustat. We hand-checked the 48 firm-years where neither AT nor NI
corresponded to our hand-collected total assets and net income numbers. The majority of differences
were due to small restatements. We dropped 17 firm-years, 15 for which Compustat did not have
any data and two where a stub year or merger caused a mismatch.
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tax summary, rate reconciliation, and the schedule of deferred tax positions from tax
footnotes. There is substantial variation across firms in the level of detail presented
in the tax footnote, although most firms follow a fairly stable reporting policy from
year to year. Appendix B describes our procedure for disaggregating DTAs and DTLs
into their component parts.
There are several data limitations inherent in our categorized data. First, our
ability to categorize deferred tax assets and liabilities is dictated by the level of
disclosure provided in the 10-K. Firms who disclose relatively few line items or use
vague language hamper our categorization efforts. Second, SFAS 109 is a world-wide
consolidated firm disclosure. Most firms are taxed in multiple jurisdictions, but they
do not make jurisdiction-specific income tax disclosures. Rather than allocating DTAs
and DTLs across jurisdictions in an arbitrary fashion, we assume that all DTAs and
DTLs relate to federal temporary differences. Finally, there may be heterogeneity
across firms in the auxiliary assumptions that are used to compute and present the
value of DTAs and DTLs. We do not have any information regarding the detailed
calculations underlying the tax footnotes, so we are unable to address such potential
heterogeneity and its effects on our estimates.
3.4 Summary Findings
We begin our analysis by reporting summary statistics. Table 3.1 reports aggregate
and median values of the estimated book-tax income gap, temporary differences, and
the share of the book-tax income gap attributable to temporary differences for our
super-firm sample. We define the book-tax income gap on a world-wide basis as
Pretax Income less estimated Taxable Income, where Taxable Income is defined as
Current Tax Expense divided by the maximum U.S. corporate statutory tax rate
(35 percent throughout our sample). We calculate temporary differences as Deferred
Tax Expense divided by 0.35. We present and discuss two alternative calculation
approaches in Appendix C. The share measure equals the book-tax gap due to tem-
porary differences divided by the total book-tax gap. While Compustat in principle
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collects the data necessary for both of these calculation, we find that Current Tax
Expense in Compustat, which we calculate as the sum of TXFED, TXFO and TXS,
is missing or zero for 25.2 percent of the firm-year observations. By comparison,
Current Tax Expense is only missing or zero for 7.6 percent in the comparable set of
firm-years in our hand-collected data. Deferred Tax Expense in Compustat, which
we calculate as the sum of TXDFED, TXDFO and TXDS is missing or zero for
37.4 percent if the firm-year observations; it is missing or zero for 8.8 percent of the
firm-year observations in the comparable component of our dataset. In light of these
discrepancies, we use hand-collected data for the calculations throughout the paper.
The third through fifth columns of Table 3.1 present medians. The median share
attributable to temporary differences is the median of the ratio estimated temporary
differences/estimated total book-tax gap, calculated at the super-firm level. For the
median firm in our sample, there is variation across years in the share of the imputed
book-tax difference attributable to temporary differences, ranging from 61.3 percent in
1994 to 93.2 percent in 1999. In every year, however, estimated temporary differences
comprise the majority of the estimated book-tax gap for the median super-firm in
our sample.
In columns six through eight of Table 3.1, we report aggregate statistics. The
aggregate share attributable to temporary differences is calculated as the sum of tem-
porary differences across super-firms divided by the sum of the book-tax gap across
super-firms. This measure offers further insight into the distribution of temporary
differences. For example, in 2001 the median super-firm reports a positive book-tax
gap and positive temporary differences but the aggregate figures are both negative.
Just slightly less than half of the sample-43.6 percent-reports a negative book-tax
gap in 2001 and it is on average significantly larger at ($2.942) billion than the aver-
age positive book-tax gap of $1.814 billion. The difference between the median and
the aggregate (or the mean) arises because firms with large book-tax gaps or large
temporary differences are more influential in the computation of the aggregate mea-
sure than in the computation of the median. For instance, the very large aggregate
share attributable to temporary differences in 2002 is driven by AOL Time Warner
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Inc., which reports a book-tax gap of ($46.254) billion but temporary differences of
only ($1.42) billion.19 Even though the aggregate ratio is less stable than the median
ratio, both measures yield a similar inference: temporary differences are the largest
component of the book-tax gap for the firms in our sample.
Table 3.2 presents additional information on the total market value and assets for
the firms in our sample. Market Value of Equity is calculated as Compustat Common
Shares Outstanding (CSHO) multiplied by fiscal year-end price (PRCCF); all other
variables are hand-collected. With regard to market value of equity (assets), our
sample represents 39.2 percent (41.9 percent) of the Compustat universe in 2004 and
averages 41.2 percent (40.3 percent) over our whole sample period.
The last four columns in Table 3.2 show the number of firms in each sample-year
that report net deferred tax assets, the number that report net deferred tax liabilities,
and the total value of these net deferred tax positions. The data demonstrate the
heterogeneity in firm tax positions, as well as the evolution of these positions through
time. In 1993, 31 of 72 super-firms report net deferred tax assets that total $52.2
billion, while the remaining 41 report net deferred tax liabilities totaling $79.7 billion.
The proportion of net DTL firms increases through our sample period, and in 2004,
27 of 78 super-firms report net DTAs. While Neubig (2006) cites a recent survey
that suggests that the majority of surveyed firms prefer a lower corporate tax rate
to other incremental or fundamental tax reforms, Table 3.2 suggests that there is a
significant minority of firms that would experience at least one adverse effect of such
a rate reduction-a decline in the value of their DTAs.
Table 3.2 suggests a rising share of firms with net DTLs during our sample period.
A net DTL, indicating cumulative book income higher than taxable income, could be
due to a number of factors, including but not limited to aggressive financial reporting
which raises pretax book income and aggressive tax reporting which lowers taxable
income. In addition to showing an increase in the proportion of firms with a net DTL,
19There is not a lone culprit for the negative share attributable to temporary differences in 1998 but
rather three super-firms that report large negative book-tax differences and either a small negative or
a positive book-tax gap: Citigroup Inc., International Business Machines, and Johnson & Johnson.
Removing these three super-firms results in an aggregate book-tax gap of $9.588 billion, 28.4 percent
of which is attributable to temporary differences.
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the table also shows that firms with a net DTL have larger deferred tax positions than
firms with a net DTA. In 1993, the average net DTL is $2.0 billion while the average
net DTA is $1.7 billion. The average net DTL increases by 122 percent during our
sample period, to $4.4 billion in 2004, while the average net DTA increases by only
42 percent. This is consistent with the increase in DTLs over our sample period that
was evident in Table 3.1.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 explore the increases in temporary differences that have con-
tributed to the rise in the book-tax income gap and present detailed information
on the composition of deferred tax positions. Table 3.3 disaggregates deferred tax
positions into their constituent components, and indicates the sources of the most
important temporary book-tax differences. Table 3.4 separates DTA positions from
DTL positions for components that do not consist almost exclusively of either assets
or liabilities. We report means of these disaggregate measures to facilitate comparison
across years with different sample sizes.
The results in Table 3.3 suggest some variation over time in the key sources of
deferred tax positions within our sample. The most important source of deferred tax
liabilities is Property. Early in the sample, the most important source is Benefits,
which includes benefits related to current employees as well as retiree health benefits
and pensions. This is not a surprise, because our sample begins in 1993 shortly after
SFAS 106, Accounting for Other Postretirement Benefits, required firms to record
liabilities for unfunded retiree medical costs. In the following decade, many companies
eliminated or scaled back such coverage, thereby decreasing the DTA values associated
with Benefits. By the end of the sample in 2004, Credits and Carryforwards replaces
Benefits as the most significant deferred tax asset, although Benefits remains a major
contributor. Although the economy had substantially recovered by 2004, many firms
likely still have unused loss and credit carryforwards from the economic downturn of
2001.
While the overall ranking of various components of deferred tax assets does not
change dramatically between 1993 and 2004, the magnitude of certain categories
does. For example, deferred tax positions related to mark-to-market adjustments rise
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and fall with the general equity market. NOL Carryforwards increase 248 percent
while Other Tax Credits and Carryforwards increase 148 percent, consistent with the
extension of the carryforward period under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Deferred
tax liabilities related to Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) increase 45 percent.
Possible explanations for the rise in PPE include special "bonus tax depreciation" that
took effect in 2001 as well as the implementation of SFAS 142, which removed book
amortization of intangible assets. Liabilities related to Intangible Assets and Leases
rise 113 percent and 77 percent, respectively. Intangible Assets includes goodwill and
is likely a result of substantial merger activity recently. Some fraction of the rise
in leasing-related deferred tax components may reflect a rise in either, or both, of
aggressive financial and tax reporting using leased assets. Table 3.3 also shows that
book revenues rose relative to tax revenues during the 1990s, a result consistent with
Plesko's (2004) study. The data in Table 3.3 suggests that the increase in temporary
differences that contributed to the rise in the book-tax income gap was not driven by
a single source, but was instead the result of increases in many deferred tax liabilities
including Property, Subsidiary-Related Items and Valuation Allowance (the latter
being a contra-asset).
In addition to describing which categories have contributed most to the rise in tem-
porary differences, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 offers insight into the deferred tax positions that
are more likely to be manipulated if managers foresee changes in statutory tax rates.
Between 1993 and 2004, the stock of deferred tax assets related to total loss and credit
carryforwards increased nearly 200 percent. While much of this increase was offset
through increases in Valuation Allowances, the rise in loss- and credit carryforward-
related deferred tax positions still suggests in the event of a pre-announced decline in
the corporate tax rate, there would be strong incentives to accelerate the recognition
of income, and thereby to utilize carryforwards at a higher tax rate than will prevail
in the future. Table 3.4 separates deferred tax assets from deferred tax liabilities for
sub-categories that include substantial assets as well as liabilities. Some categories,
such as Revenue-Related, appear relatively small in Table 3.3 when the net deferred
tax positions are presented, but represent a significant deferred tax asset for some
148
firms and a significant deferred tax liability for others. For example, a firm that re-
ceives cash but has not yet provided the service may have to pay income tax on that
cash but does not record revenue until the associated goods or services are delivered,
and so will record an unearned revenue liability and a corresponding deferred tax
asset. A firm with installment sales, for which it recognizes a gain for book purposes
when the sale closes but recognizes the gain for tax purposes as the payments are
received, will have a deferred tax liability. Disaggregating into the asset and liability
positions for certain categories also allows us to see the effect of changes to book or
tax calculation of these items.
SAB 101, published in late 1999, tightened guidelines regarding how companies
can recognize revenue; SAB 104, published in late 2003, further curtailed aggressive
financial recognition of revenue. Evidence in Table 3.4 is consistent with both of these
pronouncements-the upward trend in the DTL for Revenue-Related slows beginning
in 1999 and even reverses beginning in 2002.20 Table 3.4 presents additional detailed
information that may be helpful in understanding the contribution of temporary
differences to the increase in the book-tax income gap.
The foregoing tables suggest that temporary differences are a significant portion of
the book-tax income gap and provide evidence on the components of these temporary
differences. We now explore the size of deferred tax positions relative to assets. This
normalization is helpful for judging the importance of DTAs and DTLs relative to
firm value. Table 3.5 reports the distribution of net DTAs and DTLs as a share of firm
assets for each super-firm and for each individual firm. The net deferred tax balance
is substantial for many firms. In 2002, for example, 35 percent of both super-firms
and individual firms reported a net deferred tax position in excess of five percent of
assets. Although the table does not show it, almost ten percent of both individual
firms and super-firms had a net deferred tax position exceeding ten percent of assets.
For super-firms, the maximum (minimum) net deferred tax position as a function of
assets occurred in 2004 (1995) and was 14.5 percent (-31.9 percent). Overall, Table
20 An alternative explanation for the observed trend in Revenue-Related deferred tax positions
that we cannot rule out is the slowing economy.
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3.5 suggests that while the majority of firms have a small deferred tax position relative
to total assets, a nontrivial number have a more significant position.
Table 3.6 presents information similar to that in Table 3.5, but it distinguishes
financial and non-financial firms. We have not separated these two groups in our
earlier tables because we did not find a significant difference between them in the
average (unscaled) size of the deferred balance positions or in the percent of the book-
tax gap attributable to temporary differences. However, in Table 3.6, we separate
financial and non-financial firms; their balance sheets appear to be affected differently
by deferred tax positions.
Financial firms have relatively smaller deferred tax positions than non-financial
firms, largely because their base of financial assets is so large. In every sample year,
more than three-quarters of the financial firms in our sample have a net deferred tax
position, either positive or negative, that represents less than three percent of total
assets. About half of non-financial firms, in contrast, have deferred tax positions in
this range. The extreme values of the ratio of deferred tax positions to firm assets
are also smaller for financial than for non-financial firms. The maximum (minimum)
Net Deferred Tax Position/Assets for a financial firm occurred in 1994 (1997) and
was 16.2 percent (-18.5 percent) while the maximum (minimum) Net Deferred Tax
Position/Assets for a non-financial firm occurred in 2001 (1995) and was 48.0 percent
(-46.3 percent). For financial firms, the net deferred tax positions as a percentage of
assets are distributed more tightly around zero than are the comparable positions for
non-financial firms.
3.5 Temporary Differences and Firm Behavior
The presence of deferred tax positions on a corporation's balance sheet may affect
several aspects of firm performance and create a range of incentives that may influence
firm behavior. In this section, we describe several consequences of the presence of
temporary differences. To focus attention on a concrete policy setting, we consider a
situation in which the statutory corporate rate is expected to decline.
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3.5.1 Income Re-Timing Incentives
Firms with deferred tax assets and liabilities face incentives to alter the timing of
reported income in the periods immediately surrounding a tax rate cut. In the period
prior to the rate cut, absent deferred tax considerations firms will want to shift current
period income into the future to pay tax on that income at the lower future rate.2 1
The presence of deferred tax liabilities should exacerbate this incentive-firms will
also want to delay the reversal of deferred tax liabilities so the liability is settled at
a lower rate than currently recorded. Firms with deferred tax assets, however, will
want to receive the deferred benefits at the higher tax rate and so have an incentive
to shift income into the current period.
Many firms hold deferred tax positions related to NOL carryforwards-they have
carried the NOL as far back as is allowed and some NOL remains to offset taxable
profit in future periods. In 2004, 37 percent of the individual firms in our sample had
a beginning-of-year, NOL carryforward-related DTA that would likely be affected by a
federal rate cut. 22 While firms with deferred tax assets related to NOL carryforwards
have a strong incentive to create income in the final higher-tax-rate period in order
to receive the benefit of the NOL carryforward at the higher rate, not all firms with a
net NOL carryforward may be able to shift income. We assume that firms reporting
taxable income have more scope to accelerate income than do firms currently in a tax
loss position. In 2004, three of the firms with a net NOL carryforward are estimated
to be in a tax loss positions, leaving 26 of the 78 firms with both a beginning-
of-year net NOL Carryforward and positive estimated taxable income. This brief
analysis indicates that nearly one third of our sample would have an incentive to
accelerate income, as well as some capacity to do this. We are unable to extend this
analysis to estimate the dollars of income these firms are likely to shift. However,
21Guenther (1994) discusses nontax costs that limit this type of tax rate arbitrage, including the
cost of reporting lower financial income for debt covenants and management compensation. We
acknowledge these constraints but do not measure them. Our estimates of the percent of firms who
are likely to shift for NOL CF purposes may be considered an upper bound for the percentage of
firms who are likely to undertake income shifting into the higher tax regime.
22In this calculation, we exclude disclosed state and foreign NOL carryforwards as well as car-
ryforwards disclosed together with a tax credit (i.e., Credit and Loss Carryforwards.) The latter
exclusion may cause us to understate the percentage of firms with a federal NOL carryforward.
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based on Maydew's (1997) finding that the average firm in his sample shifts $11.2
million of income, or 1.5 percent of Net Sales, in response to a 12 percent decrease
in the corporate income tax rate, we believe that the re-timing of corporate income
associated with a change in statutory tax rates could be substantial. This suggests
that revenue estimators should consider rate-motivated income shifting into their
estimates of the short-run revenue effects of a change in the statutory corporate tax
rate.
3.5.2 Preference for Tax Rate Change
Temporary differences generally do not affect net income but only affect cash flow.
Both when they arise and when they reverse, temporary differences affect the alloca-
tion between current and deferred tax expense and therefore affect cash paid for taxes.
Generally, the effect when the difference is recorded and when it reverses are equal
and opposite. For example, when taxable depreciation exceeds book depreciation,
cash outflow for taxes decreases, increasing cash flow relative to a situation in which
book and taxable depreciation are equal. When this temporary difference reverses,
book depreciation exceeds taxable depreciation and cash outflow for taxes increases.
In both the period in which the temporary difference arises and the period in which
it reverses, the temporary difference does not affect net income but does shift cash
flow.
However, when tax rates change, the firm must revalue its deferred tax asset or
liability, which in turn affects net income. Neubig (2006) and Mills (2006) argue
that firms are very sensitive to the impact of tax reform on their reported earnings
and recognize the potential income effect through revaluation of DTAs and DTLs.
Managers who will report lower earnings as a result of these revaluations may be
particularly concerned that analysts may inadvertently assume that these one-time
effects are persistent. Chen and Schoderbek (2000) suggest that analysts did not
understand the transitory nature of deferred tax revaluations around the 1993 tax
rate change-a concern that might heighten managerial concern.
We illustrate the potential net income impact of deferred tax position revalua-
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tions with a counterfactual example in which the federal corporate income tax rate
drops by five percentage points in 2004.2 Using the data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we
estimate the revaluation of beginning-of-year deferred tax positions.24 We limit the
sample to just those firms that report federal income tax separately. This limited
sample includes 80.8 percent of our firm-year observations, representing 81.8 percent
of sample adjusted net deferred tax positions. The revaluation calculations exclude
deferred tax positions related to tax credits, including foreign tax credits. Because
credits directly offset tax liability, rather than taxable income, a rate change will not
affect their valuation.
Our results are presented in Table 3.7. A lower tax rate reduces federal tax expense
on current period income and increases the period's net income; we refer to this as its
"direct effect." This is a persistent and long-lived effect of the rate reduction. If the
2004 corporate tax rate had been reduced to 30 percent, the direct effect would have
reduced federal tax expense by $147 million for the average super-firm. The average
super-firm's net income in 2004 was $3,625 million, so this reduction in tax expense
represents an increase in net income of 4.1 percent.
In the year of the rate change, net income reflects both the direct effect and the
revaluation effect. While we might expect the deferred tax revaluation to be second-
order, for many firms it is considerably larger than the direct effect. Our estimates
in Table 3.7 suggest that for the average super-firm, the revaluation of 2003 deferred
tax positions would have increased 2004 net income by $328 million, or 9.0 percent.25
Our average super-firm would experience a 13.1 percent increase in net income-two-
thirds of which is attributable to the revaluation effect. This effect, not surprisingly,
differs across firms. For firms with net DTAs, the write-down of net DTA decreases
net income, offsetting the positive net income effect of the reduction in the current
21While many other changes in the business environment, including changes in Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, also affect deferred tax positions, we consider a statutory rate change because
it is broadly applicable and its impact is relatively easy to estimate.
24We assume no rate-change-motivated income shifting because we cannot estimate the effect of
the income shifting.
251In results that are not reported here, we found that the median revaluation effect in 2004 would
have increased net income by 2.1 percent. While the median effect is considerably lower than the
mean effect of 9.0 percent, it is still substantial.
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period's tax expense. For net DTL firms, on the other hand, the revaluation reduces
the value of a balance sheet liability, which increases their net income. Net DTA
super-firms in our sample would on average experience a $315 million revaluation
decrease in net DTA and net income.26 The lower tax rate would have decreased
these firms' current tax expense and increased their net income by $103 million. On
net, these firms would report a $212 million earnings decrease due to the rate change,
a 7.7 percent decrease in their average net income of $2,755 million. Firms in our
sample with a net DTL would experience, on average, a $677 million dollar revaluation
decrease in their net DTL, and a matching net income increase.2 7 They would also
report $171 million less in taxes on income generated in the current period. DTL firms
average $4,097 million of net income in 2004. For net DTL firms the revaluation effect
reinforces the direct tax expense effect. Net income rises, on average, by 20.7 percent
for our sample firms with a net DTL.
Although our estimates of DTAs and DTLs provide some guidance on the effects
of statutory rate changes, there are several reasons for caution in evaluating our
estimates. First, our assumption that all DTAs and DTLs relate to federal temporary
differences may lead to some overstatement of the effect of U.S. federal income tax
rate changes. Second, not all DTAs and DTLs are affected by statutory rate changes.
Tax credit carry-forwards, for example, are not, because they are applied after the tax
rate. We address this concern by removing credits from base deferred tax positions
where possible when we estimate the revaluation effect of a tax rate change. We make
the conservative assumption that any disclosure which includes credits, such as "Net
Operating Loss and Credit Carry-forwards," is comprised entirely of credits.
3.5.3 Deferred Taxes and Corporate Tax Reform
A change in the corporate tax rate would affect firms through many channels. Our
analysis highlights one aspect of corporate tax reform that is often overlooked: changes
26The median revaluation effect in 2004 for Net DTA firms would have decreased net income by
4.2 percent.
27The median revaluation effect in 2004 for Net DTL firms would have increased net income by
6.3 percent.
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statutory rates will affect firms by requiring revaluation of their deferred tax assets
and liabilities. This "temporary differences" channel will have divergent effects on
firms with net deferred tax assets and those with net deferred tax liabilities, and it
may lead their respective managers to have different reactions to tax reform and to
pursue different strategies to shift income from the old to the new regime. Managers
appear to be sensitive to the impact of tax reform on reported earnings. Chen and
Schoderbek (2000) provide evidence that the market does not fully understand the
impact of tax reform on reported earnings, providing some support for this concern.
Our findings suggest that for some firms, the effects of some corporate tax reforms
on the value of deferred tax assets and liabilities can be substantial. Managers at
firms with significant net deferred tax assets may lobby against statutory corporate
tax rate cuts, for example, if they are primarily concerned with the short-term effect
of such policy changes on reported after-tax income.
The political history of tax policy changes is replete with examples of corporate
groups with closely-aligned incentives affecting policy design. Hanna (2009) describes
the policy debate surrounding corporate tax reform in 2003 and 2004. In that episode,
corporate pressure from firms with accumulated net operating losses was one factor
in Congress' decision to replace the extraterritorial income export incentive with a
"qualified production activities" deduction, as part of AJCA, rather than a reduction
in corporate tax rates. For firms with large net deferred tax assets positions, a rate
cut would have generated substantial tax expense. Less than two months after the
passage of AJCA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published its
interpretation of the qualified production activities deduction as a special deduction,
rather than a tax rate reduction, under SFAS 109. While firms with deferred tax
liabilities would have preferred FASB treat the new qualified production activities
deduction as a tax rate reduction, FASB's treatment is additional evidence that firms
are concerned about the financial statement impact of tax rate changes.
In a different context, Neubig (2006) notes that one concern some firms may
have about expanding investment incentives by adopting expensing is that expensing
creates deferred tax liabilities that could be subject to revaluation if the corporate
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tax rate changes in the future. In the event of a corporate rate increase, this would
reduce current earnings-an event that some managers may seek to avoid.
Ohio's recent corporate tax reform, described in State and Local Tax Alert (2005),
illustrates how firms with substantial deferred tax positions may affect the tax leg-
islative process. The reform legislation included three distinct forms of transition
relief for firms that would lose deferred tax assets when the corporate income tax
was replaced by a gross receipts tax. First, firms operating in Ohio under the income
tax regime were encouraged to schedule the reversal of their temporary differences
during the phase-out of the corporate income tax. To the extent that any temporary
items would not reverse by the end of the phase-out, an adjustment for the estimated
deferred tax position at the end of the transition period was recognized in income in
the period in which the phase-out began. Second, certain deferred tax assets, pri-
marily research and development tax credits, were retained as credits under the new
activity tax regime. These credits are not recorded as assets on the financial books of
the firm, however, because SFAS 109 applies only to taxes on income. Finally, there
was special transition tax relief aimed at those firms with large NOL carryforwards,
which would lose the ability to use these assets under the new tax regime. These
policies provide transition relief to firms that were 'owed' tax relief under the income
tax regime and that lost this prospective tax relief as a result of the tax reform.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper explores the role of temporary differences in contributing to the disparity
between reported pretax book and estimated tax earnings for large U.S. corporations.
Temporary differences comprise a substantial fraction of the book-tax income gap.
Temporary differences that increase the book-tax income gap are larger than those
that decrease it in our data sample. More than half of the firms in our sample
have a net deferred tax liability, which reflects the accumulation of past excesses of
book income over taxable income. Additionally, the average net deferred tax liability
position is greater than the average net deferred tax asset position.
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Firms exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their deferred tax positions. In 2004,
more than forty percent of the firms in our sample of FORTUNE 50 companies re-
ported a net deferred tax position valued at more than five percent of corporate assets.
The observed heterogeneity suggests that firms may be affected in different ways by
tax and accounting reforms. We estimate that roughly one third of the firms in our
sample have strong incentives to shift income forward to maximize their use of NOL
Carryforwards in response to a pre-announced reduction in the statutory corporate
tax rate, while a large part of the sample likely has the opposite income shifting incen-
tives. This heterogeneity also affects the net income impact of a statutory rate cut.
If the corporate tax rate had been reduced by five percentage points in 2004, then
the average firm in our sample would have experienced a $328 million increase in net
income due to the revaluation of its deferred tax positions. The average revaluation
effect for a firm with a net deferred tax asset position is a $315 million decrease in net
income while the average revaluation effect for a firm with a net deferred tax liability
position is a $677 million increase. Understanding the disparate incentives created by
deferred tax asset and liability positions is important for crafting transitional relief
associated with changes in the structure of the corporate income tax.
The prospective importance of deferred tax assets and liabilities in affecting firm
behavior and firm incentives is possibly even greater than the findings from our sam-
ple suggest. Many corporations are likely to experience growing deferred tax assets
as a result of the recession that began in 2007. While the recently-extended NOL
carryback period will enable some firms to draw down their deferred tax assets, the
new tax provisions will not affect all firms. 28 Moreover, as new financial products
provide firms with potentially greater control over the timing of income recognition,
the magnitude of their behavioral response to transitory tax incentives associated
with deferred tax assets and liabilities may increase.
Our descriptive findings suggest a number of possibilities for future research. The
28The Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act, passed in November 2009, allows
five-year NOL carryback for NOLs incurred in 2008 or 2009. This is only useful for firms with a tax
loss in 2008 or 2009 who paid tax in 2003, 2004 or 2005, the newly accessible period that was not
accessible under the prior two-year carryback rules.
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detailed information on deferred tax positions that we have collected may provide
a starting point for studying the interplay between financial accounting for taxes
and various aspects of corporate behavior. One particularly interesting question is
how managers respond to the incentives created by deferred tax assets and liabilities.
Their responses might involve political action in support of, or opposition to, policies
that would be beneficial to, or costly for, their firms, or might involve changes in the
investment or financing policies that are designed to take advantage of opportunities,
or minimize burdens, associated with deferred tax positions. It may, for example, be
possible to investigate whether firms that are large contributors to the campaigns of
legislators who serve on tax-writing committees are particularly sensitive to the nature
of tax reform insofar as they have large deferred tax positions. Data such as that
collected for the current project provides a much richer description of the potential
heterogeneous effect of tax policies created by cross-firm differences than does the
more aggregate data reported in machine-readable databases, and it consequently
makes it possible to test more refined hypotheses about firm behavior.
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ax Income Gap and Share Attributable to Temporary Differences
Median Median Median Share Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate
of Super-Firm Super-Firm Attributable Super-Firm Super-Firm Share
Book-Tax Temporary Book-Tax Temporary Attributable
Income Gap Differences Income Gap Differences to TemporaryIncoe Ga Difereces Differences
($M) ($M) ($M.) ($M) Differences
$25.0 ($2.5) 67.08% ($7,987.5) ($14,368.0) 179.9%
96.3 72.0 61.34 29,488.4 20,371.7 69.08
115.9 47.4 64.10 31,022.9 22,762.2 73.37
134.6 155.4 71.36 41,440.6 29,578.7 71.38
117.5 136.2 67.69 33,839.3 19,123.2 56.51
10.8 10.1 63.17 9,870.7 (2,534.0) -25.67
251.0 245.7 93.20 83,660.6 67,123.7 80.23
219.7 238.9 80.97 67,715.3 63,341.0 93.54
180.8 142.0 82.22 (20,192.0) (26,220.9) 129.86
302.3 144.1 71.24 2,246.1 42,485.6 1,891.52
736.0 477.1 75.62 139,877.3 68,004.2 48.62
607.4 296.6 66.63 89,942.7 18,694.0 20.78
nd-collected. Sample includes firms ranked in the Fortune 50 from 1995-2004. To standardize firms across time, firms
;ion, or divestiture activity with the Fortune 50 ranked firm are included with the Fortune 50 ranked firm to create a
: Income gap is calculated as Pretax Book Income less Taxable Income, where Taxable Income is calculated as Current
he maximum corporate statutory rate of 35% in all periods. Temporary differences are calculated as Deferred Tax
dedian Share Attributable to Temporary Differences is the median value of (Temporary Differences/Book-tax Income
r-firm level. Aggregate measures are computed by summing all firms' book-tax gaps and temporary differences.
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haracteristics by Year
Aggregate Aggregate Cross-sectional Super-Firms with Net DTA Super-Firms 
with Net DTL
Market Total Assets Standard
Capitalization of of Super- Deviation of Number Aggregate Number Aggregate
Value ($B) Value ($B)
Super-Firms ($B) Firms ($B) Net DTA ($B)
1,718 5,202 3.5 31 52.2 40 -79.7
1,804 6,328 3.3 35 52.7 41 -81.2
2,484 4,918 3.2 32 41.5 44 -83.7
3,199 5,719 3.4 31 43.8 47 -97.4
4,311 6,768 3.8 29 48.2 49 -110.5
5,764 7,295 4.0 33 56.9 44 -108.2
6,651 8,305 5.4 33 52.0 44 -148.0
6,468 9,340 6.2 31 58.3 47 -166.5
5,938 10,229 6.6 33 69.1 45 -181.6
4,543 10,625 7.3 33 94.1 45 -186.9
5,466 11,757 7.5 29 68.4 49 -226.9
5,800 13,302 7.0 27 65.4 51 -226.6
,nd-collected except as noted. Sample includes firms ranked in the Fortune 50 from 1995-2004. To standardize firms
in merger, acquisition, or divestiture activity with the Fortune 50 ranked firm are included with the Fortune 50 ranked
L." Market capitalization is calculated as Common Shares Outstanding (Compustat CSHO) multiplied by Fiscal Year-
C_F).
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3 of Net Deferred Tax Positions ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
9unts 206 193 206 226 239 264 250 212 283 287 255 244
242 241 235 312 380 441 459 452 514 655 434 482
benefits 519 522 526 481 432 365 348 328 335 395 377 318
-25 -65 -73 -103 -105 -82 -120 -129 -172 -117 -152 -207
165 168 161 174 174 214 265 310 369 509 524 575
forwards 18 22 18 1 2 4 9 11 5 5 5 11
ryforwards 182 190 183 176 197 186 214 215 241 379 435 452
d 6 4 6 4 22 24 34 44 37 48 -31 -75
15 16 18 9 13 15 12 17 8 5 2 -5
cquisition 205 141 113 80 45 43 13 -37 34 23 2 41
23 22 27 17 11 4 4 -9 1 11 25 28
5 5 6 4 3 5 5 5 60 84 90 102
454 451 463 456 489 548 556 628 398 517 413 545
-248 -268 -257 -243 -248 -186 -234 -255 -245 -615 -578 -688
-40 -55 -55 -48 -36 -39 -65 -75 -97 -129 -169 -197
ts -117 -15 -193 -186 -276 -300 -361 -275 -286 -345 -451 -484
-148 -142 -143 -179 -166 -152 -327 -385 -394 -142 -351 -315
-208 -217 -227 -256 -280 -266 -293 -328 -333 -376 -365 -369
iment -1,479 -1,448 -1,416 -1,450 -1,500 -1,468 -1,584 -1,600 -1,707 -1,989 -2,057 -2,148
errals -17 -20 -21 -22 -29 -25 -32 -36 -35 -40 -43 -45
-139 -113 -114 -125 -132 -205 -220 -210 -219 -197 -178 -93
5 2 -2 -4 -9 -17 -20 -10 -6 -3 -1 1
-13 -9 -17 -14 -23 -41 -161 -260 -237 -153 -219 -240
i Sample 71 76 76 78 78 77 77 78 78 78 78 78
e 201 223 233 285 268 236 193 170 149 134 126 120
deferred tax positions are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report filings and assigned
based on frequency and monetary significance of disclosure items. Amounts presented here are annual averages per
defined in Table 3.1 and in the text.
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t Components of Net Deferred Tax Positions ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
DTA 269 276 303 391 452 501 542 536 534 681 572 633
DTL -27 -35 -68 -79 -72 -60 -83 -84 -20 -26 -137 -151
DTA 537 539 553 511 462 409 395 380 395 429 426 368
DTL -18 -16 -27 -29 -30 -43 -46 -52 -60 -34 -48 -50
DTA 51 35 43 29 34 42 18 1 9 39 40 36
DTL -76 -99 -115 -133 -139 -123 -138 -130 -181 -156 -192 -243
DTA 5 6 9 24 28 36 32 53 54 44 48 48
DTL -45 -61 -63 -72 -64 -75 -97 -128 -151 -173 -217 -246
DTA 24 33 35 43 60 76 90 99 118 137 118 111
DTL -18 -29 -29 -39 -39 -52 -56 -55 -80 -89 -150 -186
DTA 32 38 39 36 36 43 48 52 50 53 53 44
DTL -17 -22 -21 -27 -24 -28 -36 -35 -41 -49 -52 -49
DTA 11 72 7 7 5 7 50 34 83 163 167 135
DTL -127 -87 -200 -193 -281 -307 -411 -309 -369 -508 -617 -619
DTA 210 143 118 86 62 59 27 28 58 49 28 73
uisitionDTL 
-5 
-2 -5 -5 -17 -16 
-14 -66 
-24 -26 -25 -32
DTA 35 33 35 30 27 18 16 18 22 25 40 44
DTL -13 -11 -8 -13 -16 -15 -12 -27 -20 -14 -15 -16
DTA 44 46 46 44 54 61 47 36 50 116 131 136
DTL -191 -188 -190 -223 -220 -213 -373 -422 -444 -257 -483 -451
DTA 22 16 18 18 15 17 7 6 8 2 2 2
als DTL -39 -36 -39 -39 -44 -42 -39 -43 -43 -42 -44 -47
DTA 50 49 53 75 85 91 96 118 135 152 157 164
DTL -189 -162 -167 -199 -217 -296 -316 -328 -354 -349 -335 -257
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTA 7 5 3 2 2 2 7 5 7 7 8 10
DTL -2 -2 -4 -5 -11 -19 -26 -15 -13 -10 -9 -9
deferred tax positions are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report filings and assigned
based on frequency and monetary significance of disclosure items. Amounts presented are annual averages per super-
Lents, which are primarily DTA or DTL, we do not present the DTA and DTL detail here.
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Note: All data are hand-collected. The distribution in the upper panel is calculated at the super-firm
level; the distribution in the lower panel is calculated with each individual firm as its own observation.
%
Table 3.6: Distribution of Net Deferred Tax Positions as a Share of Firm Assets: Financial





















































































































































































































Note: All data are hand-collected except as noted. The distributions are calculated with each
individual firm as its own observation. The sample parallels that of the individual firm analysis in the
lower panel of Table 3.5. Industry is determined using SIC codes obtained from Compustat; financial
Table 3.7: Mean Impact of Federal Statutory Rate Decrease to 30% ($M)
Panel A: All Super-Firms
Number of Mean Pre- Mean Net Beginning of Revaluation Perren Direct Effect Total Effect
Super-Firms tax Income Income etA Effect on NI Tax Eene on NI on NINet DTA Tax Expense
1994 66 2,597 4,841 -486 69 569 81 150
1995 69 2,897 1,629 -463 66 615 88 154
1996 69 3,536 2,243 -516 74 763 109 183
1997 72 3,608 2,530 -574 82 769 110 192
1998 69 3,469 2,884 -690 99 787 112 211
1999 69 4,562 3,012 -580 83 1,121 160 243
2000 69 5,135 3,253 -1,241 177 1,219 174 351
2001 71 3,049 1,933 -1,466 209 578 83 292
2002 72 2,785 140 -1,615 231 759 108 339
2003 73 4,520 3,100 -1,438 205 876 125 330
2004 74 5,302 3,625 -2,298 328 1,029 147 475
Panel B: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTA
1994 29 3,079 7,234 1,514 -216 656 94 -122
1995 31 3,820 2,448 1,414 -202 778 111 -91
1996 29 3,625 2,337 1,152 -165 683 98 -67
1997 30 3,859 2,552 1,280 -183 658 94 -89
1998 28 3,145 2,677 1,569 -224 589 84 -140
1999 32 4,089 2,645 1,590 -227 881 126 -101
2000 31 4,601 2,920 1,430 -204 952 136 -68
2001 26 3,749 2,459 1,857 -265 608 87 -178
2002 32 2,994 1,808 1,720 -246 537 77 -169
2003 28 3,623 2,493 2,865 -409 629 90 -319
2004 26 4,065 2,755 2,203 -315 721 103 -212
Panel C: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTL
1994 37 2,219 2,965 -2,054 293 501 72 365
1995 38 2,145 960 -1,995 285 482 69 354
1996 40 3,471 2,174 -1,724 246 820 117 363
1997 42 3,428 2,514 -1,898 271 849 121 392
1998 41 3,690 3,025 -2,232 319 922 132 451
1999 37 4,971 3,329 -2,457 351 1,329 190 541
2000 38 5,570 3,526 -3,421 489 1,437 205 694
2001 45 2,644 1,629 -3,387 484 560 80 564
2002 40 2,618 -1,194 -4,283 612 937 134 746
2003 45 5,079 3,478 -4,116 588 1,029 147 735
2004 48 5,973 4,097 -4,737 677 1,195 171 848
Note: All data are hand-collected. The sample is limited to firms who separately report Federal Tax
Expense. We adjust Beginning of Period Net DTA for Credits as discussed in Section 3.4. All effects are
calculated assuming a 30% Federal Statutory Tax Rate rather than the actual rate 35%.
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Appendix 3A: Sample Firms and Years in Sample
Our sample was constructed based on FORTUNE magazine's annual sales-based rank-
ing of U.S. firms. The top 50 firms for each year from 1995 until 2004 were included
in the sample. To mitigate the effects of changes in firm size in the net deferred tax
analysis, the tax notes for all firms acquired or sold by FORTUNE 50 firms during
the sample period were also included. For example, Berkshire Hathaway acquired
General Re Corp in 1998, so the tax note information for General Re Corp was added
to Berkshire Hathaway for years 1993-1997. Similarly, AMR Corp spun off Sabre in
2000, so going forward, tax note details for Sabre were added to AMR Corp for years
2000-2004. We use online firm histories and 10-Ks to research merger and acquisi-
tion activity. Four FORTUNE 50 firms were dropped due to insufficient disclosures:
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, State Farm, and TIAA-CREF.
For the net deferred tax descriptive analysis, the main FORTUNE 50 firm and all
of its acquired and divested components were combined into a singe aggregate firm
observation, summing over the deferred tax and liability categories as well as total
assets and market values.
The following 81 FORTUNE 50 super-firms are included in our sample: Aetna Inc,
Allstate Corp., Albertsons Inc, Altria Group, American Electric Power Co., American
International Group Inc, AmerisourceBergen Corp., Amoco, AMR Corp, AOL Time
Warner Inc, Aquila Inc, AT&T Corp, Bank of America Corp, BellSouth Corp, Berk-
shire Hathaway Inc, Cardinal Health, CenterPoint Energy Inc, Chevron Texaco Corp.,
Cigna Corp, Citigroup Inc, Chrysler, Coca-Cola Co, Columbia/HCA Health, ConA-
gra Foods Inc, ConocoPhillips, Costco Wholesale Corp., Dell Computer Corp, Dow
Chemical Co, Duke Energy Co, Dynegy Inc, Eastman Kodak, El Paso Corp., Enron
Corp, Exxon Mobil Corp, Ford Motor Co, General Electric Co, General Motors Corp,
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Hewlett Packard Co., Home Depot Inc., Ingram Micro
Inc., Intel Corp, International Paper Co, International Business Machines, ITT Indus-
tries Inc, J C Penney Corp Inc, J P Morgan Chase & Co, Johnson & Johnson, Kmart
Holding Corp., Kroger Co., Lockheed Martin Corp, Loews Corp., Lowe's, Marathon
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Oil Corp, MCI Worldcom, McKesson Corp, Merck & Co Inc, Merrill Lynch & Co Inc,
MetLife Inc, Microsoft Corp, Morgan Stanley, Motorola Inc, PepsiCo Inc, Pfizer Inc,
Procter and Gamble Co, Prudential Financial Inc, Safeway Inc, Sara Lee Corp, SBC
Communications Inc, Sears Roebuck Co, Supervalu Inc, Target Corp., The Boeing
Co., United Parcel Service Inc, United Technologies, Valero Energy Corp,. Verizon
Communications Inc, Walgreen Co, Walmart, Wells Fargo & Co, Xerox Corp.
The following 15 FORTUNE 50 firms are included in our sample as part of an-
other super-firm: American Stores, included with Albertsons Inc; Bank One, included
with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co; BankAmerica, included with Bank of America Corp;
Bell Atlantic, included with Verizon Communications Inc; Chase Manhattan Corp,
included with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co; Citicorp, included with Citigroup Inc; Com-
paq Computer, included with Hewlett Packard Co.; Conoco, included with Cono-
coPhillips; DuPont E I De Nemours & Co, included with ConocoPhillips; GTE, in-
cluded with Verizon Communications Inc; Lucent, included with AT&T Corp.; Medco
Health, included with Merck & Co Inc; Mobil, included with ExxonMobil Corp; Pru-
dential Insurance, included with Prudential Financial Inc; Texaco, included with
Chevron Texaco Corp.
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Appendix 3B: Classification of Deferred Tax Assets
and Liabilities
Each deferred tax asset or liability category listed in a firms 10-K tax footnote is
classified into one of the following aggregate categories:
" Allowances for doubtful accounts
" Employee benefits
" Other (non-pension) post-employment benefits
* Pensions
* NOL carryforwards
" Foreign tax credit carryforwards
* Other tax credits and carryforwards
" International activity-related
" Inventory
" Restructuring, merger & acquisition







* Property, plant & equipment





Items that were too vague to categorize (e.g., 'other adjustments'), included multi-
ple categories (e.g., 'A/R and inventory reserves') or too unusual to warrant a category
(e.g., 'Bond Premiums') were classified as 'Other'.
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Appendix 3C: Example of Calculations using the
2004 10-K of Coca Cola Co.
Baseline calculations, corresponding to entries in our dataset and tables:
Pre-tax book income =$6222 Taxable income =current tax expense/0.35 =$1213/0.35
=$3466 Book-tax income gap =$6222 - $3466 =$2756 Temporary differences =de-
ferred tax expense/0.35 =$162/0.35 =$463 Permanent and other differences =book-
tax gap less temporary differences =$2756 -$463 =$2293
While we believe the deferred tax method of calculating temporary differences
suffers from fewer confounding factors than any other method, we present two al-
ternative methods below. They, like our deferred tax method, contain noise, not
bias.
Alternative Method I One alternative method of calculating temporary differences
uses the rate reconciliation to calculate permanent and other differences, and then
defines temporary differences as the resulting residual. Reconciling items total 12.9%
of pre-tax income. This translates to $803 tax dollars of permanent and other differ-
ences (12.9% x pre-tax income of $6222) or $2294 of permanent and other differences
($803/0.35) for Coca Cola Co. in 2004. When the firm discloses the current/deferred
break down for their total tax provision (i.e. current tax expense plus deferred tax
expense equals total tax provision), this alternative method results in the same figures
as calculated using the first method. However, jurisdiction-specific disclosures and
the tax effect of non-recurring items often do not include current/deferred specifics.
These disclosures confound this relationship and results in over- or under-stated tem-
porary differences relative to the deferred tax expense method.
Alternative Method II A third method of calculating temporary differences uses the
change in the net deferred tax position, divided by the tax rate. For example, for Coca
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Cola, this would equal ($671-$235)/0.35. This alternative method results in a higher
number than is calculated using the deferred tax expense. Text in the 10-K suggests
that the discrepancy is due to a valuation allowance booked against foreign deferred
tax assets. There are a number of other reasons why the change in deferred tax assets
may not equal the deferred tax expense, including mergers and acquisitions, change
in accounting standards and change in tax law or tax rates. As such, this method
may also result in over- or understated temporary differences relative to the deferred
tax method.
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
The Coca-Cola Company and Subsidiaries
Year Ended December 31, 2004 2003 2002
INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES AND CUMULATIVE
EFFECT OF ACCOUNTING CHANGE 6,222 5,495 5,499
Income taxes 1,375 1,148 1,523
NET INCOME BEFORE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
ACCOUNTING CHANGE 4,847 4,347 3,976
Cumulative effect of SFAS No. 142, net of income taxes:
Company operations - - (367)
Equity investees - - (559)
NET INCOME $ 4,847 $ 4,347 $ 3,050
Income tax expense (benefit) consists of the following (in millions):












A reconciliation of the statutory U.S. federal rate and effective rates is as follows:
Year Ended December 31, 2004 2003 2002
Statutory U.S. federal rate 35.0 % 35.0 % 35.0 %
State income taxes-net of federal benefit 1.0 0.9 0.9
Earnings in jurisdictions taxed at rates different
from the statutory U.S. federal rate (9.4)1,2 (10.6)' (6.0)
Equity income or loss (3.1 )3,4 (2.4) (2.0 )1O
Other operating charges (0.9)5 (1.1)9 -
Write-down/sale of certain bottling investments - - 0.7
Other-net (0.5)6 (0.9) (0.9)
Effective rates 22.1 % 20.9 % 27.7 %
The tax effects of temporary differences and carryforwards that give rise to deferred tax assets and





Property, plant and equipment
Trademarks and other intangible assets





Equity method investments (including translation adjustment)
Other liabilities
Benefit plans
Net operating/capital loss carryforwards
Other
Gross deferred tax assets
Valuation allowance
Total deferred tax assets'
2,522 2,457
(854) (630)
$ 1,668 $ 1,827
Deferred tax liabilities:
Property, plant and equipment
Trademarks and other intangible assets
Equity method investments (including translation adjustment)
Other liabilities
Other





Total deferred tax liabilities $ (1,794) $ (1,718)











$ (126) $ 109
